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@@ -72,6 +72,117 @@ apocalyptic literary feature. \[NEEDS MORE WORK\]
 Recently, academics examining green rhetoric have raised concerns with this
 catastrophism.
 
+It has been claimed green catastrophism is fatalistic: that the catastrophe is
+implicitly inevitable, thus encouraging despair over hope and therefore mere
+ritual over action. To be sure, most green rhetors do not explicitly say this;
+rather, they tend to say the very opposite, that it is not too late to avert the
+catastrophe: that's why we have to act now! The problem is not that green
+rhetors _assert_ that the catastrophe is inevitable, but that inevitability is
+one of those symbols packaged together with the symbols of 'catastrophe,' and
+indeed 'apocalypse.'
+
+Part of this is due to the geological connotations of 'catastrophe.'
+Paleontologists speculate about the causes of historic mass extinctions:
+volcanic eruptions, asteroid strikes, cyclical climate fluctuations gone rogue?
+One thing's for sure, there's nothing the dinosaurs could have done to stop it.
+
+'Apocalypse' is also a fatalistic concept. This fatalism is obvious whenever
+someone counts the days til doomsday. This begins with the prophet Daniel, who
+reports that 'seventy weeks are determined upon thy people and thy holy city, to
+finish the transgression' (Dan 9:24) and that 'from the time that the daily
+sacrifice shall be taken away, and the abomination that maketh desolate set up,
+there shall be a thousand two hundred and ninety days.' \[MORE DEMONSTRATION OF
+FATALIST MILLENIALISM\]
+
+\[EXAMPLE OF SCHOLAR SAYING THAT APOCALYPSE/CATASTROPHE IS FATALIST\]
+
+A fatalistic outlook may, at best, lead to what Kvandal & Levy call
+'ritualistic' behaviours: 'behaviours characterized by rigidity, compulsion, and
+goal demotion.' [@kvandal-2025] That is, people feel compelled to act in rigidly
+specific ways, even though they don't have a clear grasp on the practical
+outcomes of their behaviour. Calling on the cognitive science of religion, the
+authors assert that 'there is a general consensus that human beings tend to
+ritualize more of their behavior when they lose agency under conditions of
+stress, uncertainty, or hazards more generally.' They note the example of Greta
+Thunberg sailing across the Atlantic in a zero-carbon vessel to speak at the
+United Nations. The huge effort involved in that act seems disproportionate to
+the small impact had on greenhouse gas emissions. The authors also raise
+examples of civil disobedience motivated by climate pessimism. Fatalism might
+lead to politically productive behaviours. But the fact that ritualistic
+behaviours are severed from practical outcomes makes it a pretty bad bet:
+
+> By not allowing for hope that the world can be salvaged, this form of social
+> activism provides outlets in which activists alleviate anxiety by obtaining a
+> (simulated) sense of agency in the face of an uncontrollable threat.
+> [@kvandal-2025, p. 701]
+
+Action directed at making you feel better might lead to change in your own life,
+but it is not necessarily going to solve the problem that made you feel anxious
+in the first place. Juli Gittinger has shown that fatalistic climate narratives
+have driven some people in the US to join the 'prepper' movement, accumulating
+stockpiles of essential goods, building emergency shelters, learning 'survival
+skills,' and collecting weapons to defend your family's patch from desperate
+outsiders. [@american-apocalyptic, see esp. chp. 3, 4] 'Prepper' culture (which
+owes its existence to Cold War fears of all-out nuclear war
+[@american-apocalyptic, pp. 48-56]) might be a minority pursuit, but it is a
+response to the same apocalyptic storytelling which is a widespread phenomenon
+in mainstream American media:
+
+> The theme of _impending catastrophe_ \[…\] frames the news story
+> as more apocalyptic and therefore often becomes more sensationalized or highly
+> panic-driven. Add social media to this mix – where experts are often ignored
+> in favor of more polemic non-experts – and risk perception increases. Oddly
+> enough, impending catastrophe is less likely to alter behavior, instead
+> inspiring feelings of futility: we’re doomed, so why bother. Repeated exposure
+> to doomsday predictions can prevent us from taking action because ultimately
+> the effect of apocalyptic thinking generates a fear of existential threats
+> that are beyond our control – and thus unpreventable. [@american-apocalyptic, p. 60]
+
+Green catastrophism may have political implications, too. It has been argued
+that implicit in the catastrophist narrative is the assumption that everything
+was going well until the catastrophe loomed its ugly head. This suggests that
+'business as usual' is alright, and therefore obscures the need for a radical
+critique of the business-as-usual political get-up which produces massive
+destruction.
+
+Christiana Figueres and Tom Rivett-Carnac provided one demonstration of this
+mindset in _The Future We Choose_, which begins with an imaginative description
+of two possible futures, one optimistic, one pessimistic. The optimistic vision
+described an anthropocene paradise, a vision of how the human project to
+transcend materiality might be finally accomplished by continuing technological
+progress. To take the comments on energy, for example:
+
+> In some ways, breaking up grids and decentralising power proved easy. We no
+> longer burn fossil fuels. There is some nuclear energy in those countries that
+> can afford the expensive technology, but most of our energy now comes from
+> renewable sources like wind, solar, geothermal, and hydro. \[…\] Because there
+> is no combustion cost, energy is basically free. It is also more abundant and
+> more efficiently used than ever. Smart tech prevents unnecessary energy
+> consumption, as artificial inteligence units switch off appliances and
+> machines when not in use. The efficiency of the system means that, with a few
+> exceptions, our quality of life has not suffered. In many respects, it has
+> improved. [@future-we-choose, chp. 3]
+
+This vision of the good life promotes the idea of technological progress driving
+increasing living standards, a rising tide lifting all boats. This narrative
+perpetuates the idea that more efficient technology can deliver a free lunch,
+while ignoring the fact that modern technological progress led to increased
+exploitation of workers and of nature. It accepts that the Earth has been
+domesticated, and advocates for the Earth to be domesticated even more. As
+Eileen Crist, discussing Anthropocene discourse, puts it:
+
+> The very concept of the Anthropocene crystallizes human dominion, corralling
+> the already-pliable-in-that-direction human mind into viewing our master
+> identity as manifestly destined, quasi-natural, and sort of awesome. The
+> Anthropocene accepts the humanization of Earth as reality, even though this is
+> still contestable, partially reversible, and worth of resistance and of
+> inspiring a different vision. [@poverty-nomenclature, p. 25]
+
+It gets worse for the catastrophist. Perhaps the most vicious criticism of green
+catastrophism is that by leaning on 'Anthropocene' discourses, green rhetors
+flatten out social relationships. This, say the critics, is the death of all
+genuine politics. \[EXAMPLES\]
+
 In fact, the Apocalypse of St John is very different from catastrophism.
 
 For St John, there is no impending catastrophe that his audience can avert. The