rename chp3 -> chp4

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 201 deletions

diff --git a/chapter3.md b/chapter3.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 807837a..0000000
--- a/chapter3.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
-## Chapter 3
-
-In the previous two chapters, I've explored how and why contemporary green
-rhetoric is too often failing, and argued that the apocalyptic form is not one
-of the root causes. In this chapter, I aim to show that in order for green
-rhetoric to succeed, it must imitate some of the rhetorical strategies of the
-Apocalypse.
-
-In order to consider how green rhetoric might succeed, I have to specify: what
-is the rhetor trying to achieve? How are they hoping that it will be achieved?
-And: who are they trying to persuade to do the achieving?
-
-So, for the sake of a discussion point, I will take the example of the Green
-New Deal. The idea behind a Green New Deal, alluding by its name to the 'New
-Deal' of US President Franklin D. Roosevelt \[?\], is a large programme of
-government action at the nation-state level aiming to significantly change the
-way the economy is structured for the better.
-
-There is no fixed list of measures a Green New Deal might contain, but the
-centrepiece measures are likely to include strengthening environmental
-regulations on industry and beefing up enforcement agencies; renationalising
-key industrial sectors, particularly those in control of public goods such as
-transport infrastructure or energy infrastructure; increasing tax on wealth and
-corporations and closing tax loopholes; and spending the money on investment in
-improving and expanding the public realm and subsidising local green
-industries.
-
-The package may also extend, for example, to increasing spending on research
-and development; raising tarrifs on underpriced imported solar panels and wind
-turbines to support the development of national green industries; banning
-fracking and other extreme forms of fossil fuel extraction; instituting a
-moratorium on new data centres; making it easier for corporations to be sued
-for environmental damages; subsidising heat pumps and home insulation; and,
-yes, perhaps even raising carbon taxes.
-
-As with the original New Deal, the wide-ranging scope is thought to be a
-crucial part of the proposal. Each measure is made more attractive to its
-potential supporters because it comes as part of a package promising to
-transform society for the better.
-
-Like the original New Deal, it is not intended to be attractive to everyone. It
-is not designed to be attractive to owners of capital or senior managers, for
-whom a Green New Deal would be very expensive indeed: it would result in huge
-cuts to their salaries, bonuses and dividends, and reduce their power over the
-economy. Nor is the Green New Deal designed to be attractive to neoliberal
-ideologues, who determinedly believe that the invisible hand of the market will
-eventually, eventually, eventually bring about a just society. It could, however,
-be attractive to a large majority of, say, the UK electorate, covering proletarian
-households in both the working classes and many of those in the middle classes.
-
-The original New Deal was largely made possible by an enormous (not to say
-'apocalyptic') wave of industrial action. However, in the US in the 1930s, a
-large proportion of the workforce was unionised, and employed in sectors such
-as manufacturing, energy, and transport, where workers are gathered in
-tight-knit communities on shop floors and strikes hit shareholders hard. In the
-present UK context, unions encompass a much smaller proportion of the
-workforce, and much of the workforce is employed in the service sector, where
-industrial action can be difficult to organise and less effective than in
-primary industries. Industrial action can still play an important role, and
-Matt Huber [@climate-change-class-war] gives an excellent discussion of how
-green rhetoric might be effective in that arena. But because of the structure
-of the UK economy, it's likely that industrial action would have to work
-alongside other forms of political action if a Green New Deal is to be brought
-about in the UK in the next decade or two, and it's those other forms of action
-which I'll focus on.
-
-Alongside industrial action, people in the UK can join political parties, where
-they can shape policies by engaging in internal politics, by voting for
-candidates for election, and by standing for election themselves. They can also
-vote in general elections, ultimately resulting in electing a government which
-prioritises a Green New Deal policy. In order to increase momentum behind the
-movement, they can also join protests or take part in direct action.
-
-Notably, all of these actions may be difficult for those called to take part in
-them. Getting involved in politics in any but the most trivial capacity
-requires giving up evenings and weekends: annoying for, say, a Masters student,
-but potentially a major sacrifice for an exhausted parent working a full-time
-job. Standing for election could be costly to your relationships, and expose
-you to ridicule and abuse. Depending on the action involved, protesting or
-taking direct action could get you arrested. Meanwhile, the benefits of a Green
-New Deal stand far off, and remain largely outside your control. The call must
-then be to make a sacrifice for what is good, even if, paradoxically, it costs
-you.
-
-This is, in John Collin's terms, an 'ethic for martyrdom.' So, could John's
-apocalyptic rhetorical strategies be of use in motivating UK citizens to take
-political actions to advance the cause of a Green New Deal?
-
-First, I'll consider minority cognition. This was the first aspect of John's
-strategy which I considered in the previous chapter. While the particular kind
-of minority cognition favoured by John -- that is, direct testimony imparted by
-a divine authority -- may be unpersuasive to many UK citizens, the preference
-for a minority cognition is still necessary.
-
-Recall that, as Thompson [@thompson-revelation] argued, St. John needed to use
-minority cognition in order to resist the overwhelming weight of the majority
-epistemology of Greek society, which would have pressed his audience into
-submission to the imperial cult. Likewise, in our society, there is are
-empire-like forces constantly reinforcing dominant epistemologies, and among
-these is the fossil fuel industry.
-
-The fossil fuel industry has repeatedly bought out the science \[EVIDENCE\]. It
-continues to do so \[EVIDENCE\]. It has also reinforced conceptual frameworks
-such as 'carbon footprinting' which serve its interests by shifting blame for
-social harms from themselves onto individuals [^See chapter 1]. Therefore, as
-long as the fossil fuel industry has significant power, the majority
-epistemology of our society cannot help but be partially shaped by fossil fuel
-interests. To escape fossil knowledge requires minority cognition.
-
-This has precedents even within the green movement. In the view of Linda Lear,
-the effect of _Silent Spring_, Rachel Carson's damning exposé on the chemical
-industry, was to not only bring about regulation, but end an era of
-unquestioning trust in government agencies and chemical companies. She exposed
-that they hadn't done their homework or had lied. In a Cold War context,
-questioning the techno-scientific-industrial authorities could be perceived as
-traitorous. Chemical companies fought hard against her, sued the publishers to
-try and prevent it being published, then spent a quarter of a million dollars
-on an aggressive publicity campaign against her. She was attacked for being
-'emotional' and an 'hysterical woman.' The fact she had published novels was
-cited as evidence that she couldn't be a real scientist, and her literary
-writing style as evidence that what she was writing couldn't be real science.
-Real science, the chemical industry hastened to remind the impressionable
-public, is necessarily presented in the format of laboratory reports,
-maximising their utilisation of technical jargon in order to avoid
-under-qualified persons from understanding their contents. Carson had no PhD,
-no academic institution, and no network of scientific colleagues to back her
-up. [@silent-spring, Afterword]
-
-To fight the chemical lobby, Carson had to adopt minority epistemology. So,
-alongside her considerable arsenal of traditional scientific facts, she
-included in her book historical facts based on lived experience, with no
-attempt to fit them into clearly-defined quantifiable metrics, in the
-scientific style favoured by the chemical industry. One memorable example was
-her report that parathion poisoning had been known to induce serious illness
-not only in those exposed directly, but also to the physicians who treated
-them, and even the hospital staff who washed their clothes. \[PAGE NUMBERS\]
-
-Like St. John, she was also forced to undermine the chemical industry's
-majority epistemology. In _Silent Spring_, she showed how the chemical
-industry funded the same science which enabled its profits \[CITE\]. She
-undermined their conceptual frameworks, arguing that the use of words like
-'pesticide' and 'insecticide' function to mask the truth that the chemicals
-involved are in fact poisons (and in some cases were originally developed by
-military scientists for the purpose of deliberately injuring and killing human
-beings) \[CITE\]. And she showed how the chemical lobby used science to dismiss
-valid first-hand experiences and impose their solutions on people against their
-interests and expressed desires. For instance, she told the story of Joseph
-Sweeny Todd, a \[WHO\] in Ohio, who, in opting for a targeted approach to
-containing dutch elm disease rather than blanket poisoning, had to go against
-the advice of the chemical companies, the universities, and the US Department
-of Agriculture. \[CITE\]
-
-If rhetors today want to persuade their audiences to support a Green New Deal,
-they're going to have to fight the majority epistemology, held firmly in place
-by fossil interests. To do that, they'll need to exploit minority cognition,
-undermining the epistemologies that best serve fossil interests and finding
-alternatives that oppose them.
-
-The second feature of John's rhetoric I considered was the theme of
-tribulations. Just as John's audience stood to lose out if they resisted the
-imperial cult, UK citizens stand to lose out, in time, money, and friends, if
-they take political action for a Green New Deal. If audiences are to understand
-how such a sacrifice could be good for them, they will need to see that their
-sacrifices are not meaningless, but part of a much larger context.
-
-\[EXAMPLES\]
-
-Finally, the third feature of John's rhetoric I examined was his end-time
-speculation. This is already so much a part of green rhetoric that it has led
-to considerable meta-discussion already, particularly on the relative merits of
-utopian against dystopian schemas [@green-utopias; @forget-me-not, Epilogue]. I
-have already examined one example from _The Future We Choose_
-[@future-we-choose]. Green rhetors seem to find it irresistible to speculate on
-where this might all end, for good or ill. Even the Cold-War-inspired total
-catastrophism is one perspective on the end times.
-
-St. John, like all biblical apocalypticists, affirms a utopian end-time. As I
-discussed in the previous chapter, this is important to his rhetorical goals.
-There is no use pointing to a dystopia, or (perhaps worse still) concluding
-that we can't really be certain what the ultimate future holds. Such
-conclusions would create doubt and fear amongst his audience, and suggest to
-them that keeping your head down and submitting to the imperial ideology might
-be a safer wager than risking everything on a God who might not be willing or
-able to save those who love him. Instead, John, pointing to God's
-all-encompassing sovereignty and justice, makes a redemptive end appear
-irresistible, thus encouraging his audience to bet the house on Jesus.
-
-Green rhetors ought to take note of this. A few rhetors have expressed
-pessimism about the end, but the dominant motif is uncertainty. _The Future We
-Choose_ makes this clear from the very title. In _Forget Me Not_, Sophie
-Pavelle insists that although she could conclude either with a dystopian vision
-or a utopian vision, she refuses to do either, because the scientific evidence
-does not warrant either conclusion [@forget-me-not, Epilogue].
-
-This won't do, as should be obvious from the foregoing. If there are no
-scientifically valid utopian visions for the future of planet Earth, then green
-rhetors must have unscientific visions instead. John faced a similar challenge,
-and likewise adopted a minority epistemology -- an eschatological vision -- in
-order to convince his audience that the good fight was worth fighting.
-
-\[EXAMPLES\]