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@@ -40,9 +40,7 @@ Rebellion took to the streets of the UK in 2018, this was their message:
 The phrase 'sixth mass extinction event' categorises the present green crisis
 alongside the traditional 'big five' mass extinction events of geological
 history [@eb-extinctions], remnants of the catastrophic theory of geological
-time. Their 'Declaration of Rebellion' used the word 'catastrophe' twice,
-alongside words such as 'cataclysmic,' 'destruction,' 'crises,' 'dying planet,'
-and 'uninhabitable' to reinforce the image.
+time.
 
 Similarly, Greta Thunberg favours an imminent, catastrophic model of climate
 change:
@@ -50,9 +48,7 @@ change:
 > Around the year 2030, 10 years 252 days and 10 hours away from now, we will be
 > in a position where we set off an irreversible chain reaction beyond human
 > control, that will most likely lead to the end of our civilization as we know
-> it. That is unless, in that time, permanent and unprecedented changes in all
-> aspects of society have taken place, including a reduction of CO~2~ emissions
-> by at least 50 per cent. [@no-one-is-too-small, p. 82]
+> it. [@no-one-is-too-small, p. 82]
 
 Catastrophic models of ecological futures are so dominant, that it can be hard
 to imagine any other kind of story. This is eloquently demonstrated by the
@@ -90,7 +86,8 @@ now it is worth noting that some rhetors use allusions to the Apocalypse in orde
 to function as a catastrophic symbol.
 
 Recently, academics examining green rhetoric have raised concerns with green
-catastrophism. The first issue I will examine here is fatalism.
+catastrophism: namely, that it encourages fatalism, conservatism, and
+contributes to the 'death of politics.'
 
 It has been claimed green catastrophism is fatalistic: that the catastrophe is
 implicitly inevitable, thus encouraging despair over hope and therefore mere
@@ -98,30 +95,29 @@ ritual over action. To be sure, most green rhetors do not explicitly say this;
 rather, they tend to say the very opposite, that it is not too late to avert the
 catastrophe: that's why we have to act now! The problem is not that green
 rhetors _assert_ that the catastrophe is inevitable, but that inevitability is
-one of those symbols packaged together with the symbols of 'catastrophe,' and
-indeed 'apocalypse.'
+implicitly packaged into the symbol of 'catastrophe.'
 
 Part of this is due to the geological connotations of 'catastrophe.'
 Paleontologists speculate about the causes of historic mass extinctions:
 volcanic eruptions, asteroid strikes, cyclical climate fluctuations gone rogue?
 One thing's for sure, there's nothing the dinosaurs could have done to stop it.
 
-Some apocalyptic movements and worldviews have also promoted fatalisms. One
-notable contemporary movement is the modern pre-millenialist movement in the
+Some apocalyptic movements and worldviews have also promoted explicit fatalisms.
+One notable contemporary movement is the modern pre-millenialist movement in the
 USA. Pre-millenialists believe in the 'Rapture,' based on an interpretation of
-Thess 4:17: 'then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together
-with \[the dead in Christ\] in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air.'
-
-While pre-millenialists have traditionally been notable for rejecting the
-apocalyptic vision of the USA as the New Jerusalem of Rev 21, and therefore
-been at times able to point out distortions and injustices belonging to
-mainstream American patriotic ideology [@unveiling-empire, pp. 3-15], the
-pre-millenialist outlook is inescapably fatalist. As a result, when the 'social
-gospel' movement took off in the late nineteenth century, some
-pre-millenialists condemned the movement for failing to trust God's plan to
-redeem the world in the end-times and trying to redeem the world by inferior
-and vain human efforts instead [@unveiling-empire, p. 10]. Wes Howard-Brooke
-and Anthony Gwyther have observed this contradictory situation:
+Thess 4:17: 'then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with
+\[the dead in Christ\] in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air.'
+
+While pre-millenialists have been notable for rejecting the traditional
+apocalyptic vision of the USA as the New Jerusalem of Rev 21, and therefore been
+at times able to point out distortions and injustices belonging to mainstream
+American patriotic ideology [@unveiling-empire, pp. 3-15], the pre-millenialist
+outlook is inescapably fatalist. As a result, when the 'social gospel' movement
+took off in the late nineteenth century, some pre-millenialists condemned the
+movement for failing to trust God's plan to redeem the world in the end-times
+and trying to redeem the world by inferior and vain human efforts instead
+[@unveiling-empire, p. 10]. Wes Howard-Brooke and Anthony Gwyther have observed
+this situation, which can seem contradictory to outsiders:
 
 > \[…\] in the 1950s-1970s, pre-millenialists were also taking frequent aim at what
 > they saw as other U.S. cultural signs of the approaching End. Among their
@@ -136,112 +132,82 @@ and Anthony Gwyther have observed this contradictory situation:
 
 In the case of the green movement, a fatalistic outlook may, at best, lead to
 what Kvandal & Levy call 'ritualistic' behaviours: 'behaviours characterized by
-rigidity, compulsion, and goal demotion.' [@kvandal-2025] While this may not
-serve as an adequate account of ritual behaviours in general, the authors'
-point is this: green activists who hold a fatalistic outlook feel compelled to
-act in rigidly specific ways, even though they don't have a clear grasp on the
-practical outcomes of their behaviour.
+rigidity, compulsion, and goal demotion.' [@kvandal-2025] While this would
+struggle to hold up as an adequate account of ritual behaviours in general, the
+authors' point is this: green activists who hold a fatalistic outlook feel
+compelled to act in rigidly specific ways, even though they don't have a clear
+grasp on the practical outcomes of their behaviour.
 
 Calling on the cognitive science of religion, the authors assert that 'there is
 a general consensus that human beings tend to ritualize more of their behavior
 when they lose agency under conditions of stress, uncertainty, or hazards more
 generally.' They note the example of Greta Thunberg sailing across the Atlantic
-in a zero-carbon vessel to speak at the United Nations. The huge effort
-involved in that act seems disproportionate to the small impact had on
-greenhouse gas emissions. The authors also raise examples of civil disobedience
-motivated by climate pessimism. Fatalism might lead to politically productive
-behaviours. But the fact that ritualistic behaviours are severed from practical
-outcomes makes it a pretty bad bet:
+in a zero-carbon vessel to speak at the United Nations. The huge effort involved
+in that act seems disproportionate to the small impact on greenhouse gas
+emissions against simply flying to New York instead. Fatalism might lead to
+politically productive behaviours, and the authors mention examples of civil
+disobedience. But the fact that ritualistic behaviours are severed from
+practical outcomes makes it a pretty bad bet:
 
 > By not allowing for hope that the world can be salvaged, this form of social
 > activism provides outlets in which activists alleviate anxiety by obtaining a
 > (simulated) sense of agency in the face of an uncontrollable threat.
 > [@kvandal-2025, p. 701]
 
-Action directed at making you feel better might lead to change in your own
-life, but it is not necessarily going to solve the problem that made you feel
-anxious in the first place. Juli Gittinger has shown that fatalistic climate
-narratives have driven some people in the US to join the 'prepper' movement,
-accumulating stockpiles of essential goods, building emergency shelters,
-learning 'survival skills,' and collecting weapons to defend your family's
-patch from desperate outsiders. [@american-apocalyptic, see esp. chp. 3, 4]
-'Prepper' culture (which owes its existence to Cold War fears of all-out
-nuclear war [@american-apocalyptic, pp. 48-56] and is sometimes also pursued as
-a result of certain pre-millenialist beliefs [@unveiling-empire, p. 5]) might
-be a minority pursuit, but it is a response to the same apocalyptic
-storytelling which is a widespread phenomenon in mainstream American media:
-
-> The theme of _impending catastrophe_ \[…\] frames the news story
-> as more apocalyptic and therefore often becomes more sensationalized or highly
-> panic-driven. Add social media to this mix – where experts are often ignored
-> in favor of more polemic non-experts – and risk perception increases. Oddly
-> enough, impending catastrophe is less likely to alter behavior, instead
-> inspiring feelings of futility: we’re doomed, so why bother. Repeated exposure
-> to doomsday predictions can prevent us from taking action because ultimately
-> the effect of apocalyptic thinking generates a fear of existential threats
-> that are beyond our control – and thus unpreventable. [@american-apocalyptic, p. 60]
-
-If fatalistic narratives don't cause their audiences to resign themselves to the
-impending catastrophe, then they may also inspire resistance against those
-narratives and the people who tell them. If what someone is telling you is
-threatening to destroy the world as you know it, one way of coping with that
-violent threat is to find a way to dismiss the speaker's credibility.
-
-For example, Gill Ereaut and Nat Segnit document how some people in Britain
-respond to fatalistic narratives about the climate with what they call
-'settlerdom discourse.' [@warm-words pp. 7-8, cf. @warm-words-2 p. 21] By this,
-they mean a discourse implying that whatever isn't 'common sense' isn't
-credible. Using such a discourse, it is easy to dismiss alarmist climate
-rhetoric as 'doom-mongering.' Closely related is the discourse of 'British comic
-nihilism,' or, as they put it, the discourse of 'bugger it and open another
-bottle!'
-
-So, because catastrophic language tends to encourage a fatalist outlook, it
-fails when it convinces -- since 'why bother trying when we're all stuffed
-anyway?' -- and it fails when it doesn't -- since 'why pay attention to such
-excitable nonsense?'
+Action directed at making you feel better might lead to change in your own life,
+but it is not necessarily going to solve the problem that made you feel anxious
+in the first place. Juli Gittinger has shown that fatalistic climate narratives
+have driven some people in the US to join the 'prepper' movement, accumulating
+stockpiles of essential goods, building emergency shelters, learning 'survival
+skills,' and collecting weapons to defend your family's patch from desperate
+outsiders. [@american-apocalyptic, see esp. chp. 3, 4] 'Prepper' culture (which
+owes its existence to Cold War fears of all-out nuclear war
+[@american-apocalyptic, pp. 48-56] and is sometimes also pursued as a result of
+certain pre-millenialist beliefs [@unveiling-empire, p. 5]) might be a minority
+pursuit, but it is a response to the same apocalyptic storytelling which is a
+widespread phenomenon in mainstream American media. This media landscape
+neutralises what might have been active concern and transforms it into apathetic
+fatalism [@american-apocalyptic, p. 60].
 
 A second problem with catastrophic language is that it is conservative. Often,
-catastrophist narratives tacitly assume that everything was going well until
-The Catastrophe loomed its ugly head. This suggests that 'business as usual' is
-alright, and that a solution to the problem, by definition, means a return to
-normal. But if, as many political analysts contend, green harms are in fact an
-inevitable consequence of business as usual, such narratives then obstruct the
-radical political critique which will be necessary for a lasting solution to
-green issues.
-
-Christiana Figueres and Tom Rivett-Carnac provided one demonstration of this
-mindset in _The Future We Choose_, which begins with an imaginative description
-of two possible futures, one optimistic, one pessimistic. The optimistic vision
-described an anthropocene paradise, a vision of how the human project to
-transcend materiality might be finally accomplished by continuing technological
-progress. To take the comments on energy, for example:
-
-> In some ways, breaking up grids and decentralising power proved easy. We no
-> longer burn fossil fuels. There is some nuclear energy in those countries that
-> can afford the expensive technology, but most of our energy now comes from
-> renewable sources like wind, solar, geothermal, and hydro. \[…\] Because there
-> is no combustion cost, energy is basically free. It is also more abundant and
-> more efficiently used than ever. Smart tech prevents unnecessary energy
-> consumption, as artificial inteligence units switch off appliances and
-> machines when not in use. The efficiency of the system means that, with a few
-> exceptions, our quality of life has not suffered. In many respects, it has
-> improved. [@future-we-choose, chp. 3]
-
-This vision of the good life promotes the idea of technological progress driving
-increasing living standards, a rising tide lifting all boats. This narrative
-perpetuates the idea that more efficient technology can deliver a free lunch,
-while ignoring the fact that modern technological progress led to increased
-exploitation of workers and of nature. It accepts that the Earth has been
-domesticated, and advocates for the Earth to be domesticated even more. As
-Eileen Crist, discussing Anthropocene discourse, puts it:
-
-> The very concept of the Anthropocene crystallizes human dominion, corralling
-> the already-pliable-in-that-direction human mind into viewing our master
-> identity as manifestly destined, quasi-natural, and sort of awesome. The
-> Anthropocene accepts the humanization of Earth as reality, even though this is
-> still contestable, partially reversible, and worthy of resistance and of
-> inspiring a different vision. [@poverty-nomenclature, p. 25]
+catastrophist narratives tacitly assume that everything was going well until The
+Catastrophe loomed its ugly head. The urgency of the crisis means that
+established power structures must be supported to work at full throttle, and we
+certainly haven't got time to replace or radically transform them. But if, as
+many political analysts contend, green harms are in fact an inevitable
+consequence of business as usual, such narratives then obstruct the radical
+political critique which will be necessary for a lasting solution to green
+issues. For example, when a consortium of central banks commissioned a report
+on financing the global response to climate change, this is how that report
+opened:
+
+> Climate change is one of the most critical challenges facing humanity, with
+> far reaching consequences that threaten the well-being of people and the
+> planet. Current estimates for climate investment needs in \[emerging market
+> and developing economies\] are in the trillions, _with about 80-90 percent of
+> climate mitigation investments to be financed by the private sector as public
+> funding will be limited._ [@ngfs-dec-2023, p. 5, my emphasis]
+
+Where does this '80-90 percent' come from? The citation takes you to an IMF
+report on global financial stability. The relevant paragraph reads as follows:
+
+> Aligning capital flows on a low-carbon trajectory has become a critical policy
+> objective, including for financial stability, given that current renewable
+> energy investment and production fall grossly short of funding needed to meet
+> climate targets. A rapid acceleration of investment in low-carbon
+> energy infrastructure is needed, especially in emerging market and developing
+> economies. Private finance is key to achieving these objectives, while climate
+> and financial policies, such as a transition-oriented climate information
+> architecture, are complementary. The new Resilience and Sustainability Trust
+> can help eligible IMF members address longer-term structural challenges
+> generated by climate change. [@imf-apr-2023, p. 46]
+
+There is no mention of an '80 to 90 percent' figure. Doubtless, it is helpful as
+a rhetorical flourish to make the assertion seem more scientific that it really
+is: an ideological assumption that the neoliberal world order, in which
+governments are held hostage to markets, is permanent and inevitable. The figure
+of climate catastrophe functions here to attempt to foreclose radical
+imagination.
 
 So catastrophic language, apart from its fatalist tendencies, can shut down
 radical political discourses and thus discredit the best solutions to green
@@ -250,6 +216,15 @@ criticism of green catastrophism is that since green catastrophism reverberates
 strongly with 'Anthropocene' discourses, such rhetoric flattens out power
 relationships. This, say the critics, is the death of all genuine politics.
 
+Anthropocene discourse is catastrophic. The arrival of the Anthropocene means
+the end of the Holocene, defined as the time when the climate was hospitable to
+the growth of human civilization. The Anthropocene is thus inherently perceived
+as a threat to human survival. Climate change is conceived as a catastrophic
+consequence of greed driving human individuals to over-consume natural
+resources, especially fossil fuels. Critics, meanwhile, lambast such narratives,
+accusing them of deploying threats of catastrophe to distract from the
+importance of economic structure in driving the climate crisis.
+
 Andreas Malm and Alf Hornborg, to take one typical example, argue that the
 Anthropocene discourse of climate catastrophe emphasises the 'anthropos', the
 universal human subject, implying that social relations within the human species
@@ -265,17 +240,6 @@ the biological species, such as greed or the ability to make fire.
 > beings have caused global warming over the course of their _history_.
 > [@malm-hornborg-2014, pp. 65-66]
 
-Such thinking is dominant in popular thinking about climate change. Climate
-change is conceived as a product of human beings greedily over-exploiting
-natural resources, and in particular, burning fossil fuels. Anthropocene
-discourse is also almost always catastrophic: the arrival of the Anthropocene is
-equivalent to the end of the Holocene, defined as the time when the climate was
-hospitable to the growth of human civilization, but human beings were balanced
-against the powers of other species. Human domination has upset this imbalance,
-and the Anthropocene is thus inherently perceived as a threat to human survival.
-Most mainstream catastrophist narratives about climate change adopt this
-Anthropocene framing.
-
 In sum, green catastrophism is accused of encouraging a fatalist outlook,
 disarming radical discourses in favour of business as usual, and deeping harmful
 'post-politics' discourses by obscuring the importance of power relationships.