chp1: helm on international agreements

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@@ -481,6 +481,21 @@ can be achieved by anyone at all.
 
 Example 1: legally binding emissions targets. (Who's going to enforce them?)
 
+The economist Dieter Helm has brilliantly summarised his scepticism of any
+global agreement on reducing greenhouse gas emissions:
+
+> To name but a few of the problems: the allocation of responsibility for the
+> existing stock of carbon in the atmosphere \[…\] is complex; carbon emissions
+> per head are low in those countries most rapidly increasing their emissions;
+> some countries (and, particularly, some countries' political élites) may
+> actually benefit from climate change, and generally the effects vary greatly
+> between countries; there are powerful—multidimensional—free-rider incentives;
+> the measurement of emissions \[…\] is at best weak; and there are, at present,
+> no serious enforcement mechanisms. It is hard to think of an international
+> problem which lends itself less to a coherent, credible, and sufficiently
+> robust and comprehensive general agreement. To put it in perspective, limiting
+> nuclear proliferation is trivial by comparison. [@helm-2009]
+
 Example 2: give free stuff to developing countries. (Who's going to pay for it?
 Who are you going to give it to?)