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diff --git a/bibliography.bib b/bibliography.bib index 7937b2c..28f54a1 100644 --- a/bibliography.bib +++ b/bibliography.bib @@ -1,3 +1,17 @@ +@report{ngfs-dec-2023, + title={Scaling Up Blended Finance for Climate Mitigation and Adaptation in Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs)}, + author={{Network for Greening the Financial System}}, + date={2023-12}, +} + +@report{imf-apr-2023, + title={Global Financial Stability Report}, + subtitle={Safeguarding Financial Stability amid High Inflation and Geopolitical Risks}, + date={2023-04}, + author={{International Monetary Fund}}, + address={Washington}, +} + @book{legacy, title={Legacy}, subtitle={How to Build the Sustainable Economy}, @@ -30,8 +44,6 @@ author={Stetler, Harrison}, date={2025-03-03}, journal={Jacobin}, - url={https://jacobin.com/2025/03/environmentalism-climate-activism-ngos-policy}, - urldate={2026-07-31}, } @article{blaser-2018, @@ -42,7 +54,6 @@ volume={19}, number={1}, pages={74--94}, - doi={10.1177/1463499618779745}, } @article{malm-hornborg-2014, @@ -53,7 +64,6 @@ number={1}, volume={1}, pages={62--69}, - doi={10.1177/2053019613516291}, } @book{ajl-gnd, @@ -125,6 +135,7 @@ editor={Helm, Dieter and Hepburn, Cameron}, publisher={Oxford University Press}, address={Oxford}, + date={2009}, } @book{reason-dark-time, @@ -181,7 +192,7 @@ publisher={{PoliticsHome}}, } -@unpublished{thatcher-1990-05-15, +@misc{thatcher-1990-05-15, author={Thatcher, Margaret}, date={1990-05-15}, note={Speech quoted in Leggett (1990), p. 11}, @@ -280,21 +291,19 @@ } @report{parl-fuel-escalator, - url={https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN03015/SN03015.pdf}, title={Taxation of road fuels}, subtitle={the road fuel escalator (1993-2000)}, date={2011-01-21}, - urldate={2026-07-24}, author={Seely, Anthony}, publisher={House of Commons Library}, address={Westminster}, note={Standard Note: SN3015}, } -@article{bbc-fuel-duty-cut, +@online{bbc-fuel-duty-cut, url={http://news.bbc.co.uk/news/vote2001/hi/english/newsid_1323000/1323018.stm}, urldate={2026-07-24}, - title={Q&A: the fuel tax cut}, + title={{Q&A: the fuel tax cut}}, publisher={BBC News}, date={2001-05-10}, } @@ -305,11 +314,12 @@ title={Energy Profits Data}, subtitle={June 2025}, publisher={Energy Profits}, + date={2025-06}, } @book{no-planet-b, author={Berners-Lee, Mike}, - title={There Is No Planet B}, + title={{There Is No Planet B}}, subtitle={a handbook for the make or break years}, date={2021}, edition={Updated edition}, @@ -332,7 +342,6 @@ title={The meaning of the Anthropocene}, subtitle={why it matters even without a formal geological definition}, author={Zalasiewicz, Jan and Thomas, Julia Adeney and Waters, Colin N. and Turner, Simon and Head, Martin J.}, - doi={https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-024-02712-y}, } @book{boxall-rev, @@ -436,7 +445,6 @@ date={2014}, volume={122}, pages={681--694}, - doi={10.1007/s10584-013-1018-7}, title={Institutionalizing delay}, subtitle={foundation funding and the creation of U.S. climate change counter-movement organizations}, author={Brulle, Robert J.}, @@ -509,7 +517,6 @@ number={2}, publisher={Michigan State University Press}, pages={195--228}, - doi={10.1353/rap.2010.0222}, } @article{hulac-jul-2016, @@ -525,7 +532,6 @@ bookeditor={Collins, John J.}, author={Flannery, Frances}, date={2014}, - doi={10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199856497.013.007}, pages={104--120}, publisher={Oxford University Press}, address={Oxford}, @@ -640,10 +646,9 @@ urldate={2026-06-10}, } -@inreference{oed-catastrophe, +@inbook{oed-catastrophe, title={catastrophe (n.)}, booktitle={Oxford English Dictionary}, - doi={10.1093/OED/1027188634}, date={2026-06}, publisher={Oxford University Press}, address={Oxford}, @@ -705,7 +710,6 @@ journal={Journal of Cleaner Production}, volume={149}, pages={321--324}, - doi={10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.02.016}, date={2017-02-03}, } @@ -720,7 +724,7 @@ @report{limits-to-growth, date={1972}, - author={Meadows, Donella H. and Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows and Randers, Jørgen and Behrens III, William}, + author={Meadows, Donella H. and Meadows, Dennis L. and Randers, Jørgen and Behrens III, William}, publisher={Universe Books}, address={New York}, title={The Limits to Growth}, @@ -766,16 +770,12 @@ title={BP: Coloring Public Opinion?}, journal={Adweek}, date={2008-01-14}, - url={https://perma.cc/DF67-UCXG}, - urldate={2026-06-04}, } @article{safire-2008, author={Safire, William}, date={2008-02-17}, title={On Language: Footprint}, - url={https://perma.cc/U8QC-RR22}, - urldate={2026-06-04}, journal={The New York Times Magazine}, address={New York}, } @@ -784,8 +784,6 @@ author={{The New York American Marketing Association}}, date={2007}, title={2007 Effie Awards}, - url={http://current.effie.org/downloads/org_downloads/2007_Awards_Journal.pdf}, - urldate={2026-06-04}, } @book{future-we-choose, @@ -1472,7 +1470,6 @@ volume={60}, year={2025}, author={Kvandal, Halvor and Levy, Gabriel}, - address={CAMBRIDGE}, issn={0591-2385}, journal={Zygon}, } diff --git a/chapter0.md b/chapter0.md index ee4211e..c535b18 100644 --- a/chapter0.md +++ b/chapter0.md @@ -1,25 +1,13 @@ ## Introduction My thesis is that green rhetoric would be more successful were it to be more -apocalyptic, not less. In order for this claim to be coherent, 'green rhetoric' -must denote a real thing: some real set of language-events. Furthermore, 'green -rhetoric' must be more than an arbitrary set of language-events, with nothing -more binding them together than my own imagination: green rhetoric must display -some shared linguistic characteristics and agendas. Else making claims about its -linguistic characteristics, or identifying when it would or wouldn't be -'successful', would be incoherent. So, let me do just that. +apocalyptic, not less. -By 'green rhetoric', I'm referring, of course, to a kind of rhetoric. While the -word 'rhetoric' is often used to suggest empty or untrustworthy political -speech, my sense is much broader than this. By 'rhetoric', I simply mean an -utterance with an agenda. A speaker counts as a 'rhetor', and is producing -'rhetoric', just when they are putting forth an utterance (or writing, or -non-verbal communication) with the intention of causing their audience to make -something happen as a result of their utterance. 'Rhetoric' in this sense is a -very broad category of language. A politician making a speech, of course, might -count as a rhetor, but so might a military officer issuing an order, or a lover -seducing their partner to bed, or a friend texting to a group chat: 'pub quiz -tn?' +While the word 'rhetoric' is often used to suggest empty or untrustworthy +political speech, my sense is much broader than this. By 'rhetoric', I mean an +utterance with an agenda. A speaker counts as a 'rhetor' in this sense when they +are putting forth language with the intention of causing their audience to make +something happen. By 'green', I am narrowing down that very broad category to specifically the political rhetoric belonging to a particular historical situation: the green @@ -29,21 +17,18 @@ movement^[We could use a range of epithets in the place of 'green': prefer the name 'green' to refer to this movement and the closely-related cluster of issues which these names represent.]. -The green movement began in the 1960s. Major institutions rapidly gained mass -membership, especially among the urban professional middle classes, in many -Western nations [@sutton-environment, p. 103]. Rachel Carson's _Silent Spring_ -caused a huge public controversy and thus helped to kick green rhetoric up to -the highest level of politics in the US and other countries [@silent-spring, pp. -122-124]. Carson made use of well-established forms of language which -distinguished between 'nature' and 'civilisation', and called on her audience to -protect pristine nature from the clutches of corrupting civilisation. This kind -of rhetoric proliferated, and in its wake followed wave upon wave of -legislation. Just to give a flavour just of US federal legislation in the decade +In the 1960s, major environmental institutions rapidly gained mass membership, +especially among the urban professional middle classes, in many Western nations, +forming the basis of the modern green movement [@sutton-environment, p. 103]. +Rachel Carson's _Silent Spring_ caused a huge public controversy over the use of +poison to control alleged environmental threats, and thus helped to kick green +rhetoric up to the highest level of politics in the US and other countries +[@silent-spring, pp. 122-124]. In its wake followed wave upon wave of +legislation. To sample just some of the US federal legislation in the decade following _Silent Spring_: - Clean Air Act 1963 - Wilderness Act 1964 -- National Emissions Standards Act 1965 - National Environmental Policy Act 1969 - Occupational Safety and Health Act 1970 - Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 1972 @@ -67,16 +52,7 @@ order to make her point, she adopted an explicitly nuclear framing: > In this now universal contamination of the environment, chemicals are the > sinister and little-recognized partners of radiation in changing the very -> nature of the world – the very nature of its life. Strontium 90, released -> through nuclear explosions into the air, comes to earth in rain or drifts down -> as fallout, lodges in soil, enters into the grass or corn or wheat grown -> there, and in time takes up its abode in the bones of a human being, there to -> remain until his death. Similarly, chemicals sprayed on croplands or forests -> or gardens lie long in soil, entering into living organisms, passing from one -> to another in a chain of poisoning and death. Or they pass mysteriously by -> underground streams until they emerge and, through the alchemy of air and -> sunlight, combine into new forms that kill vegetation, sicken cattle, and work -> unknown harm on those who drink from once-pure wells. [@silent-spring, p. 17] +> nature of the world – the very nature of its life. [@silent-spring, p. 17] At times, governments, particularly in nuclear-armed NATO states such as the US and the UK, distributed public information campaigns informing citizens on how @@ -115,25 +91,17 @@ and concluded in response to what it called the 'greenhouse threat' that 'the prospects of future environmental security being compromised by global warming are now so real as to make adoption of a precautionary response imperative – in other words, policy should focus on buying insurance' [@greenpeace-report, p. -460]. The word choice – 'threat,' 'security,' 'insurance' – all coheres better -with the mental model of an impending instantaneous event than an epoch of -gradual and persistent change. +460]. -This, then, is green rhetoric. Green rhetoric is that produced by people -associated with the green movement in order to bring about solutions to that -movement's issues. The green movement, in turn, is a predominantly urban, -professional middle-class Western political movement which emerged in the 1960s -to protect 'nature' against the encroachment of 'civilisation', and which has -now adopted climate change as a 'master frame' for its issues. - -In recent decades, many of the most important political demands of the green -movement have not been realised, and many scholars have supposed that green -rhetoric is not fulfilling its proper function of delivering change. In this -rest of this dissertation, I will first explore why it might be that green -rhetoric is failing to deliver political change, before exploring in more detail -one particular allegation: green rhetoric isn't working because it is too -apocalyptic. I will argue that this diagnosis is unhelpful and untrue. In -contrast, I will argue not only that green rhetors must continue to use -apocalyptic end-of-the-world language, but that they must draw deeper on other -aspects of apocalyptic language which have been heretofore neglected by green -rhetors, if they are to play their proper part in delivering political change. +This is where green rhetoric stands today. In recent decades, many of the most +important political demands of the green movement have not been realised, and +many scholars have supposed that green rhetoric is not fulfilling its proper +function of delivering change. In this rest of this dissertation, I will first +explore why it might be that green rhetoric is failing to deliver political +change, before exploring in more detail one particular allegation: green +rhetoric isn't working because it is too apocalyptic. I will argue that this +diagnosis is unhelpful and untrue. In contrast, I will argue not only that green +rhetors must continue to use the motif of catastrophe most strongly associated +with apocalyptic, but they must draw deeper on other aspects of apocalyptic +language which have been heretofore neglected by green rhetors, if they are to +play their proper part in delivering political change. diff --git a/chapter1.md b/chapter1.md index 53f30e7..4926b27 100644 --- a/chapter1.md +++ b/chapter1.md @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ ## Chapter 1 -Since the 1990s, the green movement has been on the back foot. There have of +Since the 1980s, the green movement has been on the back foot. There have of course been many green successes on the local scale. But, in stark contrast to the 1960s and 1970s, when the green lobby succeeded in delivering strong government legislation to protect clean air, water, and establish nature -reserves, in the last thirty years, most of the key social-scale demands of the +reserves, in the last few decades, most of the key social-scale demands of the green movement have not been met, and even some of those earlier successes have been partially rolled back. @@ -39,7 +39,10 @@ and if the solution is to be credible, the rhetor will be best placed if they have accurately identified the root causes of the problem. There are problems with dominant green rhetoric from beginning to end of this -process. First, green rhetoric mis-diagnoses the problem. Rhetors imply that the +process: rhetors mis-diagnose the root causes of the problem, propose solutions +which are not credible, and mis-identify their audience. + +First, green rhetoric mis-diagnoses the problem. Rhetors imply that the root cause of green evils is the combined choices, and particularly the consumption choices, of all the world's individuals. @@ -47,17 +50,16 @@ So, when Christiana Figueres and Tom Rivett-Carnac come to recommend ten actions for their readers to take to fight climate change, coming in at number 4 (after 'Let Go of the Old World,' 'Face Your Grief but Hold a Vision of the Future,' and 'Defend the Truth') is 'See Yourself as a Citizen – Not as a Consumer.' The -problem is that we're consuming too much. The solution is to change the -psychology which causes over-consumption. +problem is that 'we' (that is, the universal human individual) are consuming too +much. The solution is to change the psychology which causes over-consumption. > Much of what we buy is intended to enhance our sense of identity. Particular > brands of clothes, soap, cookies, televisions, and cars and designed with a > _tribe_ in mind, their attributes carefully cultivated by the consumer goods -> companies that sell the products. Identity and consumption keep moving closer -> together. In the UK, for example, the average person consumes more than 65 -> pounds of clothes every year, equivalent to about five loads of laundry. These -> purchases are driven mainly by the fact that fashion trends change every -> season. [@future-we-choose, p. 118] +> companies that sell the products. \[…\] In the UK, for example, the average +> person consumes more than 65 pounds of clothes every year, equivalent to about +> five loads of laundry. These purchases are driven mainly by the fact that +> fashion trends change every season. [@future-we-choose, p. 118] They're not alone in emphasising individual psychology as a root cause of climate change. For example, writing about climate change with TV co-host Chris @@ -75,20 +77,19 @@ inviting people to think differently about a political issue like climate change can be perceived as a personal attack, preventing people from thinking rationally. [@back-to-nature, pp. 32-33] -This analysis assumes that the problem is one for the universal individual -human. It is 'our human reluctance' that has to be addressed. Having identified -a psychological problem – why can't human beings like you and me act rationally -when presented with the facts? – it's natural to seek a psychological solution. -This only makes sense if, as soon as 'we' (whoever that is) start behaving -sensibly, everyone else that matters will follow our lead. +This analysis identifies a psychological problem – why can't human beings like +you and me act rationally when presented with the facts? Having done so, it's +natural to seek a psychological solution. But identifying the root cause in +psychology only makes sense if, as soon as 'we' start behaving sensibly, +everyone else that matters will follow our lead. > Remember, you're in the driving seat and the corporations and big companies > are your wheels. If you turn right, they will turn right too. Eventually. > [@back-to-nature, p. 95] Fellow nature writer Benedict Macdonald extends this idea, that green harms are -driven by consumption, into a sweeping grand history of the human race from -primeval time: +driven by 'our' consumption, into a sweeping grand history of the human race +from primeval time: > \[…] we became systematic, methodical and determined in our eradication of > some cornerstone species \[…] By the Middle Ages, our desire to tame the @@ -103,42 +104,22 @@ primeval time: > movement was nascent \[…] it would take further decades before, at last, the > Ape Aware would emerge. [@cornerstones, pp. 200-202] -In Macdonald's account, the reason 'we' – as if all humans have always had the -same powers and interests – caused so much harm to the non-human world is -because 'we' stole stuff to make 'us' richer: land, trees, food, water. Thus -'our' consumption is what drives ecological catastrophe. +In Macdonald's account, the reason 'we' caused so much harm to the non-human +world is because 'we' stole stuff to make 'us' richer: land, trees, food, water. +Thus 'our' consumption is what drives ecological catastrophe. The idea that green harms are driven by consumption is further reinforced with the language of 'carbon footprinting.' The idea seems innocuous enough: tot up the carbon emissions produced in the process of producing all the goods and services consumed by a person, and you've got their 'carbon footprint,' their -personal contribution to global carbon dioxide emissions. - -WWF-UK offers a popular carbon footprint calculator on their website -[@wwf-footprint-calculator]. I'm promised that although 'our world is in crisis -\[…\] it's up to us to fix it' and I'm encouraged to 'take your first step with -our UK based environmental footprint calculator.' With each question, it ekes on -a little more guilt: how many flights did you take this year? How much did you -spend in your car last week? When's the last time you bought large electricals? -How much do you spend on clothes, or beauty products, in an average month? I did -my best to max out on every question. At the end, I'd chocked up over 39 tonnes -of CO~2~. I was duly informed that I was just under four times more evil than -the UK average. Not to worry, I can install their My Footprint App. - -> We’ve seen the devastating impact that human activity can have on the natural -> world, but it doesn’t have to be this way. We can build a better world by all -> making small changes in our everyday lives. \[…\] WWF-UK’s My Footprint app is -> your hub for positive change. Using this app is a step in the right direction -> to help our planet and keep you motivated to make sustainable choices. -> [@wwf-my-footprint] - -This rhetoric is clear: human beings (that's me) are wreaking havoc, and I am -contributing more than my fair share to the mayhem. But if we all play our part, -by following simple tips to change how we choose to consume goods and services, -together we'll make a big difference. I just need to do my bit. - -By calling on people to reduce their 'carbon footprint,' the rhetor suggests -that global carbon dioxide emissions are determined by the aggregation of every +personal contribution to global carbon dioxide emissions. WWF publishes a free +carbon calculator on their website and in the Apple and Google app stores +[@wwf-footprint-calculator; wwf-my-footprint]. The concept was first popularised +by an Effie-winning advertising campaign run by British Petroleum [@effies-2007; +@kaufman-2020]. + +By calling on people to reduce their 'carbon footprint,' rhetors suggest that +global carbon dioxide emissions are determined by the aggregation of every individual's consumption choices, plus a bit extra for whatever can't be directly linked to consumption. This analysis acknowledges inequality, but only insofar as people have unequal spending power. @@ -181,28 +162,80 @@ a day managing this industrial capitalist enterprise and only perhaps forty minutes commuting to work—so why do we only pay attention to the latter?' [@climate-change-class-war, p. 16] -The idea that carbon footprinting shifts blame from producers to consumers isn't -just a left-wing conspiracy theory. The fossil fuel industry thinks so, too, and -has bet huge amounts of money on this very strategy. In the early 2000s, BP -Petroleum spent hundreds of millions of dollars on their 'Beyond Petroleum' ad -campaign, for which Madison Avenue moguls Ogilvie & Mathers won a gold Effie -award. [@effies-2007] As part of this effort, they popularised the carbon -footprint calculator, which had previously been an obscure concept. -[@bp-carbon-calculator; @don-miller-bp; @safire-2008; @solman-2008; -@supran-2021; @kaufman-2020] +Taking an alternative approach, many green rhetors advocate for a simple +programme: listen to the science, then act rationally. This call to action +suggests that the root cause of the relevant problems is that some relevant +actors are not responding rationally to the scientific evidence. + +This is a dialectic favoured by the star climate campaigner, Greta Thunberg. In +February 2019, she spoke to a gathering of EU civil servants in Brussels: + +> We know that most politicians don't want to talk to us. Good, we don't want to +> talk to them either. We want them to talk to the scientists instead. +> [@no-one-is-too-small, pp. 53-54] + +In September of the same year, while the US government was halfway through the +4-year process of withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, she spoke at the US +Congress. In a speech which repeatedly referenced Martin Luther King Junior's 'I +have a dream' speech, she pleaded with legislators: + +> Perhaps it is impossible. But looking at those numbers – looking at the +> current best available science signed by every nation – then I think that is +> precisely what we are up against. But you must not spend all of your time +> dreaming, or see this as some political fight to win. And you must not gamble +> your children's future on the flip of a coin. Instead, you must unite behind +> the science. [@no-one-is-too-small, pp. 122-123] + +In their 1996 rationalist-environmentalist call to arms, _Betrayal of Science +and Reason_, Paul and Anne Ehrlich were explicit about how they saw the link +between science and government policy: + +> In short, people should have faith in their own judgment when they've taken +> the time to examine different views of an issue and taken into account their +> own predispositions and prejudices. Then they can become activists—devote as +> much of their time as possible to improving the human condition. The +> scientific community needs help in re-plotting humanity's trajectory toward a +> sustainable future. [@betrayal-science-reason, p. 212] + +For such rhetors, the bogeyman is the 'science denier' or 'science fraudster'. +Much of _Betrayal and Science and Reason_ is taken up with naming, exposing, and +rebutting some of the authors' critics, whom they derogatively label +'brownlashes.' In Thunberg's speeches, she has repeatedly proclaimed the +narrative that 'we spoke the science and demanded that the people in power would +listen to and act on the science, but our political leaders didn't listen' +[@no-one-is-too-small, p. 134]. + +However, there's no particular reason to think that the fossil fuel industry is +scientifically incompetent or unable to act rationally. In fact, fossil fuel +companies are if anything astonishingly capable of mustering scientific and +technological resources to act rationally. Fossil fuel extraction makes +intensive use of technological and scientific resources, from the geological +surveying needed to identify reserves to the hydraulic engineering needed to +pump gas and oil from underground or subsea reservoirs. Despite these +technological and scientific challenges, fossil fuel companies among the world's +profitable. Adding together the most recent annual profits from the five largest +state-owned fossil fuel companies and the five largest public fossil fuel +companies produces a number well over $500 billion [@energy-profits-jun-25]. -Thus, green rhetors, in targeting individual consumption, mis-diagnose the root -cause of the problems they're trying to address. +Even the production of so-called 'fake science' can be seen as the result of the +fossil fuel industry acting rationally on the basis of the scientific evidence. +As I'll explore in more detail in chapter 4, the fossil fuel industry is +following the tobacco industry's strategies and even hiring the same PR +consultants in their campaign to use science to influence public opinion. The +problem for the world is not that people aren't listening to the science, but +rather that fossil fuel companies, and other business lobbies, have an interest +in poisoning the world, and powerful means of ensuring their interests are met. +So again, the 'listen to the science' line mis-diagnoses the root causes of +green issues, and thus fails to bring about change. Having mis-diagnosed the root causes of the problem, green rhetors too often go on to propose politically impossible solutions. The worst is simply to cut -consumption. Since _The Limits to Growth_ was published for the Club of Rome in -1972 [@limits-to-growth], bolstered by eco-classics such as _Small Is Beautiful_ -(1973) [@small-is-beautiful] and _The Population Bomb_ (1968) +individual consumption. Since _The Limits to Growth_ was published for the Club +of Rome in 1972 [@limits-to-growth], bolstered by eco-classics such as _Small Is +Beautiful_ (1973) [@small-is-beautiful] and _The Population Bomb_ (1968) [@population-bomb], the green movement has frequently emphasised a message of -austerity or 'de-growth,' echoing the austerity rhetoric which dominated the -cost-of-living discourse in the 1970s and since that time -[@climate-change-class-war, pp. 158-159]. +austerity, echoing the austerity rhetoric which dominated the cost-of-living +discourse in the 1970s and since [@climate-change-class-war, pp. 158-159]. So, in 2006, George Monbiot set out his manifesto for putting the UK through a 90% cut in greenhouse gas emissions. While Monbiot acknowledged that austerity @@ -223,11 +256,12 @@ ones to save the climate: > [@heat, p. 22] Two fans, Sharon Astyk and Miranda Edel, inspired by the book, set out in 2007 -to reduce their household consumption to 10% of the US average. In response to -Monbiot's observation that 'people don't riot for austerity,' they called their -personal austerity campaign a 'Riot for Austerity' and blogged about their +to reduce their household carbon footprint to 10% of the US average. In response +to Monbiot's observation that 'people don't riot for austerity,' they called +their personal austerity campaign a 'Riot for Austerity' and blogged about their efforts online, finding hundreds of people from around the world joining them in -their 'riot.' As Chris Rootes observed, in spite of their impressive efforts, the movement had very little impact. +their 'riot.' As Chris Rootes observed, in spite of their impressive efforts, +the movement had very little impact. > This action, interesting though it is, scarcely resembled a riot, or, indeed, > any other form of collective action. It was a series of individual efforts to @@ -249,28 +283,10 @@ services. Christiana Figueres and Tom Rivett-Carnac implore their readers: 'How will a working class that often struggles to pay for basic services like heat and electricity respond to such demands?' asks Matt Huber -[@climate-change-class-war, p. 170]. According to the Trussel Trust, in 2024, -10.4 million adults and 3.8 million children in the UK skimped on food or had no -way to re-stock an empty cupboard [@hunger-uk-2024]. National Energy Action -estimated that in 2023, 15.2% of UK households were setting their thermostat -dangerously cold, more than double the rate from the year before -[@nea-nov-2024]. - -Millions more stand on the precipice of hardship. Citizens Advice reports that -the mean UK household can only afford to set 5% of their income aside for -savings – and that's the mean. The result is that since the advent of austerity -in the early 2010s, households have been draining their savings, leaving them -exposed to financial shocks, like not getting as many shifts as they hoped, or -having to call the plumber out [@ca-thin-ice]. The Financial Conduct Authority -classifies as quarter of UK households as having 'low financial resilience' and -estimates that barely half have enough cash to make it 3 months without -borrowing if their main source of income were cut off [@financial-lives-2024]. - -For many, the call to 'buy less' is not 'liberating,' because it's the call of -the bailiff. It's hardly surprising that the de-growth movement has -remained largely academic, with little impact on politics, and indeed a vague -grasp on what de-growth policy would actually mean in practice or who you could -possibly convince to make it happen. [@vansintjan-2019; @cosme-2017] +[@climate-change-class-war, p. 170]. Most consumption for most people is not +discretionary even in the Global North, and this is even more true in the Global +South. There is no feasible route to persuading people to impose voluntary +austerity upon themselves en masse. Another favourite of green rhetors is to propose smart market-based policies, mainly taxing carbon, aimed at tweaking the incentives for private capital to @@ -279,127 +295,33 @@ with eloquent experts like Sir Dieter Helm [@legacy] who argues that a sustainable economy must observe what he calls the 'polluter-pays principle.' However, too often, smart market tweaks are proposed which exacerbate market injustice, effectively levying the cost of economic transformation on those -least able to pay. This is not politically sustainable. +already squeezed by markets. This is not politically sustainable. In March 1993, for example, Norman Lamont announced a fuel price 'escalator', promising to gradually increase fuel duty, partly in order to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. A tobacco escalator followed in November. However, amidst criticism that the fuel duty was regressive and ineffective and protests from lorry drivers, Gordon Brown was forced in March 2000 to rescind the escalator -and reduce fuel duty [@parl-fuel-escalator; @bbc-fuel-duty-cut]. In 2018, the -'gilets jaunes' protest movement brought France to a standstill, the protests -having been triggered by the annual implementation of a similar fuel price -escalator scheme bequeathed to Emmanuel Macron by the previous government, -similarly motivated by environmental concerns. Despite Macron's strong political -position at the beginning of the protests, he was forced to roll back the tax -increases alongside other concessions to the protesters [@bbc-gilets-jaune]. - -So, while smart market fixes might work in theory, they are too often divorced +and reduce fuel duty [@parl-fuel-escalator; @bbc-fuel-duty-cut]. In 2018, +Emmanuel Macron suffered a huge loss to his political authority after a similar +fuel duty policy bequeathed to him by a previous government sparked the 'gilets +jaunes' civil disobedience movement [@bbc-gilets-jaunes]. + +So, while smart market fixes might work on paper, they are too often divorced from any politically sustainable programme. Thus, here too, green rhetoric has failed to demonstrate to their audience that the change they advocate will be good for them, and thus their proposals are politically impossible. -Taking another approach, many green rhetors advocate for a simple programme: -listen to the science, then act rationally. This call to action suggests that -the root cause of the relevant problems is that some relevant actors are not -responding rationally to the scientific evidence. - -This is a dialectic favoured by the star climate campaigner, Greta Thunberg. In -February 2019, she spoke to a gathering of EU civil servants in Brussels: - -> We know that most politicians don't want to talk to us. Good, we don't want to -> talk to them either. We want them to talk to the scientists instead. -> [@no-one-is-too-small, pp. 53-54] - -In September of the same year, while the US government was halfway through the -4-year process of withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, she spoke at the US -Congress. In a speech which repeatedly referenced Martin Luther King Junior's 'I -have a dream' speech, she pleaded with legislators: - -> Perhaps it is impossible. But looking at those numbers – looking at the -> current best available science signed by every nation – then I think that is -> precisely what we are up against. But you must not spend all of your time -> dreaming, or see this as some political fight to win. And you must not gamble -> your children's future on the flip of a coin. Instead, you must unite behind -> the science. [@no-one-is-too-small, pp. 122-123] - -In their 1996 rationalist-environmentalist call to arms, _Betrayal of Science -and Reason_, Paul and Anne Ehrlich were explicit about how they saw the link -between science and government policy: - -> In short, people should have faith in their own judgment when they've taken -> the time to examine different views of an issue and taken into account their -> own predispositions and prejudices. Then they can become activists—devote as -> much of their time as possible to improving the human condition. The -> scientific community needs help in re-plotting humanity's trajectory toward a -> sustainable future. [@betrayal-science-reason, p. 212] - -The spectre of the 'science denier' or 'science fraudster' has traditionally -served as the main scapegoat of green rhetoric. Much of _Betrayal and Science -and Reason_ is taken up with naming, exposing, and rebutting some of their -critics, whom they derogatively label 'brownlashes.' In Thunberg's speeches, she -has repeatedly proclaimed the narrative that 'we spoke the science and demanded -that the people in power would listen to and act on the science, but our -political leaders didn't listen' [@no-one-is-too-small, p. 134]. Dale Jamieson, -a philosopher at New York University, asked in 2014 why there had been so little -social-scale action to address the problems of climate change, and concluded -that the main factors were as follows: - -> We live in a society in which there is a cultural chasm between scientists and -> policy-makers. Most of us, including scientists, are largely confused about -> the relations between facts and values, and science and policy. Many of us are -> scientifically ignorant, and large sums have been spent to further confuse and -> misinform us. This has occurred against the background of rising cynicism, -> eroding respect for Enlightenment values, and dysfunctional political systems. -> Making things worse, climate change presents us with the largest collective -> action problem that humanity has ever faced, one that is extended both in space -> and time. It is not the sort of problem that Mother Nature raised us to solve -> or even to notice. [@reason-dark-time, pp. 103-104] - -However, there's no particular reason to think that the fossil fuel industry is -scientifically incompetent or unable to act rationally. In fact, fossil fuel -companies are if anything astonishingly capable of mustering scientific and -technological resources to act rationally. Fossil fuel extraction makes -intensive use of technological and scientific resources, from the geological -surveying needed to identify reserves to the hydraulic engineering needed to -pump gas and oil from underground or subsea reservoirs. Despite these -technological and scientific challenges, fossil fuel companies among the world's -profitable. Adding together the most recent annual profits from the five largest -state-owned fossil fuel companies and the five largest public fossil fuel -companies produces a number well over $500 billion [@energy-profits-jun-25]. - -Even the production of so-called 'fake science' can be seen as the result of the -fossil fuel industry acting rationally on the basis of the scientific evidence. -As has been pointed out time and time again, the fossil fuel industry is -following the tobacco industry's strategies and even hiring the same PR -consultants in their campaign to use science to influence public opinion. Their -borrowed tactics include manufacturing uncertainty by funding contrarian -scientific research, giving cash to scientists who publicly promote contrarian -points of view in the media, calling for more research as a delaying tactic, and -so-called 'information laundering' -- using secret donations to thinktanks with -opaque financial models to hide their involvement in the production of -information favourable to their bottom line [@smoke-mirrors-hot-air]. - -The problem for the world is not that people aren't listening to the science, -but rather that fossil fuel companies, and other business lobbies, have an -interest in poisoning the world, and powerful means of ensuring their interests -are met. - -\[TODO: how does 'listen to the science' lead to a practical call to action?\] - -So again, the 'listen to the science' line mis-diagnoses the root causes of -green issues, and thus fails to bring about change. - Finally, having mis-diagnosed the root causes of the issues and proposed solutions their audience cannot support, green rhetors fail to properly identify an audience that can make a difference. As I've already shown, green rhetors have a tendency to address an unspecified -'we', suggesting a universal human citizen, implying that for all relevant +'we,' suggesting a universal human individual, implying that for all relevant purposes, everyone has the same interests and powers. Thus Chris Packham and -Megan McCubbin can talk about 'Ape Aware,' explicitly describing the -environmental movement as the up-and-coming stage in human evolution -[@cornerstones, p. 202]. +Megan McCubbin can announce the arrival of 'Ape Aware' [@cornerstones, p. 202], +and Christiana Figueres and Tom Rivett-Carnac of 'the next phase of human +evolution' [@future-we-choose, p. 62]. The word 'Anthropocene' tells a similar story. The word was coined by Paul Crutzen in 2000 in order to propose that the International Geosphere-Biosphere @@ -409,31 +331,30 @@ extended discussion, the IGBP rejected Crutzen's proposal, but the word has nevertheless obtained currency far beyond the discipline of geology [@meaning-of-anthropocene]. -For many critics in the humanities, the term 'Anthropocene' describes the -present time as one characterised by human domination over the Earth. The choice -of 'anthropos,' or 'human,' as the focus point, rather than 'animal' or -'accountant,' implies that all humans take a roughly equal share of -responsibility for recent changes to Earth's ecosystems. Some critics have -proposed alternative terms such as 'Capitalocene' or 'Oligarchocene' so as to -more fairly reflect the social texture of the changing relationship of human -beings within Earth ecosystems [see e.g. @anthropocene-or-capitalocene, @blaser-2018]. But -Anthropocene, by describing the shaping power over Earth's ecosystems as the -undifferentiated 'anthropos', downplays the importance of the different powers -and interests between different humans. Thus, when a green rhetor uses the word -'Anthropocene', they suggest that you and I engage in environmental discourses -as a universalised human, that our location in social systems is not relevant to -our location in Earth ecosystems. +For many scholars, in the world beyond the technical debates of geological +technocrats, the term 'Anthropocene' describes the present time as one +characterised by human domination over the Earth. The choice of 'anthropos,' or +'human,' as the focus point, rather than 'animal' or 'accountant,' implies that +responsibility for recent changes to Earth's ecosystems are shared roughly +equally amongst all and only humans. + +Some critics have proposed alternative terms such as 'Capitalocene' or +'Oligarchocene' so as to more fairly reflect the social texture of the changing +relationship of human beings within Earth ecosystems [see e.g. +@anthropocene-or-capitalocene, @blaser-2018]. But Anthropocene, by describing +the shaping power over Earth's ecosystems as the undifferentiated 'anthropos', +downplays the importance of the different powers and interests between different +humans. Thus, when a green rhetor uses the word 'Anthropocene', they suggest +that you and I engage in environmental discourses as a universalised human, that +our location in social systems is not relevant to our location in Earth +ecosystems. For example, Mike Berners-Lee uses the word 'Anthropocene' liberally in his -public appearances. On his website, he offers to give private presentations -titled 'Investment in the Anthropocene' and 'Education for the Anthropocene', -and claims to have recently presented for clients including Microsoft, Shell, -and British Gas [@mike-berners-lee]. In his popular book, _There Is No Planet B_, -he describes the 'Anthropocene' as the time when ever-expanding human power comes -to dominate Earth's systems [@no-planet-b, pp. 2-3]. -Notice how seamlessly -Berners-Lee slips from talking about systems far larger than individuals into -talking about individual psychology: +public appearances. In his popular book, _There Is No Planet B_, he describes +the 'Anthropocene' as the time when ever-expanding human power comes to dominate +Earth's systems [@no-planet-b, pp. 2-3]. Notice how seamlessly Berners-Lee slips +from talking about systems far larger than individuals into talking about +individual psychology: > Some people I meet say energy has always gone up so it always must. Some say > it will come to a natural halt on its own. Some say our species will wipe @@ -449,52 +370,44 @@ talking about individual psychology: > are generally talking about exceptionally nasty experiences). > > All this strikes me as determinism. I am not a determinist. I reject any -> scientist telling me they can prove the absence of free will. I don’t actually -> think anyone can prove it either way, and I don’t see much point in a long -> discussion about it either. Like most people, I have at some point -> contemplated the possibility that I’m a figment of my own imagination and, of -> course, I can’t rule it out. However, my practical observation is that people -> who live as if they have free will tend to have more positive lives. To put it -> another way, determinism is a way of dodging the challenge of trying to do -> things that are difficult. +> scientist telling me they can prove the absence of free will. If the relevant problems are at the scale of global co-operation, energy systems, and the human species, it's not obvious that individual psychology is directly relevant. But in the 'Anthropocene' discourse, because it is the human that is at fault, it is easy to elide super-human social structures with the -human individual. Thus green rhetors apparently address the universal human. - -In reality, green rhetoric is primarily addressed to the Western middle classes. -This makes sense, since the green movement has historically been heavily -dominated by large non-governmental organisations such as the RSPB, National -Audubon Society, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, and WWF, to name but a few. -Typically, such NGOs don't depend on grassroots mass mobilisation, and indeed, -often struggle to mobilise their members on the rare occasions they try to do -so. Their business model is one of raising funds from mass membership and -corporate partnerships, even in more activist organisations like Greenpeace, -which largely function as 'protest businesses' [@rootes-2012, pp. 47-53]. Thus, -these NGOs are dominated by the Western middle classes who provide them with -money by taking out membership subscriptions and signing off corporate -partnerships. -Meanwhile, working-class concerns are often seen as less important or relevant -to environmentalism by the dominant NGOs [@working-class-env, p. 13]. +human individual. + +In reality, green rhetoric is primarily addressed not to an imaginary universal +human individual, but to the Western middle classes. This makes sense, since the +green movement has historically been heavily dominated by large non-governmental +organisations such as the RSPB, National Audubon Society, Friends of the Earth, +Greenpeace, and WWF, to name but a few. Typically, such NGOs don't depend on +grassroots mass mobilisation, and indeed, often struggle to mobilise their +members on the rare occasions they try to do so. Their business model is one of +raising funds from mass membership, even in more activist organisations like +Greenpeace, which largely function as 'protest businesses' [@rootes-2012, pp. +47-53]. Thus, these NGOs are dominated by the Western middle classes who provide +them with money by taking out membership subscriptions. Meanwhile, working-class +concerns are often seen as less important or relevant to environmentalism by the +dominant NGOs [@working-class-env, p. 13]. But what change is it that Western professional middle classes are capable of bringing about? If it's not reducing your individual 'carbon footprint' – which, as I've already discussed, is not a proposal with legs – green rhetors have a -tendency to propose actions which cannot be achieved by this audience, if they -can be achieved by anyone at all. - -One possibility is an international agreement. Greta Thunberg has spent a great -deal of her considerable campaigning energy attending international diplomatic -summits, such as UN Climate Change Conferences of the Parties (COPs) and the -World Economic Forum. _An Inconvenient Truth_, Al Gore's influential campaign -film, was primarily motivated by the desire to see the US get back on board with -the Kyoto agreement. Only in December, Fiona Harvey wrote a 10-year -retrospective of the Paris Agreement for the Guardian, in which she lauded its -achievements and declared, 'the question now is: can countries learn from the -mistakes of the past decade, in order to keep the Paris agreement alive in the -next?' [@harvey-2025-12-13] +tendency to propose actions which could only be achieved by the imaginary +universal human 'we,' and not by their actual audience. + +One common rallying cry is for an international agreement. Greta Thunberg has +spent a great deal of her considerable campaigning energy attending +international diplomatic summits, such as UN Climate Change Conferences of the +Parties (COPs) and the World Economic Forum. _An Inconvenient Truth_, Al Gore's +influential campaign film, was primarily motivated by the desire to see the US +get back on board with the Kyoto agreement. Only in December, Fiona Harvey wrote +a 10-year retrospective of the Paris Agreement for the Guardian, in which she +lauded its achievements and declared, 'the question now is: can countries learn +from the mistakes of the past decade, in order to keep the Paris agreement alive +in the next?' [@harvey-2025-12-13] The economist Dieter Helm has brilliantly summarised his scepticism of any global agreement on reducing greenhouse gas emissions: @@ -524,8 +437,11 @@ to default to activism, but this has no route to political success: > a call for street-level protests, invariably demanding that governments 'do > something' about climate change. [@or-something-worse, p. 111] -The net result is little political change and feelings of betrayal, demonstrated, -as eloquently as ever, by Thunberg: +Sadly, despite the great excitement protests often generate, they typically have +limited material impacts on governments. It is therefore easy for governments to +pay lip service to some grand ideals and move on. The net result is little +political change and feelings of betrayal, demonstrated, as eloquently as ever, +by Thunberg: > You have taken away my dreams and my childhood with your empty words. And yet > I'm one of the lucky ones. People are suffering. People are dying. Entire @@ -538,29 +454,26 @@ is so. Green rhetoric mis-diagnoses the root causes of the relevant problems by putting harms down to individual consumption choices and science denial, whereas in fact, these factors play a relatively small role in explaining ecological harm, and other factors, such as industrial production decisions shaped by -markets, may be much more significant. A mis-diagnosis of the problem leads to -false solutions: austerity or 'de-growth', or 'smart' market fixes, neither of -which are not politically sustainable. This in turn is due to green rhetors -failing to take account of the powers and interests of their audience. Rhetors -speak as if they are addressing a universal human collective capable of acting -rationally in the universal human interest, asking them to take actions such as -setting binding emissions targets or transferring wealth from 'rich nations' to -'poor nations.' But in fact, green rhetors do not address the universal human -collective, but rather the Western middle classes, who may not have the right -powers and interests for such exhortations to be feasible. - -This begs the question: if green rhetoric is failing, how might it be fixed? In -what follows, I will not be proposing a practical manifesto for transforming the -green movement, but I will be engaging in blue-sky thinking, imagining what a -more successful green rhetoric might look like. - -One common suggestion is that green rhetoric needs to be less catastrophic. Since -apocalyptic language is often assumed to be more or less equivalent to catastrophic -language, it is easy for commentators such as Frances Flannery to infer that -successful green rhetoric should avoid apocalyptic language. In chapter 3, I'll -argue that Flannery's argument ignores the possibilities of apocalyptic language, -including, and going well beyond, its catastrophic aspects. Then, in chapter 4, -I'll argue that green rhetors today must use John's rhetorical techniques in order -to make change happen. But first, in the following chapter, I'll explore how -catastrophism appears in contemporary green rhetoric, and why critics allege that -catastrophic language is counter-productive in this context. +markets, are much more significant. A mis-diagnosis of the problem leads to +false solutions: austerity or 'smart' market fixes, neither of which are not +politically sustainable. This in turn is due to green rhetors failing to take +account of the powers and interests of their audience. Rhetors speak as if they +are addressing an imaginary universal human 'we' capable of acting rationally in +the universal human interest, asking them to take actions such as creating +international agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But in fact, green +rhetors do not address that imaginary 'we,' but rather the Western middle +classes, who may not have the right powers and interests for such exhortations +to be feasible. + +This begs the question: if green rhetoric is failing, how might it be fixed? One +common suggestion is that green rhetoric needs to be less catastrophic. Since +apocalyptic language is often assumed to be more or less equivalent to +catastrophic language, it is easy for commentators such as Frances Flannery to +infer that successful green rhetoric should avoid apocalyptic language. In +chapter 3, I'll argue that such a conclusion ignores the possibilities of +apocalyptic language, including, and going well beyond, its catastrophic +aspects. Then, in chapter 4, I'll argue that green rhetors today must use John's +apocalyptic rhetorical techniques in order to make change happen. But first, in +the following chapter, I'll explore how catastrophism appears in contemporary +green rhetoric, and why critics allege that catastrophic language is +counter-productive in this context. diff --git a/chapter2.md b/chapter2.md index a80729d..4badb3b 100644 --- a/chapter2.md +++ b/chapter2.md @@ -40,9 +40,7 @@ Rebellion took to the streets of the UK in 2018, this was their message: The phrase 'sixth mass extinction event' categorises the present green crisis alongside the traditional 'big five' mass extinction events of geological history [@eb-extinctions], remnants of the catastrophic theory of geological -time. Their 'Declaration of Rebellion' used the word 'catastrophe' twice, -alongside words such as 'cataclysmic,' 'destruction,' 'crises,' 'dying planet,' -and 'uninhabitable' to reinforce the image. +time. Similarly, Greta Thunberg favours an imminent, catastrophic model of climate change: @@ -50,9 +48,7 @@ change: > Around the year 2030, 10 years 252 days and 10 hours away from now, we will be > in a position where we set off an irreversible chain reaction beyond human > control, that will most likely lead to the end of our civilization as we know -> it. That is unless, in that time, permanent and unprecedented changes in all -> aspects of society have taken place, including a reduction of CO~2~ emissions -> by at least 50 per cent. [@no-one-is-too-small, p. 82] +> it. [@no-one-is-too-small, p. 82] Catastrophic models of ecological futures are so dominant, that it can be hard to imagine any other kind of story. This is eloquently demonstrated by the @@ -90,7 +86,8 @@ now it is worth noting that some rhetors use allusions to the Apocalypse in orde to function as a catastrophic symbol. Recently, academics examining green rhetoric have raised concerns with green -catastrophism. The first issue I will examine here is fatalism. +catastrophism: namely, that it encourages fatalism, conservatism, and +contributes to the 'death of politics.' It has been claimed green catastrophism is fatalistic: that the catastrophe is implicitly inevitable, thus encouraging despair over hope and therefore mere @@ -98,30 +95,29 @@ ritual over action. To be sure, most green rhetors do not explicitly say this; rather, they tend to say the very opposite, that it is not too late to avert the catastrophe: that's why we have to act now! The problem is not that green rhetors _assert_ that the catastrophe is inevitable, but that inevitability is -one of those symbols packaged together with the symbols of 'catastrophe,' and -indeed 'apocalypse.' +implicitly packaged into the symbol of 'catastrophe.' Part of this is due to the geological connotations of 'catastrophe.' Paleontologists speculate about the causes of historic mass extinctions: volcanic eruptions, asteroid strikes, cyclical climate fluctuations gone rogue? One thing's for sure, there's nothing the dinosaurs could have done to stop it. -Some apocalyptic movements and worldviews have also promoted fatalisms. One -notable contemporary movement is the modern pre-millenialist movement in the +Some apocalyptic movements and worldviews have also promoted explicit fatalisms. +One notable contemporary movement is the modern pre-millenialist movement in the USA. Pre-millenialists believe in the 'Rapture,' based on an interpretation of -Thess 4:17: 'then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together -with \[the dead in Christ\] in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air.' - -While pre-millenialists have traditionally been notable for rejecting the -apocalyptic vision of the USA as the New Jerusalem of Rev 21, and therefore -been at times able to point out distortions and injustices belonging to -mainstream American patriotic ideology [@unveiling-empire, pp. 3-15], the -pre-millenialist outlook is inescapably fatalist. As a result, when the 'social -gospel' movement took off in the late nineteenth century, some -pre-millenialists condemned the movement for failing to trust God's plan to -redeem the world in the end-times and trying to redeem the world by inferior -and vain human efforts instead [@unveiling-empire, p. 10]. Wes Howard-Brooke -and Anthony Gwyther have observed this contradictory situation: +Thess 4:17: 'then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with +\[the dead in Christ\] in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air.' + +While pre-millenialists have been notable for rejecting the traditional +apocalyptic vision of the USA as the New Jerusalem of Rev 21, and therefore been +at times able to point out distortions and injustices belonging to mainstream +American patriotic ideology [@unveiling-empire, pp. 3-15], the pre-millenialist +outlook is inescapably fatalist. As a result, when the 'social gospel' movement +took off in the late nineteenth century, some pre-millenialists condemned the +movement for failing to trust God's plan to redeem the world in the end-times +and trying to redeem the world by inferior and vain human efforts instead +[@unveiling-empire, p. 10]. Wes Howard-Brooke and Anthony Gwyther have observed +this situation, which can seem contradictory to outsiders: > \[…\] in the 1950s-1970s, pre-millenialists were also taking frequent aim at what > they saw as other U.S. cultural signs of the approaching End. Among their @@ -136,112 +132,82 @@ and Anthony Gwyther have observed this contradictory situation: In the case of the green movement, a fatalistic outlook may, at best, lead to what Kvandal & Levy call 'ritualistic' behaviours: 'behaviours characterized by -rigidity, compulsion, and goal demotion.' [@kvandal-2025] While this may not -serve as an adequate account of ritual behaviours in general, the authors' -point is this: green activists who hold a fatalistic outlook feel compelled to -act in rigidly specific ways, even though they don't have a clear grasp on the -practical outcomes of their behaviour. +rigidity, compulsion, and goal demotion.' [@kvandal-2025] While this would +struggle to hold up as an adequate account of ritual behaviours in general, the +authors' point is this: green activists who hold a fatalistic outlook feel +compelled to act in rigidly specific ways, even though they don't have a clear +grasp on the practical outcomes of their behaviour. Calling on the cognitive science of religion, the authors assert that 'there is a general consensus that human beings tend to ritualize more of their behavior when they lose agency under conditions of stress, uncertainty, or hazards more generally.' They note the example of Greta Thunberg sailing across the Atlantic -in a zero-carbon vessel to speak at the United Nations. The huge effort -involved in that act seems disproportionate to the small impact had on -greenhouse gas emissions. The authors also raise examples of civil disobedience -motivated by climate pessimism. Fatalism might lead to politically productive -behaviours. But the fact that ritualistic behaviours are severed from practical -outcomes makes it a pretty bad bet: +in a zero-carbon vessel to speak at the United Nations. The huge effort involved +in that act seems disproportionate to the small impact on greenhouse gas +emissions against simply flying to New York instead. Fatalism might lead to +politically productive behaviours, and the authors mention examples of civil +disobedience. But the fact that ritualistic behaviours are severed from +practical outcomes makes it a pretty bad bet: > By not allowing for hope that the world can be salvaged, this form of social > activism provides outlets in which activists alleviate anxiety by obtaining a > (simulated) sense of agency in the face of an uncontrollable threat. > [@kvandal-2025, p. 701] -Action directed at making you feel better might lead to change in your own -life, but it is not necessarily going to solve the problem that made you feel -anxious in the first place. Juli Gittinger has shown that fatalistic climate -narratives have driven some people in the US to join the 'prepper' movement, -accumulating stockpiles of essential goods, building emergency shelters, -learning 'survival skills,' and collecting weapons to defend your family's -patch from desperate outsiders. [@american-apocalyptic, see esp. chp. 3, 4] -'Prepper' culture (which owes its existence to Cold War fears of all-out -nuclear war [@american-apocalyptic, pp. 48-56] and is sometimes also pursued as -a result of certain pre-millenialist beliefs [@unveiling-empire, p. 5]) might -be a minority pursuit, but it is a response to the same apocalyptic -storytelling which is a widespread phenomenon in mainstream American media: - -> The theme of _impending catastrophe_ \[…\] frames the news story -> as more apocalyptic and therefore often becomes more sensationalized or highly -> panic-driven. Add social media to this mix – where experts are often ignored -> in favor of more polemic non-experts – and risk perception increases. Oddly -> enough, impending catastrophe is less likely to alter behavior, instead -> inspiring feelings of futility: we’re doomed, so why bother. Repeated exposure -> to doomsday predictions can prevent us from taking action because ultimately -> the effect of apocalyptic thinking generates a fear of existential threats -> that are beyond our control – and thus unpreventable. [@american-apocalyptic, p. 60] - -If fatalistic narratives don't cause their audiences to resign themselves to the -impending catastrophe, then they may also inspire resistance against those -narratives and the people who tell them. If what someone is telling you is -threatening to destroy the world as you know it, one way of coping with that -violent threat is to find a way to dismiss the speaker's credibility. - -For example, Gill Ereaut and Nat Segnit document how some people in Britain -respond to fatalistic narratives about the climate with what they call -'settlerdom discourse.' [@warm-words pp. 7-8, cf. @warm-words-2 p. 21] By this, -they mean a discourse implying that whatever isn't 'common sense' isn't -credible. Using such a discourse, it is easy to dismiss alarmist climate -rhetoric as 'doom-mongering.' Closely related is the discourse of 'British comic -nihilism,' or, as they put it, the discourse of 'bugger it and open another -bottle!' - -So, because catastrophic language tends to encourage a fatalist outlook, it -fails when it convinces -- since 'why bother trying when we're all stuffed -anyway?' -- and it fails when it doesn't -- since 'why pay attention to such -excitable nonsense?' +Action directed at making you feel better might lead to change in your own life, +but it is not necessarily going to solve the problem that made you feel anxious +in the first place. Juli Gittinger has shown that fatalistic climate narratives +have driven some people in the US to join the 'prepper' movement, accumulating +stockpiles of essential goods, building emergency shelters, learning 'survival +skills,' and collecting weapons to defend your family's patch from desperate +outsiders. [@american-apocalyptic, see esp. chp. 3, 4] 'Prepper' culture (which +owes its existence to Cold War fears of all-out nuclear war +[@american-apocalyptic, pp. 48-56] and is sometimes also pursued as a result of +certain pre-millenialist beliefs [@unveiling-empire, p. 5]) might be a minority +pursuit, but it is a response to the same apocalyptic storytelling which is a +widespread phenomenon in mainstream American media. This media landscape +neutralises what might have been active concern and transforms it into apathetic +fatalism [@american-apocalyptic, p. 60]. A second problem with catastrophic language is that it is conservative. Often, -catastrophist narratives tacitly assume that everything was going well until -The Catastrophe loomed its ugly head. This suggests that 'business as usual' is -alright, and that a solution to the problem, by definition, means a return to -normal. But if, as many political analysts contend, green harms are in fact an -inevitable consequence of business as usual, such narratives then obstruct the -radical political critique which will be necessary for a lasting solution to -green issues. - -Christiana Figueres and Tom Rivett-Carnac provided one demonstration of this -mindset in _The Future We Choose_, which begins with an imaginative description -of two possible futures, one optimistic, one pessimistic. The optimistic vision -described an anthropocene paradise, a vision of how the human project to -transcend materiality might be finally accomplished by continuing technological -progress. To take the comments on energy, for example: - -> In some ways, breaking up grids and decentralising power proved easy. We no -> longer burn fossil fuels. There is some nuclear energy in those countries that -> can afford the expensive technology, but most of our energy now comes from -> renewable sources like wind, solar, geothermal, and hydro. \[…\] Because there -> is no combustion cost, energy is basically free. It is also more abundant and -> more efficiently used than ever. Smart tech prevents unnecessary energy -> consumption, as artificial inteligence units switch off appliances and -> machines when not in use. The efficiency of the system means that, with a few -> exceptions, our quality of life has not suffered. In many respects, it has -> improved. [@future-we-choose, chp. 3] - -This vision of the good life promotes the idea of technological progress driving -increasing living standards, a rising tide lifting all boats. This narrative -perpetuates the idea that more efficient technology can deliver a free lunch, -while ignoring the fact that modern technological progress led to increased -exploitation of workers and of nature. It accepts that the Earth has been -domesticated, and advocates for the Earth to be domesticated even more. As -Eileen Crist, discussing Anthropocene discourse, puts it: - -> The very concept of the Anthropocene crystallizes human dominion, corralling -> the already-pliable-in-that-direction human mind into viewing our master -> identity as manifestly destined, quasi-natural, and sort of awesome. The -> Anthropocene accepts the humanization of Earth as reality, even though this is -> still contestable, partially reversible, and worthy of resistance and of -> inspiring a different vision. [@poverty-nomenclature, p. 25] +catastrophist narratives tacitly assume that everything was going well until The +Catastrophe loomed its ugly head. The urgency of the crisis means that +established power structures must be supported to work at full throttle, and we +certainly haven't got time to replace or radically transform them. But if, as +many political analysts contend, green harms are in fact an inevitable +consequence of business as usual, such narratives then obstruct the radical +political critique which will be necessary for a lasting solution to green +issues. For example, when a consortium of central banks commissioned a report +on financing the global response to climate change, this is how that report +opened: + +> Climate change is one of the most critical challenges facing humanity, with +> far reaching consequences that threaten the well-being of people and the +> planet. Current estimates for climate investment needs in \[emerging market +> and developing economies\] are in the trillions, _with about 80-90 percent of +> climate mitigation investments to be financed by the private sector as public +> funding will be limited._ [@ngfs-dec-2023, p. 5, my emphasis] + +Where does this '80-90 percent' come from? The citation takes you to an IMF +report on global financial stability. The relevant paragraph reads as follows: + +> Aligning capital flows on a low-carbon trajectory has become a critical policy +> objective, including for financial stability, given that current renewable +> energy investment and production fall grossly short of funding needed to meet +> climate targets. A rapid acceleration of investment in low-carbon +> energy infrastructure is needed, especially in emerging market and developing +> economies. Private finance is key to achieving these objectives, while climate +> and financial policies, such as a transition-oriented climate information +> architecture, are complementary. The new Resilience and Sustainability Trust +> can help eligible IMF members address longer-term structural challenges +> generated by climate change. [@imf-apr-2023, p. 46] + +There is no mention of an '80 to 90 percent' figure. Doubtless, it is helpful as +a rhetorical flourish to make the assertion seem more scientific that it really +is: an ideological assumption that the neoliberal world order, in which +governments are held hostage to markets, is permanent and inevitable. The figure +of climate catastrophe functions here to attempt to foreclose radical +imagination. So catastrophic language, apart from its fatalist tendencies, can shut down radical political discourses and thus discredit the best solutions to green @@ -250,6 +216,15 @@ criticism of green catastrophism is that since green catastrophism reverberates strongly with 'Anthropocene' discourses, such rhetoric flattens out power relationships. This, say the critics, is the death of all genuine politics. +Anthropocene discourse is catastrophic. The arrival of the Anthropocene means +the end of the Holocene, defined as the time when the climate was hospitable to +the growth of human civilization. The Anthropocene is thus inherently perceived +as a threat to human survival. Climate change is conceived as a catastrophic +consequence of greed driving human individuals to over-consume natural +resources, especially fossil fuels. Critics, meanwhile, lambast such narratives, +accusing them of deploying threats of catastrophe to distract from the +importance of economic structure in driving the climate crisis. + Andreas Malm and Alf Hornborg, to take one typical example, argue that the Anthropocene discourse of climate catastrophe emphasises the 'anthropos', the universal human subject, implying that social relations within the human species @@ -265,17 +240,6 @@ the biological species, such as greed or the ability to make fire. > beings have caused global warming over the course of their _history_. > [@malm-hornborg-2014, pp. 65-66] -Such thinking is dominant in popular thinking about climate change. Climate -change is conceived as a product of human beings greedily over-exploiting -natural resources, and in particular, burning fossil fuels. Anthropocene -discourse is also almost always catastrophic: the arrival of the Anthropocene is -equivalent to the end of the Holocene, defined as the time when the climate was -hospitable to the growth of human civilization, but human beings were balanced -against the powers of other species. Human domination has upset this imbalance, -and the Anthropocene is thus inherently perceived as a threat to human survival. -Most mainstream catastrophist narratives about climate change adopt this -Anthropocene framing. - In sum, green catastrophism is accused of encouraging a fatalist outlook, disarming radical discourses in favour of business as usual, and deeping harmful 'post-politics' discourses by obscuring the importance of power relationships. diff --git a/chapter3.md b/chapter3.md index ba7097a..13dfc63 100644 --- a/chapter3.md +++ b/chapter3.md @@ -10,16 +10,12 @@ University, has argued just this. Flannery emphasises that in popular imagination, 'apocalypse' signifies nothing more than the end of the world, ignoring the world-creating aspects of biblical -apocalypses [@flannery-2024, p. 209]. This may be a legacy of Cold-War era -nuclear rhetoric and science fiction, which re-purposed the symbol 'apocalypse' -to describe the consequences of a nuclear war, while deliberately stripping the -disaster of any redemptive afterward [@wojcik-end-of-the-world, p. 1]. Thus, she -argues, the result of raising the threat of a 'climate apocalypse' is to 'create -passivity rather than spur on quick and cooperative climate action' and to inspire -mass climate anxiety. Such a fatalist narrative can also imply that human action -is irrelevant, or encourage audiences to put their hope in 'savior figures such -as inventors, scientists, or governments who might rescue humanity in the nick -of time.' [@flannery-2024, p. 210] +apocalypses. Thus, she argues, the result of raising the threat of a 'climate +apocalypse' is to 'create passivity rather than spur on quick and cooperative +climate action' and to inspire mass climate anxiety. Such a fatalist narrative +can also imply that human action is irrelevant, or encourage audiences to put +their hope in 'savior figures such as inventors, scientists, or governments who +might rescue humanity in the nick of time.' [@flannery-2024, pp. 209-210] Flannery's critique would imply that green rhetors ought to avoid apocalyptic language. This conclusion rests on two key premises: one, that apocalyptic @@ -28,31 +24,33 @@ and post-politics as described in the previous chapter; and two, that catastrophe is the dominant effective symbol associated with apocalyptic language. -In what remains of this chapter, I will argue that were these criticisms to be -levelled against the model of apocalyptic language in the West, -namely, the Apocalypse of St John, the Apocalypse would resist the force of -these criticisms. Reading from the perspective of John's original audiences, -the Apocalypse does not promote fatalism, conservatism or post-politics, but -works against these responses. Later in the chapter, I'll explore three -further key apocalyptic features of the Apocalypse which John uses towards -his rhetorical ends, demonstrating how apocalyptic rhetoric may have worked -effectively in probably the most influential representative of the genre. -Then, in chapter 4, I'll extend this argument to the case of contemporary -green rhetoric, and show how these features of John's ancient rhetoric could -be reproduced effectively in a contemporary context. - -So, what of the criticisms enumerated in the previous chapter, namely, that -catastrophic language promotes fatalism, conservatism and post-politics? The -first thing to observe here is that, whereas green rhetors typically position -the catastrophe as an impending event over which the audience has some measure -of control, St John, in contrast, discusses tribulations which have already -begun, and are largely in the hands of cosmic forces far bigger than his -audience. While John's tribulation discourse surely is catastrophic in some -respects -- involving a definite period in time where cosmic-scale destruction -renders former ways of life permanently unsustainable -- his exhortation is not -to avert the catastrophe, but to endure it. As a result of this very different -dialectic, John's catastrophism can be against fatalism and promote radical -politics grounded in an analysis of power relations. +In what remains of this chapter, I will argue that in the case of the Apocalypse +of St John, by far the dominant model of apocalyptic literature in the +post-Christendom West, these criticisms do not cut. For John and his historical +audience, John's visions of catastrophe were essential to his critique of the +Roman Empire. In contrast to the accusations of fatalism, conservatism and +death-of-politics levelled against contemporary green catastrophism, John's +catastrophism motivated his audience to action, undermined dominant ideologies, +and exposed economic social structure as a basis for radical political critique. +Further, catastrophism only scratches the surface of John's apocalypticism, and +I'll show how three further aspects of his apocalyptic language add to his +rhetorical strategy. Then, in chapter 4, I'll show how these features of John's +ancient rhetoric can be reproduced effectively in a contemporary green context. + +In the previous chapter, we saw how some kinds of catastrophic language +prominent in contemporary green rhetoric can elicit fatalism and conservatism +and support the 'death of politics.' To understand why John's catastrophic +language had a very different effect, it is important to first understand that +John has a very different catastrophic dialectic. + +Whereas green rhetors typically position the catastrophe as an impending event +over which the audience has some measure of control, John, in contrast, +discusses a series of catastrophes which have already begun, and are largely in +the hands of cosmic forces far bigger than his audience. While typical green +catastrophism ends with an exhortation to to avert the catastrophe, John's +exhortation is to endure it. As a result of this very different dialectic, +John's catastrophism can be against fatalism and promote radical politics +grounded in an analysis of power relations. John's alternative catastrophic dialectic is visible from the opening chapters of the Apocalypse, which makes explicit John's exhortation to endure. Rev 2-3 @@ -77,89 +75,46 @@ against the church in Pergamum: > children of Israel, to eat things sacrificed unto idols, and to commit > fornication. (Rev 2:14) -In contemporary Greek society, temple sacrifices were important civic events, -and upstanding citizens were expected to show face and take the meat which had -been sacrificed [@revelation-vision-of-a-just-world, p. 56]. Jews were exempted -from eating the meat, but as early Christian communities sometimes had difficult -relationships with local Jewish leaders, they may have struggled to benefit from -the Jewish exemption, and therefore had to face a serious dilemma in whether or -not to eat the meat [@revelation-vision-of-a-just-world, pp. 54-55]. John is not -the only New Testament author to grapple with this issue. Paul seems to have -taken an irenic approach in 1 Cor 8 and Rom 14, while the author of the Epistle -to the Hebrews suggests a stricter approach in Heb 13:8-16. The reference to -'fornication' in Rev 2:14 may be a literal reference to fornication, but it may -also be a symbolic reference to idol worship [@hemer-letters, p. 91], echoing -prophets such as Ezekiel (Ezek 16). - -So it seems that John is taking a hardline stance on the issue of eating food -sacrificed to idols. Failing to fully participate in the imperial cult could be -costly, particularly for rich Christians who had the most to benefit from -fitting in to the trade guilds and other civic institutions and private dinners -where meat sacrificed to idols might be offered to them -[@revelation-vision-of-a-just-world, p. 56]. In this context, it makes sense -that Jesus, as seen in John's vision, has the most praise for the poorest -churches, such as Smyrna and Philadelphia, and the harshest condemnation for the -richest, such as Pergamum and Thyatira [@revelation-vision-of-a-just-world, p. -57]. - -John's stance on food sacrificed to idols also makes sense of the vision of two -beasts in Rev 13. The second beast instructs people to worship an image of the -first, and to receive a mark of the beast on their right hand or forehead. If -they refuse to take the mark, they aren't able to buy or sell. The number of the -beast is 666. The number 666 is most likely a reference to the emperor Nero -[@rowland-rev, p. 114], and the references to buying and selling suggest the -difficulties a rich Christian might have had doing business unless they -participated fully in the imperial cult [@roloff-rev, pp. 164-165]. +In contemporary Greek society, temple sacrifices were important civic events. +Failing to show face could be embarassing, or even costly, particularly for rich +Christians who had the most to benefit from fitting in to the trade guilds and +other civic institutions and private dinners where meat sacrificed to idols +might be offered to them. Jews were exempted from eating the meat, but as early +Christian communities sometimes had difficult relationships with local Jewish +leaders, they may have struggled to benefit from the Jewish exemption, and +therefore had to face a serious dilemma in whether or not to eat the meat. In +this context, it makes sense that Jesus, as seen in John's vision, has the most +praise for the poorest churches, such as Smyrna and Philadelphia, and the +harshest condemnation for the richest, such as Pergamum and Thyatira +[@revelation-vision-of-a-just-world, pp. 54-57]. + +Understanding John's central message this way, as one to endure the hardships of +resisting the imperial cult, makes sense of his catastrophic visions, such as +the one of the two beasts in Rev 13. The second beast instructs people to +worship an image of the first, and to receive a mark of the beast on their right +hand or forehead. If they refuse to take the mark, they aren't able to buy or +sell. The number of the beast is 666. The number 666 is most likely a reference +to the emperor Nero [@rowland-rev, p. 114], and the references to buying and +selling suggest the difficulties a rich Christian might have had doing business +unless they participated fully in the imperial cult [@roloff-rev, pp. 164-165]. From this, it seems that the visions John relates are not, or at least not merely, about an impending catastrophe which he wants his audience to work to avoid, but about a catastrophe -- perhaps, as Leonard Thompson [@thompson-revelation, pp. 27-28] suggests, a catastrophe only visible as a catastrophe from John's apocalyptic perspective -- which is already unfolding, -which he wants his audience to endure. Given this rhetorical drive, John's -mythological language, among other things, may have functioned to situate the -local, present contexts of John's audiences within a larger cosmic context, -covering the whole of both space and time [@thompson-revelation, pp. 28-29], -helping to motivate his audience to participate in John's self-sacrificial -ethic. Thus, as Ben Witherington III puts it: - -> This material is not _just_ about the future, nor should we have expected it -> to be since it is narrative forensic rhetoric meant to prepare and exhort -> John's audience. \[…\] It is hard to escape the impression that John believed -> he was living in the midst of the inauguration of these judgments or put -> another way in the age when the seals were being unsealed. [@ncbc-rev, p. 131] - -What then, of the criticisms of apocalyptic language which followed on the basis -of its supposed catastrophism, that it is fatalistic, neutralises radicalism, -and flattens out power relationships? - -It is true that most of the events of John's vision unfold without much input -from the saints. The saints aren't able to stop the seven seals from being -unsealed, or the seven trumpets from being blown, or the seven goldens bowls of -God's wrath from being poured out. The saints have no part in the fall of -Babylon, and when Satan besieges them, they do not fight him in battle, but -Satan and his army is overthrown by fire from heaven. - -However, it would be wrong to accuse St John of fatalism, and worse still to -accuse him of neutralising radicalism and flattening out power relationships. At -the core of his message is an exhortation to endure. John's promise is that -those who endure will participate in God's final fulfilment of the creation. But -what must be endured is a result of human powers distorting God's creation. This -evil requires a radical subversion of actual power relationships, and John -conceives of just such a subversion, and calls his audience to participate in -that event. +which he wants his audience to endure. Thus, as Ben Witherington III puts it: -St John's rhetoric therefore is against fatalism: he motivates and calls his -audience to political action. It is against conservatism: he asks his audience -to subvert dominant power structures and build a radical alternative society -and value system. It is ardently political: his rhetoric is rooted in a -analysis of power structures within Greek society, and particularly between the -rich and poor among Asian Christian churches. +> It is hard to escape the impression that John believed he was living in the +> midst of the inauguration of these judgments or put another way in the age +> when the seals were being unsealed. [@ncbc-rev, p. 131] -Andrew Chester [@chaos-new-creation] has explored John's radical subversion of -the dominant Greek value-system in detail, beginning with the observation that -in Rev 6:12-17, God's life-sustaining creative acts of Gen 1 are threatened -with total annihilation: +Using this alternative catastrophic dialectic, exhorting his audience to endure +an ongoing disaster rather than avert a future one, is essential to John's +radical politics. Andrew Chester [@chaos-new-creation] has explored in detail +how John subverted the dominant Greek value-system, beginning with the +observation that in Rev 6:12-17, God's life-sustaining creative acts of Gen 1 +are threatened with total annihilation: > And I beheld when he had opened the sixth seal, and, lo, there was a great > earthquake; and the sun became black as sackcloth of hair, and the moon became @@ -205,15 +160,21 @@ power, they tragically bring death and destruction on themselves and the world. > powerful, now hover on the edge of losing completely what distinguishes > them – the great lights and source of all life. [@chaos-new-creation, p. 346] -Fatalistic? Conservative? Post-political? Far from it. The destructive events -of John's vision are the result of human powers distorting God's creation for -their own ends. We can be complicit and accept the mark of the beast, or we can -resist. Those who resist will conquer, but not in the way of God's enemies, who -raise up armies to fight battles: the saints will conquer through the blood of -the Lamb, and win pride of place in God's new creation, while the nations of -the earth flood in to worship and to receive life and healing. 'It is an ethic -for martyrdom,' as John J. Collins, a leading scholar on biblical apocalyptic, -puts it [@apocalyptic-imagination, chp. 9]. +The destructive events of John's vision are the result of human powers +distorting God's creation for their own ends. We can be complicit and accept the +mark of the beast, or we can resist. Those who resist will conquer, but not in +the way of God's enemies, who raise up armies to fight battles: the saints will +conquer through the blood of the Lamb, and win pride of place in God's new +creation, while the nations of the earth flood in to worship and to receive life +and healing. 'It is an ethic for martyrdom,' as John J. Collins, a leading +scholar on biblical apocalyptic, puts it [@apocalyptic-imagination, chp. 9]. + +St John's rhetoric therefore is against fatalism: he motivates and calls his +audience to meaningful political action. It is against conservatism: he asks his +audience to subvert dominant power structures and build a radical alternative +society and value system. It is ardently political: his rhetoric is rooted in a +analysis of power structures within Greek society, and particularly between the +rich and poor among Asian Christian churches. As a result, apocalypticism has been a powerful force helping to mobilise radical social movements – for better and for worse – continually throughout @@ -224,26 +185,22 @@ French, American and Haitian Revolutions, the numerous evangelical revivals, the environmental movement – all have been associated with apocalyptic forms of language. -So if the catastrophism of John's Apocalypse works not for, but against -fatalism, conservatism, and post-politics, how else does John use apocalyptic -language to achieve his rhetorical goals? I will focus on three key features: -revealed knowledge, tribulations, and the end times, as well as the use of -mythological language throughout each of these. +So if the catastrophism of John's Apocalypse is essential to the success of his +rhetoric, how else does John use apocalyptic language to achieve his rhetorical +goals? I will focus on three key features: revealed knowledge, tribulation +discourse, and end-time speculation. One is the use of revealed knowledge. For biblical scholars, this, along with a concern with the end times, is a key feature of ancient apocalyptic literature -[@semeia-14-intro]. The book is framed as an epistle – likely a traditional form -for Christians by the time John was writing, following the Pauline models – and -is also presented as prophecy, which was a common feature of early Christian -life [see e.g. @apocalyptic-imagination, chp. 9]. But within those framings, -John recounts a vision. At first, he sees Jesus, who dictates an address to the -seven churches in Asia, and after this, an angel shows him a series of visions -of 'things which must be hereafter' (Rev 4:1). Visions are not a necessary -component of early Christian prophecy, but they do follow the model of works -such as 1 Enoch, Daniel, 4 Ezra, 2 Baruch, and numerous other ancient Jewish and +[@semeia-14-intro]. The Apocalypse is John's account of a vision he experienced. +At first, he sees Jesus, who dictates an address to the seven churches in Asia, +and after this, an angel shows him a series of visions of 'things which must be +hereafter' (Rev 4:1). This literary structure follows the model of works such as +1 Enoch, Daniel, 4 Ezra, 2 Baruch, and numerous other ancient Jewish and Christian works, which likewise contain fantastic visions related via a heavenly -intermediary, and is thus regarded by scholars as a marker of the genre, -'apocalypse.' [@apocalyptic-imagination, chp. 1]. +intermediary. Modern biblical scholars mostly agree that this is a key marker of +an ancient literary genre, which, incidentally, they label 'apocalypse' +[@apocalyptic-imagination, chp. 1]. Why might John have used this genre? While it is perfectly plausible that John had a genuine visionary experience [@visions-in-apocalyptic-handbook, pp. @@ -265,17 +222,15 @@ epistemic norms. As a result, early Christians would have needed to develop defensive strategies if their minority cognition were to survive. By adopting the form of an apocalyptic prophecy, and, no less, an apocalypse of -Jesus Christ, John claims authority beyond any mainstream Greek -authority. In the course of his apocalypse, he also subtly undermines majority -epistemology. As already explored, he mocks top Greek gods such as Apollo and -Artemis. He also highlights the material benefits on offer for the rich to -collude with Babylon (Rev 18), and highlights the power of Satan to 'deceive' -the nations (Rev 20:7). The cognitive majority might want to dismiss John as a -crackpot. But John can defend himself: they have an interest in lies, their gods -are lies, and they listen to the Devil's lies. - -Thus, the apocalyptic motif of revealed knowledge helps John's rhetoric to -convince his audience. +Jesus Christ, John claims authority beyond any mainstream Greek authority. In +the course of his apocalypse, he also subtly undermines majority epistemology. +As already explored, he mocks top Greek gods such as Apollo and Artemis. He also +highlights the material benefits on offer for the rich to collude with Babylon +(Rev 18), and highlights the power of Satan to 'deceive' the nations (Rev 20:7). +The cognitive majority might want to dismiss John as a crackpot. But John can +defend himself: they have an interest in lies, their gods are lies, and they +listen to the Devil's lies. Thus, the apocalyptic motif of revealed knowledge +helps John's rhetoric to convince his audience. A second apocalyptic motif in John's Apocalypse is the theme of tribulations. Humans, and in particular the saints, experience suffering in John's visions, @@ -288,7 +243,8 @@ idolatrous imperial cult, and that in turn is just the human face of an eschatological battle between Jesus and Satan. John's call for his audience to persevere is made more compelling if he can convince his audience that their struggles are part of a much bigger fight, and one that, because they're on -God's side, they cannot lose, even if they suffer death. +God's side, they cannot lose, even if they suffer death along with the 'Lamb who +was slain.' Thirdly, like most ancient apocalypses, John's vision explores the end times, and this feature also works to strengthen his rhetoric. If the tribulations are @@ -304,20 +260,24 @@ The nations and their kings, instead of usurping God's place and distorting God's world, bring their glory to God's city (21:24-26). The tree of life, from which Adam and Eve were cut off, is open for all to receive healing (22:2). Instead of the mark of the beast, God's servants will bear the name of God on -their foreheads (22:4). Standing in unresolved tension with this total -redemption, John warns that evildoers will remain outside the city (20:15, +their foreheads (22:4). Unrepentant evildoers remain outside the city (20:15, 21:7-8,27, 22:14-15). Although John's vision is surely mythological, it is not merely fanciful. Given John's case, made throughout the book, that God is sovereign but the world is currently distorted by evil, it is natural to conclude that eventually, things will be transformed, to remove evil and reveal God's perfect plan for his -creation, as he has promised. John's utopian vision, then, although it may not -be an accurate prediction of the future, does function as a way of -mythologically 'naming' the eschaton which God will surely bring about. Rather -than being left with an abstract theological definition, we have a -representative picture. Hope in this, John says, and your hope will not be -disappointed, even if things don't turn out exactly in this way. +creation as he has promised. Crucially, this eschaton is not only a remote, +invisible future, but it is real and present in the Church: when the martyrs are +willing to follow the Lamb to non-violent, self-sacrificial resistance against +idolatrous, life-denying ideologies, the New Jerusalem is already visible. +John's utopian vision, then, although it may not be an accurate prediction of +the future, does function as a way of mythologically 'naming' the eschaton which +God is visibly bringing about. Contemporary green rhetors often shy away from +utopian visions for fear of being 'unrealistic.' While John does not have a +scientistic prejudice about what a 'realistic' vision ought to look like, he is +likewise rightly concerned that his vision be plausible: his utopia is possible, +even inevitable, and visibly beginning to come about. Thus, the way John treats the end times gives his audience hope, a sure grasp of what it is they are suffering for, and thus encourages them to endure their diff --git a/chapter4.md b/chapter4.md index 007ccc1..071350b 100644 --- a/chapter4.md +++ b/chapter4.md @@ -9,92 +9,41 @@ literature, namely, the Apocalypse of St John. Now, in this chapter, I aim to show that in order for green rhetoric to succeed, it should imitate the apocalyptic rhetorical strategies of the Apocalypse discussed in the previous chapter. -In order to consider how green rhetoric might succeed, I have to specify: what -is the rhetor trying to achieve? How are they hoping that it will be achieved? -And: who are they trying to persuade to do the achieving? - -So, for the sake of a discussion point, I will take the example of the Green -New Deal. The idea behind a Green New Deal, alluding by its name to the 'New -Deal' of US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, is a large programme of -government action at the nation-state level aiming to significantly change the -way the economy is structured for the better [@pettifor-gnd, pp. 14-25]. - -There is no fixed list of measures a Green New Deal might contain, but the -centrepiece measures are likely to include strengthening environmental -regulations on industry and beefing up enforcement agencies; renationalising -key industrial sectors, particularly those in control of public goods such as -transport infrastructure or energy infrastructure; increasing tax on wealth and -corporations and closing tax loopholes; and spending the money on investment in -improving and expanding the public realm and subsidising local green -industries. - -The package may also extend, for example, to increasing spending on research -and development; raising tariffs on underpriced imported solar panels and wind -turbines to support the development of national green industries; banning -fracking and other extreme forms of fossil fuel extraction; instituting a -moratorium on new data centres; making it easier for corporations to be sued -for environmental damages; subsidising heat pumps and home insulation; and, -yes, perhaps even raising carbon taxes. - -As with the original New Deal, the wide-ranging scope is thought to be a -crucial part of the proposal. Each measure is made more attractive to its -potential supporters because it comes as part of a package promising to -transform society for the better. - -Like the original New Deal, it is not intended to be attractive to everyone. It -is not designed to be attractive to owners of capital or senior managers, for -whom a Green New Deal would be very expensive indeed: it would result in huge -cuts to their salaries, bonuses and dividends, and reduce their power over the -economy. Nor is the Green New Deal designed to be attractive to neoliberal -ideologues, who determinedly believe that the invisible hand of the market will -eventually, eventually, eventually bring about a just society. It could, however, -be attractive to a large majority of, say, the UK electorate, covering proletarian -households in both the working classes and many of those in the middle classes. - -The original New Deal was largely made possible by an enormous (not to say -'apocalyptic') wave of industrial action. However, in the US in the 1930s, a -large proportion of the workforce was unionised, and employed in sectors such -as manufacturing, energy, and transport, where workers are gathered in -tight-knit communities on shop floors and strikes hit shareholders hard. In the -present UK context, unions encompass a much smaller proportion of the -workforce, and much of the workforce is employed in the service sector, where -industrial action can be difficult to organise and less effective than in -primary industries. Industrial action can still play an important role, and -Matt Huber [@climate-change-class-war] gives an excellent discussion of how -green rhetoric might be effective in that arena. But because of the structure -of the UK economy, it's likely that industrial action would have to work -alongside other forms of political action if a Green New Deal is to be brought -about in a country like the UK in the near to medium term. - -Alongside industrial action, people in the UK can join political parties, where -they can shape policies by engaging in internal politics, by voting for -candidates for election, and by standing for election themselves. They can also -vote in general elections, ultimately resulting in electing a government which -prioritises a Green New Deal policy. In order to increase momentum behind the -movement, they can also join protests or take part in direct action. +What kinds of action might a green rhetor feasibly seek to evoke addressing a +mass audience in the UK? As in the major economic transformations of the early +twentieth century and post-war era, industrial action could play a crucial role, +although legal restrictions on union activity and the de-industrialised nature +of the UK economy constrain what industrial action can achieve. Alongside +industrial action, people in the UK can join political parties, where they can +shape policies by engaging in internal politics, by voting for candidates for +election, and by standing for election themselves. They can also vote in general +elections, ultimately pressuring the government into prioritising green issues. +In order to increase momentum behind the green movement, they can join protest +groups such as Extinction Rebellion. They can also take direct action, such as +the campaign of non-compliance which forced the repeal of the poll tax in 1990. Notably, all of these actions may be difficult for those called to take part in them. Getting involved in politics in any but the most trivial capacity requires giving up evenings and weekends: annoying for, say, a Masters student, but potentially a major sacrifice for an exhausted parent working a full-time job. Standing for election could be costly to your relationships, and expose you to -ridicule and abuse. Depending on the action involved, protesting or taking -direct action could get you arrested. Organising your workplace could get you -fired. Meanwhile, the benefits of a Green New Deal stand far off, and remain -largely outside your control. The call must then be to make a sacrifice for what -is good, even if, paradoxically, it costs you. +ridicule and abuse. Protesting or taking direct action could get you arrested. +Organising your workplace could get you fired. Meanwhile, the benefits of a +major green transformation stand far off, and remain largely outside your +control. The call must then be to make a sacrifice for what is good, even if, +paradoxically, it costs you. This is, in John Collin's terms, an 'ethic for martyrdom.' So, could John's apocalyptic rhetorical strategies be of use in motivating UK citizens to take -political actions to advance the cause of a Green New Deal? +political actions to advance the causes of the green movement? First, I'll consider minority cognition. This was the first aspect of John's strategy which I considered in the previous chapter. While the particular kind of minority cognition favoured by John -- that is, direct testimony imparted by -a divine authority -- may be unpersuasive to many UK citizens, the preference -for a minority cognition is still necessary. +a divine authority -- may be unpersuasive to many UK citizens, minority +cognition is still necessary. -Recall that, as Thompson [@thompson-revelation] argued, St. John needed to use +Recall that, as Thompson [@thompson-revelation] argued, John needed to use minority cognition in order to resist the overwhelming weight of the majority epistemology of Greek society, which would have pressed his audience into submission to the imperial cult. Likewise, in our society, there are @@ -129,17 +78,17 @@ unquestioning trust in government agencies and chemical companies. She exposed that they hadn't done their homework or had lied. In a Cold War context, questioning the techno-scientific-industrial authorities could be perceived as traitorous. Chemical companies fought hard against her, sued the publishers to -try and prevent it being published, then spent a quarter of a million dollars -on an aggressive publicity campaign against her. She was attacked for being +try and prevent it being published, then spent a quarter of a million dollars on +an aggressive publicity campaign against her. She was attacked for being 'emotional' and an 'hysterical woman.' The fact she had published novels was cited as evidence that she couldn't be a real scientist, and her literary writing style as evidence that what she was writing couldn't be real science. Real science, the chemical industry hastened to remind the impressionable -public, is necessarily presented in the format of laboratory reports, -maximising their utilisation of technical jargon in order to avoid -under-qualified persons from understanding their contents. Carson had no PhD, -no academic institution, and no network of scientific colleagues to back her -up. [@silent-spring, pp. 122-124] +public, is necessarily presented in the format of laboratory reports, maximising +their utilisation of technical jargon in order to prevent the comprehension of +their contents by under-qualified persons. Carson had no PhD, no academic +institution, and no network of scientific colleagues to back her up. +[@silent-spring, pp. 122-124] To fight the chemical lobby, Carson had to adopt minority epistemology. So, alongside her considerable arsenal of traditional scientific facts, she @@ -150,20 +99,18 @@ her report that parathion poisoning had been known to induce serious illness not only in those exposed directly, but also to the physicians who treated them, and even the hospital staff who washed their clothes. [@silent-spring, p. 27] -Like St. John, she was also forced to undermine the chemical industry's -majority epistemology. In _Silent Spring_, she showed how the chemical -industry funded the same science which enabled its profits. She -undermined their conceptual frameworks, arguing that the use of words like -'pesticide' and 'insecticide' function to mask the truth that the chemicals -involved are in fact poisons (and in some cases were originally developed by -military scientists for the purpose of deliberately injuring and killing human -beings). And she showed how the chemical lobby used science to dismiss -valid first-hand experiences and impose their solutions on people against their -interests and expressed desires. For instance, she told the story of Joseph -Sweeny, a forestry official in Ohio, who, in opting for a targeted approach to -containing dutch elm disease rather than blanket poisoning, had to go against -the advice of the chemical companies, the universities, and the US Department -of Agriculture [@silent-spring, p. 57]. +Like John, she was also forced to undermine the chemical industry's majority +epistemology. In _Silent Spring_, she showed how the chemical industry funded +the same science which enabled its profits. She undermined their conceptual +frameworks, arguing that the use of words like 'pesticide' and 'insecticide' +function to mask the truth that the chemicals involved are in fact poisons. And +she showed how the chemical lobby used science to dismiss valid first-hand +experiences and impose their solutions on people against their interests and +expressed desires. For instance, she told the story of Joseph Sweeny, a forestry +official in Ohio, who, in opting for a targeted approach to containing dutch elm +disease rather than blanket poisoning, had to go against the advice of the +chemical companies, the universities, and the US Department of Agriculture +[@silent-spring, p. 57]. More recently, Sunita Narain, a veteran of India's environmental regulator, the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), has written about the CSE's attempts @@ -180,7 +127,7 @@ courts, in the legislative process, and in the public square. > 'established' science of conservation in our effort to bring a new way to > manage wildlife so that people also benefit. [@conflicts-of-interest, pp. x-xi] -If rhetors today want to persuade their audiences to support a Green New Deal, +If green rhetors today want to persuade their audiences, they're going to have to fight the majority epistemology, held firmly in place by fossil interests. To do that, they'll need to exploit minority cognition, undermining the epistemologies that best serve fossil interests and finding @@ -228,7 +175,7 @@ able to save those who love him. Instead, John, pointing to God's all-encompassing sovereignty and justice, makes a redemptive end appear irresistible, thus encouraging his audience to bet the house on Jesus. -Green rhetors ought to take note of this. A few rhetors have expressed +Green rhetors ought to take note of this. A few mainstream rhetors have expressed pessimism about the end, but the dominant motif is uncertainty. _The Future We Choose_ makes this clear from the very title. In _Forget Me Not_, Sophie Pavelle insists that although she could conclude either with a dystopian vision @@ -251,20 +198,7 @@ self-branded eco-socialist scholar and activist, Max Ajl: > lower, lifting out from healthy obsidian soil, a palette of landrace tomatoes > and peppers. Roofs are coated with patterned raised beds. Side-yards feature > fishponds, which receive all kinds of manure, fattening up their inhabitants. -> Greenbelts surround all cities, as popular planning converts sprawling suburbs -> into farmed swards. High-speed trains link bigger cities to smaller ones, -> smaller ones to capillary lines leading to outlying hamlets kitted out with -> high-speed internet. Ranchers manage grasslands roamed by a bouquet of native -> breed animals that churn cellulosic matter into the soil, producing -> negative-CO2 milk and meat. Intercalated forest-fields overproduce walnut, -> fodder, and myriad maize and wheat varieties. In some places, the burgeoning -> low-tech of perennial cereals inject root structures far deeper than people -> are tall into prairies. There is a lot to do beyond farming: Skilled -> technicians live in the countryside and smaller villages and estates, and -> manage high-voltage smart grids, local renewable storage systems, and -> decentralized windmills, while artisans and decentralized manufacturing -> processes local agricultural materials, supplementing and replacing – where it -> makes sense – large-scale mass-market industrial goods. [@ajl-gnd, p. 117] +> \[_…etc ad nauseam_\] [@ajl-gnd, p. 117] Ajl, as with many other Green New Deal activists, recognises that having and sharing the right utopian vision plays an essential role in bringing about diff --git a/chapter5.md b/chapter5.md index e352acb..f9b48d3 100644 --- a/chapter5.md +++ b/chapter5.md @@ -20,41 +20,33 @@ catastrophic symbol in popular culture, leads Frances Flannery to suggest that green rhetors should avoid evoking apocalyptic associations. However, in chapter 3, I argued that the Apocalypse of St. John, the chief -source of apocalyptic language in the West, was not originally conceived as -catastrophic, and did not create the aforementioned negative reactions, but -rather used apocalyptic language as an essential tool in the author's rhetorical -strategy. - -In chapter 4, I went further, and argued that in order to succeed now, green -rhetors must use similar apocalyptic rhetorical strategies. I did this through -the case study of arguing for a Green New Deal, arguing that in order to -convince UK citizens to take the political action necessary to bring a Green New -Deal about, green rhetors need to use minority cognition, tribulation language, -and utopian end-time speculation, in similar ways and for similar reasons as -once applied to St. John. +source of apocalyptic language in the West, had a very different catastrophic +dialectic, and did not create the aforementioned negative reactions, but rather +used apocalyptic language as an essential tool in the author's rhetorical +strategy. In chapter 4, I went further, and argued that in order to succeed now, +green rhetors must use similar apocalyptic rhetorical strategies. My analysis has severe limits. As I explored in chapter 1, there are many reasons why green rhetoric is too often failing at present, and there's no good cause to think that any one solution will fix all. Nor have I made any attempt -to explain why catastrophic motifs are so consistently reproduced in green -rhetoric, nor have I provided a feasible means of ensuring that green rhetors -can and do adopt the apocalyptic strategies I have proposed. In chapter 1, I -warned that a great deal of contemporary green rhetoric does not successfully -identify a practical plan of action or the right audience to carry it out: I am -happy to confess my guilt in the same sin. I have also not given nearly as much -attention to people who hold millenialist worldviews as I would have liked, and -they deserve. - -What I do claim, is that, in defiance of the many critics of apocalypticism, a -better green rhetoric would be a more apocalyptic rhetoric, at least in the -sense that it uses similar rhetorical strategies to those deployed by St. John -of the Apocalypse. - -To put it another way, both St. John and contemporary green rhetors have the -same rhetorical goal: to motivate an ethic of martyrdom. This puts similar -constraints on the kinds of rhetorical strategies which will and won't work. To -better achieve their goals, green rhetors will have to find minority -epistemologies with which to fight fossil-think, steel their audiences for -tribulations, and engage in utopian end-time speculation to convince their -audiences that their potential sufferings are worth enduring. When they do so, -they will find the path well-trodden by St. John. +to explain why the catastrophic dialectic criticised in chapter 2 are so +consistently reproduced in green rhetoric, nor have I provided a feasible means +of ensuring that green rhetors can and do adopt the apocalyptic strategies I +have proposed. In chapter 1, I warned that a great deal of contemporary green +rhetoric does not successfully identify a practical plan of action or the right +audience to carry it out: I am happy to confess my guilt in the same sin. I have +also not given nearly as much attention to people who hold millenialist +worldviews as I would have liked, and they deserve. + +What I do claim, is that, in defiance of the many critics of apocalypticism, and +despite the fact that apocalypticism, like all good things, can and is twisted +to evil ends, green rhetors must draw on John's apocalyptic rhetorical strategies. + +Since ancient times, apocalyptic imagination has been used to name and shame +idolatrous economic and ideological systems which pretend to the divine status +of eternal peace and prosperity, while in reality driving massive violence and +destruction which can only end in either revolution or collective suicide. For +all that, the apocalypticist is no cynic: John sees a realistic vision of +social, indeed cosmic, transformation at the end of all things, which has +motivated revolution and resistance for centuries. In the fight for a greener +world, apocalyptic is as necessary as ever. |