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| author | Joe Carstairs <me@joeac.net> | 2026-06-30 11:12:50 +0100 |
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| committer | Joe Carstairs <me@joeac.net> | 2026-06-30 11:12:50 +0100 |
| commit | ae1a9adcff3d1132c73399b3febc89e30d839407 (patch) | |
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| parent | b45431414cc47cc245ba16e8ef662ca8eb4dc2ca (diff) | |
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diff --git a/chapter4.md b/chapter4.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..07be2d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/chapter4.md @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +## Chapter 4 + +In the previous two chapters, I've explored how and why contemporary green +rhetoric is too often failing, and argued that the apocalyptic form is not one +of the root causes. In this chapter, I aim to show that in order for green +rhetoric to succeed, it must imitate some of the rhetorical strategies of the +Apocalypse. + +In order to consider how green rhetoric might succeed, I have to specify: what +is the rhetor trying to achieve? How are they hoping that it will be achieved? +And: who are they trying to persuade to do the achieving? + +So, for the sake of a discussion point, I will take the example of the Green +New Deal. The idea behind a Green New Deal, alluding by its name to the 'New +Deal' of US President Franklin D. Roosevelt \[?\], is a large programme of +government action at the nation-state level aiming to significantly change the +way the economy is structured for the better. + +There is no fixed list of measures a Green New Deal might contain, but the +centrepiece measures are likely to include strengthening environmental +regulations on industry and beefing up enforcement agencies; renationalising +key industrial sectors, particularly those in control of public goods such as +transport infrastructure or energy infrastructure; increasing tax on wealth and +corporations and closing tax loopholes; and spending the money on investment in +improving and expanding the public realm and subsidising local green +industries. + +The package may also extend, for example, to increasing spending on research +and development; raising tarrifs on underpriced imported solar panels and wind +turbines to support the development of national green industries; banning +fracking and other extreme forms of fossil fuel extraction; instituting a +moratorium on new data centres; making it easier for corporations to be sued +for environmental damages; subsidising heat pumps and home insulation; and, +yes, perhaps even raising carbon taxes. + +As with the original New Deal, the wide-ranging scope is thought to be a +crucial part of the proposal. Each measure is made more attractive to its +potential supporters because it comes as part of a package promising to +transform society for the better. + +Like the original New Deal, it is not intended to be attractive to everyone. It +is not designed to be attractive to owners of capital or senior managers, for +whom a Green New Deal would be very expensive indeed: it would result in huge +cuts to their salaries, bonuses and dividends, and reduce their power over the +economy. Nor is the Green New Deal designed to be attractive to neoliberal +ideologues, who determinedly believe that the invisible hand of the market will +eventually, eventually, eventually bring about a just society. It could, however, +be attractive to a large majority of, say, the UK electorate, covering proletarian +households in both the working classes and many of those in the middle classes. + +The original New Deal was largely made possible by an enormous (not to say +'apocalyptic') wave of industrial action. However, in the US in the 1930s, a +large proportion of the workforce was unionised, and employed in sectors such +as manufacturing, energy, and transport, where workers are gathered in +tight-knit communities on shop floors and strikes hit shareholders hard. In the +present UK context, unions encompass a much smaller proportion of the +workforce, and much of the workforce is employed in the service sector, where +industrial action can be difficult to organise and less effective than in +primary industries. Industrial action can still play an important role, and +Matt Huber [@climate-change-class-war] gives an excellent discussion of how +green rhetoric might be effective in that arena. But because of the structure +of the UK economy, it's likely that industrial action would have to work +alongside other forms of political action if a Green New Deal is to be brought +about in the UK in the next decade or two, and it's those other forms of action +which I'll focus on. + +Alongside industrial action, people in the UK can join political parties, where +they can shape policies by engaging in internal politics, by voting for +candidates for election, and by standing for election themselves. They can also +vote in general elections, ultimately resulting in electing a government which +prioritises a Green New Deal policy. In order to increase momentum behind the +movement, they can also join protests or take part in direct action. + +Notably, all of these actions may be difficult for those called to take part in +them. Getting involved in politics in any but the most trivial capacity +requires giving up evenings and weekends: annoying for, say, a Masters student, +but potentially a major sacrifice for an exhausted parent working a full-time +job. Standing for election could be costly to your relationships, and expose +you to ridicule and abuse. Depending on the action involved, protesting or +taking direct action could get you arrested. Meanwhile, the benefits of a Green +New Deal stand far off, and remain largely outside your control. The call must +then be to make a sacrifice for what is good, even if, paradoxically, it costs +you. + +This is, in John Collin's terms, an 'ethic for martyrdom.' So, could John's +apocalyptic rhetorical strategies be of use in motivating UK citizens to take +political actions to advance the cause of a Green New Deal? + +First, I'll consider minority cognition. This was the first aspect of John's +strategy which I considered in the previous chapter. While the particular kind +of minority cognition favoured by John -- that is, direct testimony imparted by +a divine authority -- may be unpersuasive to many UK citizens, the preference +for a minority cognition is still necessary. + +Recall that, as Thompson [@thompson-revelation] argued, St. John needed to use +minority cognition in order to resist the overwhelming weight of the majority +epistemology of Greek society, which would have pressed his audience into +submission to the imperial cult. Likewise, in our society, there is are +empire-like forces constantly reinforcing dominant epistemologies, and among +these is the fossil fuel industry. + +The fossil fuel industry has repeatedly bought out the science \[EVIDENCE\]. It +continues to do so \[EVIDENCE\]. It has also reinforced conceptual frameworks +such as 'carbon footprinting' which serve its interests by shifting blame for +social harms from themselves onto individuals [^See chapter 1]. Therefore, as +long as the fossil fuel industry has significant power, the majority +epistemology of our society cannot help but be partially shaped by fossil fuel +interests. To escape fossil knowledge requires minority cognition. + +This has precedents even within the green movement. In the view of Linda Lear, +the effect of _Silent Spring_, Rachel Carson's damning exposé on the chemical +industry, was to not only bring about regulation, but end an era of +unquestioning trust in government agencies and chemical companies. She exposed +that they hadn't done their homework or had lied. In a Cold War context, +questioning the techno-scientific-industrial authorities could be perceived as +traitorous. Chemical companies fought hard against her, sued the publishers to +try and prevent it being published, then spent a quarter of a million dollars +on an aggressive publicity campaign against her. She was attacked for being +'emotional' and an 'hysterical woman.' The fact she had published novels was +cited as evidence that she couldn't be a real scientist, and her literary +writing style as evidence that what she was writing couldn't be real science. +Real science, the chemical industry hastened to remind the impressionable +public, is necessarily presented in the format of laboratory reports, +maximising their utilisation of technical jargon in order to avoid +under-qualified persons from understanding their contents. Carson had no PhD, +no academic institution, and no network of scientific colleagues to back her +up. [@silent-spring, Afterword] + +To fight the chemical lobby, Carson had to adopt minority epistemology. So, +alongside her considerable arsenal of traditional scientific facts, she +included in her book historical facts based on lived experience, with no +attempt to fit them into clearly-defined quantifiable metrics, in the +scientific style favoured by the chemical industry. One memorable example was +her report that parathion poisoning had been known to induce serious illness +not only in those exposed directly, but also to the physicians who treated +them, and even the hospital staff who washed their clothes. \[PAGE NUMBERS\] + +Like St. John, she was also forced to undermine the chemical industry's +majority epistemology. In _Silent Spring_, she showed how the chemical +industry funded the same science which enabled its profits \[CITE\]. She +undermined their conceptual frameworks, arguing that the use of words like +'pesticide' and 'insecticide' function to mask the truth that the chemicals +involved are in fact poisons (and in some cases were originally developed by +military scientists for the purpose of deliberately injuring and killing human +beings) \[CITE\]. And she showed how the chemical lobby used science to dismiss +valid first-hand experiences and impose their solutions on people against their +interests and expressed desires. For instance, she told the story of Joseph +Sweeny Todd, a \[WHO\] in Ohio, who, in opting for a targeted approach to +containing dutch elm disease rather than blanket poisoning, had to go against +the advice of the chemical companies, the universities, and the US Department +of Agriculture. \[CITE\] + +If rhetors today want to persuade their audiences to support a Green New Deal, +they're going to have to fight the majority epistemology, held firmly in place +by fossil interests. To do that, they'll need to exploit minority cognition, +undermining the epistemologies that best serve fossil interests and finding +alternatives that oppose them. + +The second feature of John's rhetoric I considered was the theme of +tribulations. Just as John's audience stood to lose out if they resisted the +imperial cult, UK citizens stand to lose out, in time, money, and friends, if +they take political action for a Green New Deal. If audiences are to understand +how such a sacrifice could be good for them, they will need to see that their +sacrifices are not meaningless, but part of a much larger context. + +\[EXAMPLES\] + +Finally, the third feature of John's rhetoric I examined was his end-time +speculation. This is already so much a part of green rhetoric that it has led +to considerable meta-discussion already, particularly on the relative merits of +utopian against dystopian schemas [@green-utopias; @forget-me-not, Epilogue]. I +have already examined one example from _The Future We Choose_ +[@future-we-choose]. Green rhetors seem to find it irresistible to speculate on +where this might all end, for good or ill. Even the Cold-War-inspired total +catastrophism is one perspective on the end times. + +St. John, like all biblical apocalypticists, affirms a utopian end-time. As I +discussed in the previous chapter, this is important to his rhetorical goals. +There is no use pointing to a dystopia, or (perhaps worse still) concluding +that we can't really be certain what the ultimate future holds. Such +conclusions would create doubt and fear amongst his audience, and suggest to +them that keeping your head down and submitting to the imperial ideology might +be a safer wager than risking everything on a God who might not be willing or +able to save those who love him. Instead, John, pointing to God's +all-encompassing sovereignty and justice, makes a redemptive end appear +irresistible, thus encouraging his audience to bet the house on Jesus. + +Green rhetors ought to take note of this. A few rhetors have expressed +pessimism about the end, but the dominant motif is uncertainty. _The Future We +Choose_ makes this clear from the very title. In _Forget Me Not_, Sophie +Pavelle insists that although she could conclude either with a dystopian vision +or a utopian vision, she refuses to do either, because the scientific evidence +does not warrant either conclusion [@forget-me-not, Epilogue]. + +This won't do, as should be obvious from the foregoing. If there are no +scientifically valid utopian visions for the future of planet Earth, then green +rhetors must have unscientific visions instead. John faced a similar challenge, +and likewise adopted a minority epistemology -- an eschatological vision -- in +order to convince his audience that the good fight was worth fighting. + +\[EXAMPLES\] |
