second pass

6 files changed, 267 insertions, 371 deletions

diff --git a/chapter0.md b/chapter0.md
index c535b18..4dd1f45 100644
--- a/chapter0.md
+++ b/chapter0.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ## Introduction
 
-My thesis is that green rhetoric would be more successful were it to be more
-apocalyptic, not less.
+My thesis is that green rhetoric must be apocalyptic as modelled by the biblical
+Apocalypse of John.
 
 While the word 'rhetoric' is often used to suggest empty or untrustworthy
 political speech, my sense is much broader than this. By 'rhetoric', I mean an
@@ -10,59 +10,41 @@ are putting forth language with the intention of causing their audience to make
 something happen.
 
 By 'green', I am narrowing down that very broad category to specifically the
-political rhetoric belonging to a particular historical situation: the green
-movement^[We could use a range of epithets in the place of 'green':
-'environmental,' 'conservation,' 'nature,' 'wilding,' 're-wilding,' 'climate,'
-'ecological,' to name but a few. For the purposes of this dissertation, I will
-prefer the name 'green' to refer to this movement and the closely-related
-cluster of issues which these names represent.].
+political rhetoric belonging to a particular historical situation: the 'green,'
+or 'environmental,' movement.
 
 In the 1960s, major environmental institutions rapidly gained mass membership,
-especially among the urban professional middle classes, in many Western nations,
-forming the basis of the modern green movement [@sutton-environment, p. 103].
-Rachel Carson's _Silent Spring_ caused a huge public controversy over the use of
-poison to control alleged environmental threats, and thus helped to kick green
-rhetoric up to the highest level of politics in the US and other countries
-[@silent-spring, pp. 122-124]. In its wake followed wave upon wave of
-legislation. To sample just some of the US federal legislation in the decade
-following _Silent Spring_:
-
-- Clean Air Act 1963
-- Wilderness Act 1964
-- National Environmental Policy Act 1969
-- Occupational Safety and Health Act 1970
-- Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 1972
+especially among the Western middle classes, forming the basis of the modern
+green movement [@sutton-environment, p. 103]. Rachel Carson's _Silent Spring_
+caused a huge public controversy over the use of poison to control alleged
+environmental threats, and thus helped to kick green rhetoric up to the highest
+level of politics in the US and other countries [@silent-spring, pp. 122-124].
+Waves of legislation followed, protecting clean air, clean water, and wildlife.
 
 From the beginning, one of the central issues of the green movement was nuclear
-power. Throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, nuclear power functioned as the
-dominant 'master frame' of the green movement, so that all other green issues
-tended to be framed in nuclear terms.
+power. Until the 1980s, nuclear power functioned as the 'master frame' of the
+green movement: all other green issues tended to be framed in nuclear terms.
 
-For example, in _Silent Spring_, Carson wrote that 'only within the moment of time
-represented by the present century has one species – man – acquired significant
-power to alter the nature of his world.' This statement echoed widespread
-sentiments about nuclear power. For example, in what became known as the
-'Russell-Einstein Manifesto,' eleven eminent scientists including Bertrand
-Russell and Albert Einstein appealed to the public to put aside national
-security concerns and consider themselves 'only as members of a biological
-species,' and warned that nuclear weapons threatened 'universal death'
-[@russell-einstein]. Carson argued that 'the most alarming of all man’s assaults
-upon the environment' was not nuclear weapons, but chemicals. Nevertheless, in
-order to make her point, she adopted an explicitly nuclear framing:
+For example, in _Silent Spring_, Carson wrote that 'only within the moment of
+time represented by the present century has one species – man – acquired
+significant power to alter the nature of his world.' This statement echoed
+widespread sentiments about nuclear power such as that expressed in the
+'Russell-Einstein Manifesto' [@russell-einstein]. Carson argued that 'the most
+alarming of all man’s assaults upon the environment' was not nuclear weapons,
+but chemicals. Nevertheless, she adopted an explicitly nuclear framing:
 
 > In this now universal contamination of the environment, chemicals are the
 > sinister and little-recognized partners of radiation in changing the very
 > nature of the world – the very nature of its life. [@silent-spring, p. 17]
 
-At times, governments, particularly in nuclear-armed NATO states such as the US
-and the UK, distributed public information campaigns informing citizens on how
-to prepare for a nuclear attack, while secretly preparing in the knowledge that
-tens of millions of civilians would be killed directly, probably resulting in a
-total breakdown of civil society [@american-apocalyptic, pp. 48-53;
-@young-2017; @waller-2026].
+At times, governments informed citizens on how best to prepare for a nuclear
+attack, while secretly preparing for tens of millions of civilians to be killed
+directly, probably resulting in a total breakdown of civil society
+[@american-apocalyptic, pp. 48-53; @young-2017; @waller-2026].
 
-In the views of anti-nuclear campaigners, such rhetoric served to quell
-resistance to pro-nuclear policies. A CND leaflet from the 1980s asserted that:
+In the views of anti-nuclear campaigners, keep-calm-and-carry-on rhetoric served
+to quell resistance to pro-nuclear policies. A CND leaflet from the 1980s
+asserted that:
 
 > The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament does not wish to belittle the efforts of
 > Civil Defence workers who train themselves to help their fellow-citizens in
@@ -70,38 +52,36 @@ resistance to pro-nuclear policies. A CND leaflet from the 1980s asserted that:
 > save millions if a nuclear war breaks out. They use Civil Defence to delude
 > people that Britain could survive an all-out nuclear attack. [@cnd-civil-defence]
 
-To fight back against this rhetoric, rhetors invented terms such as 'nuclear
-winter', 'nuclear holocaust', 'nuclear apocalypse', and 'nuclear Armageddon',
-attempting to persuade their audiences that a nuclear war would bring about the
-end of the world, and must therefore be avoided at all costs [see e.g.
-@nuclear-winters-tale, chp. 6].
+To fight back, rhetors invented terms such as 'nuclear winter', 'nuclear
+holocaust', 'nuclear apocalypse', and 'nuclear Armageddon', arguing a nuclear
+war would bring about the end of the world, and must therefore be avoided at all
+costs [see e.g. @nuclear-winters-tale, chp. 6].
 
 Beginning in the late 1980s, climate change moved in to take over the role of
 the green movement's master frame [@rootes-2012]. However, the movement's
-nuclear heritage left an indelible impression on the way greens talked about
-climate change. Environmental campaigners tended to frame climate change in
-terms of an impending sudden catastrophe which might strike at any time: a model
-far better suited to the prospect of nuclear winter than that of climate change
-unfolding over decades and centuries [@ertelt-2018, pp. 25-38]. In 1990,
-Margaret Thatcher described the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
-as an 'early warning system' [@thatcher-1990-05-15]. The Greenpeace Report on
-global warming of the same year noted that 'even nuclear-weapons laboratories
-host conferences on the greenhouse effect these days' [@greenpeace-report, p. 1]
-and concluded in response to what it called the 'greenhouse threat' that 'the
-prospects of future environmental security being compromised by global warming
-are now so real as to make adoption of a precautionary response imperative – in
-other words, policy should focus on buying insurance' [@greenpeace-report, p.
-460].
+nuclear heritage has left its mark. Environmental campaigners still tend to
+frame climate change in terms of an impending sudden catastrophe which might
+strike at any time: a far better description of nuclear winter than of climate
+change [@ertelt-2018, pp. 25-38].
+
+In 1990, Margaret Thatcher described the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
+Change (IPCC) as an 'early warning system' [@thatcher-1990-05-15]. The
+Greenpeace Report on global warming of the same year noted that 'even
+nuclear-weapons laboratories host conferences on the greenhouse effect these
+days' [@greenpeace-report, p. 1] and concluded in response to what it called the
+'greenhouse threat' that 'the prospects of future environmental security being
+compromised by global warming are now so real as to make adoption of a
+precautionary response imperative – in other words, policy should focus on
+buying insurance' [@greenpeace-report, p. 460].
 
 This is where green rhetoric stands today. In recent decades, many of the most
-important political demands of the green movement have not been realised, and
-many scholars have supposed that green rhetoric is not fulfilling its proper
-function of delivering change. In this rest of this dissertation, I will first
-explore why it might be that green rhetoric is failing to deliver political
-change, before exploring in more detail one particular allegation: green
-rhetoric isn't working because it is too apocalyptic. I will argue that this
-diagnosis is unhelpful and untrue. In contrast, I will argue not only that green
-rhetors must continue to use the motif of catastrophe most strongly associated
-with apocalyptic, but they must draw deeper on other aspects of apocalyptic
-language which have been heretofore neglected by green rhetors, if they are to
-play their proper part in delivering political change.
+important political demands of the green movement have not been realised.
+Green rhetoric is not delivering change.
+
+In the chapters which follow, I will first explore why it might be that green
+rhetoric is failing to deliver political change, before exploring in more detail
+one particular allegation: green rhetoric is too catastrophic, or, in the terms
+of some critics, 'apocalyptic.' In contrast, I will argue not only that green
+rhetors must continue to use catastrophic language, but they must also draw
+deeper on other aspects of apocalyptic language which have been heretofore
+neglected, if green rhetors are to play their part in delivering change.
diff --git a/chapter1.md b/chapter1.md
index 4926b27..fa214c8 100644
--- a/chapter1.md
+++ b/chapter1.md
@@ -1,20 +1,16 @@
 ## Chapter 1
 
-Since the 1980s, the green movement has been on the back foot. There have of
-course been many green successes on the local scale. But, in stark contrast to
-the 1960s and 1970s, when the green lobby succeeded in delivering strong
-government legislation to protect clean air, water, and establish nature
-reserves, in the last few decades, most of the key social-scale demands of the
-green movement have not been met, and even some of those earlier successes have
-been partially rolled back.
-
-Human beings have burned more coal since 1987 than they did from 1800 until
-1987, and more oil and gas since the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1993 than
-between 1800 and that time [@owid-fossil-fuels; @energy-inst-2025; @smil-2017].
-Once upon a time, environmental campaigners declared that 400 parts of carbon
-dioxide per million in the atmosphere ought to be an uncrossable red line: last
-year, the figure ticked steadily up past 428 [@noaa-co2]. Without changes to
-government policies, plastic pollution is set to triple between 2020 and 2040
+Since the 1980s, the green movement has been on the back foot. In stark contrast
+to the legislative successes of the 1960s and 1970s, in the last few decades,
+the social-scale demands of the green movement have broadly not been met.
+
+Human beings have burned more oil and gas, and almost as much coal, since the
+Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1993 than between 1800 and that time
+[@owid-fossil-fuels; @energy-inst-2025; @smil-2017]. Once upon a time,
+environmental campaigners declared that 350 parts of carbon dioxide per million
+in the atmosphere ought to be an uncrossable red line: last year, the figure
+ticked steadily up past 428 [@noaa-co2]. Without changes to government policies,
+plastic pollution is set to triple between 2020 and 2040
 [@breaking-plastic-wave]. Since 1974, the proportion of the world's fish stocks
 deemed by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation to be within sustainable
 levels has fallen from 90% to 62% [@unfao-fish-stocks]. The Living Planet Index,
@@ -25,33 +21,27 @@ All these failures beg the question: why aren't the green movement's strategies
 working? 'Has public attention gone numb?' asks journalist Harrison Stetler. 'Is
 the sense of crisis faced with the devastating effects of climate change feeding
 passivity — or even the rush to preserve past privileges — rather than
-mobilization?' [@stetler-2025] In particular, I want to focus on the movement's
-rhetoric.
-
-Rhetoric, as I'm using the term, refers to an utterance with an agenda. When
-green rhetoric works well, it solves a problem relevant to green concerns. In
-order to solve the problem, the rhetor must persuade their audience that taking
-action is good for them. For that action to be effective in solving the problem,
-the rhetor must also address an appropriate audience: that is, an audience that
-has or could have the means, motive, and opportunity to solve the relevant
-problem. Furthermore, they must present their audience with a credible solution,
-and if the solution is to be credible, the rhetor will be best placed if they
-have accurately identified the root causes of the problem.
-
-There are problems with dominant green rhetoric from beginning to end of this
-process: rhetors mis-diagnose the root causes of the problem, propose solutions
-which are not credible, and mis-identify their audience.
-
-First, green rhetoric mis-diagnoses the problem. Rhetors imply that the
+mobilization?' [@stetler-2025]
+
+In order to solve a problem, a rhetor must persuade their audience that taking
+action is good for them. For that action to solve the problem, the rhetor must
+address an appropriate audience. Furthermore, they must present a credible
+solution, and if the solution is to be credible, the rhetor ought to have
+accurately identified the root causes of the problem.
+
+There are problems with mainstream green rhetoric from beginning to end of this
+process: rhetors mis-diagnose the root causes of the problem, propose incredible
+solutions, and mis-identify their audience.
+
+First, green rhetoric mis-diagnoses the problem. Many rhetors imply that the
 root cause of green evils is the combined choices, and particularly the
 consumption choices, of all the world's individuals.
 
-So, when Christiana Figueres and Tom Rivett-Carnac come to recommend ten actions
-for their readers to take to fight climate change, coming in at number 4 (after
-'Let Go of the Old World,' 'Face Your Grief but Hold a Vision of the Future,'
-and 'Defend the Truth') is 'See Yourself as a Citizen – Not as a Consumer.' The
+So, when Christiana Figueres, a leading architect of the 2015 Paris Agreement,
+wrote to the general public on the problems and solutions to climate change,
+she overwhelmingly focused on individual psychology. In her telling, the
 problem is that 'we' (that is, the universal human individual) are consuming too
-much. The solution is to change the psychology which causes over-consumption.
+much. The solution is to change the psychology behind over-consumption.
 
 > Much of what we buy is intended to enhance our sense of identity. Particular
 > brands of clothes, soap, cookies, televisions, and cars and designed with a
@@ -61,7 +51,7 @@ much. The solution is to change the psychology which causes over-consumption.
 > five loads of laundry. These purchases are driven mainly by the fact that
 > fashion trends change every season. [@future-we-choose, p. 118]
 
-They're not alone in emphasising individual psychology as a root cause of
+Figueres is not alone in emphasising individual psychology as a root cause of
 climate change. For example, writing about climate change with TV co-host Chris
 Packham, Megan McCubbin, discussing 'our human reluctance to change our own
 mindsets and behaviours,' writes:
@@ -72,10 +62,9 @@ mindsets and behaviours,' writes:
 > practices? [@back-to-nature, p. 31]
 
 Part of the answer, they argue, is that political thought is associated with the
-prefrontal cortex, which is also associated with personal expression: thus,
-inviting people to think differently about a political issue like climate change
-can be perceived as a personal attack, preventing people from thinking
-rationally. [@back-to-nature, pp. 32-33]
+prefrontal cortex, also associated with personal expression: thus, debating with
+people about climate change can be perceived as a personal attack, preventing
+people from thinking rationally. [@back-to-nature, pp. 32-33]
 
 This analysis identifies a psychological problem – why can't human beings like
 you and me act rationally when presented with the facts? Having done so, it's
@@ -87,29 +76,7 @@ everyone else that matters will follow our lead.
 > are your wheels. If you turn right, they will turn right too. Eventually.
 > [@back-to-nature, p. 95]
 
-Fellow nature writer Benedict Macdonald extends this idea, that green harms are
-driven by 'our' consumption, into a sweeping grand history of the human race
-from primeval time:
-
-> \[…] we became systematic, methodical and determined in our eradication of
-> some cornerstone species \[…] By the Middle Ages, our desire to tame the
-> natural world around us grew in intensity and purpose \[…] As we began to
-> industrialise, the Great Fens would be drained and our conquest of the
-> land-at-scale, beginning with our deforestation in the Bronze Age, grew almost
-> complete \[…] By the early twentieth century, we had for the first time the
-> ability to create total order in the world around us; order that made way for
-> just one species’ progress and stability: ourselves. \[…] By the late 1950s
-> and early 1960s came a critical moment in human awareness. We began to notice,
-> at last, the growing silence around us. By this stage, the environmental
-> movement was nascent \[…] it would take further decades before, at last, the
-> Ape Aware would emerge. [@cornerstones, pp. 200-202]
-
-In Macdonald's account, the reason 'we' caused so much harm to the non-human
-world is because 'we' stole stuff to make 'us' richer: land, trees, food, water.
-Thus 'our' consumption is what drives ecological catastrophe.
-
-The idea that green harms are driven by consumption is further reinforced with
-the language of 'carbon footprinting.' The idea seems innocuous enough: tot up
+'Carbon footprinting' reinforces the focus on individual consumption. Tot up
 the carbon emissions produced in the process of producing all the goods and
 services consumed by a person, and you've got their 'carbon footprint,' their
 personal contribution to global carbon dioxide emissions. WWF publishes a free
@@ -131,9 +98,8 @@ investments (e.g. in infrastructure) and international transport,' before
 showing that the the poorest half of the world's people only account for 10% of
 the world's 'lifestyle emissions.' [@oxfam-extreme-carbon-inequality]
 
-However, this analysis downplays the degree to which consumption is constrained
-by production decisions over which most people have no control. As Matthew Huber
-puts it:
+However, this analysis overstates the degree of control people have over the
+their own consumption. As Matthew Huber puts it:
 
 > Carbon footprint analysis is more deeply rooted in neoclassical economics with
 > its particular theory of power in the economy known as "consumer sovereignty."
@@ -146,21 +112,15 @@ puts it:
 
 But in reality, consumers are often at the mercy of production decisions. To
 borrow Huber's illustration, the villain of the 'carbon footprint' narrative is
-a rich consumer, say, someone who has the air conditioning on all day in their
-spacious suburban house and drives a over-sized diesel SUV to work. But imagine
-that hypothetical rich consumer works in the manager's office of a fertiliser
-plant, where one day he is presented with the option of sourcing low-carbon
-hydrogen from electrolysis of water instead of extracting the hydrogen from
-coal. He decides that the low-carbon alternative is too expensive and will make
-his factory uncompetitive, so sticks with the coal. The carbon emissions of the
-factory, which might be equivalent to 100,000 American consumers, are not
-attributed to the manager of the factory, nor even the factory's owners, but to
-the 'carbon footprint' of the thousands of consumers eating the food produced at
-the ultimate end of the process, even though they are unlikely to have any power
-or even knowledge over the manager's decisions. 'This person spends eight hours
-a day managing this industrial capitalist enterprise and only perhaps forty
-minutes commuting to work—so why do we only pay attention to the latter?'
-[@climate-change-class-war, p. 16]
+a rich consumer, say, someone who drives a over-sized diesel SUV to work. But
+imagine that one day, that hypothetical rich consumer drives their SUV to their
+senior manager's office in a fertiliser plant, where they are presented with the
+option of switching their hydrogen source from coal to electrolysis of water. In
+carbon footprint analysis, if he sticks with coal, the resulting extra carbon
+emissions, which might be equivalent to tens of thousands of individual
+consumers, won't be attributed to the manager of the factory, nor the factory's
+owners, but thousands of end-product consumers, even though they have to eat to
+live, and are practically powerless over the manager's decisions.
 
 Taking an alternative approach, many green rhetors advocate for a simple
 programme: listen to the science, then act rationally. This call to action
@@ -174,10 +134,9 @@ February 2019, she spoke to a gathering of EU civil servants in Brussels:
 > talk to them either. We want them to talk to the scientists instead.
 > [@no-one-is-too-small, pp. 53-54]
 
-In September of the same year, while the US government was halfway through the
-4-year process of withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, she spoke at the US
-Congress. In a speech which repeatedly referenced Martin Luther King Junior's 'I
-have a dream' speech, she pleaded with legislators:
+She spoke at the US Congress in September of the same year. Having repeatedly
+referenced Martin Luther King Junior's 'I have a dream' speech, she pleaded with
+legislators:
 
 > Perhaps it is impossible. But looking at those numbers – looking at the
 > current best available science signed by every nation – then I think that is
@@ -186,9 +145,8 @@ have a dream' speech, she pleaded with legislators:
 > your children's future on the flip of a coin. Instead, you must unite behind
 > the science. [@no-one-is-too-small, pp. 122-123]
 
-In their 1996 rationalist-environmentalist call to arms, _Betrayal of Science
-and Reason_, Paul and Anne Ehrlich were explicit about how they saw the link
-between science and government policy:
+In their 1996 _Betrayal of Science and Reason_, Paul and Anne Ehrlich explained
+their rationalist account of how science ought to drive government policy:
 
 > In short, people should have faith in their own judgment when they've taken
 > the time to examine different views of an issue and taken into account their
@@ -198,21 +156,18 @@ between science and government policy:
 > sustainable future. [@betrayal-science-reason, p. 212]
 
 For such rhetors, the bogeyman is the 'science denier' or 'science fraudster'.
-Much of _Betrayal and Science and Reason_ is taken up with naming, exposing, and
-rebutting some of the authors' critics, whom they derogatively label
-'brownlashes.' In Thunberg's speeches, she has repeatedly proclaimed the
-narrative that 'we spoke the science and demanded that the people in power would
-listen to and act on the science, but our political leaders didn't listen'
-[@no-one-is-too-small, p. 134].
+Much of _Betrayal and Science and Reason_ is dedicated to rebutting
+'brownlashes.' In Thunberg's speeches, she repeatedly proclaims that 'we spoke
+the science and demanded that the people in power would listen to and act on the
+science, but our political leaders didn't listen' [@no-one-is-too-small, p. 134].
 
 However, there's no particular reason to think that the fossil fuel industry is
-scientifically incompetent or unable to act rationally. In fact, fossil fuel
-companies are if anything astonishingly capable of mustering scientific and
-technological resources to act rationally. Fossil fuel extraction makes
+irrational or unscientific. In fact, fossil fuel companies are some of the
+world's most scientifically capable organisations. Fossil fuel extraction makes
 intensive use of technological and scientific resources, from the geological
 surveying needed to identify reserves to the hydraulic engineering needed to
 pump gas and oil from underground or subsea reservoirs. Despite these
-technological and scientific challenges, fossil fuel companies among the world's
+technological and scientific challenges, fossil fuel companies rank among the world's
 profitable. Adding together the most recent annual profits from the five largest
 state-owned fossil fuel companies and the five largest public fossil fuel
 companies produces a number well over $500 billion [@energy-profits-jun-25].
@@ -220,24 +175,25 @@ companies produces a number well over $500 billion [@energy-profits-jun-25].
 Even the production of so-called 'fake science' can be seen as the result of the
 fossil fuel industry acting rationally on the basis of the scientific evidence.
 As I'll explore in more detail in chapter 4, the fossil fuel industry is
-following the tobacco industry's strategies and even hiring the same PR
-consultants in their campaign to use science to influence public opinion. The
-problem for the world is not that people aren't listening to the science, but
-rather that fossil fuel companies, and other business lobbies, have an interest
-in poisoning the world, and powerful means of ensuring their interests are met.
-So again, the 'listen to the science' line mis-diagnoses the root causes of
-green issues, and thus fails to bring about change.
-
-Having mis-diagnosed the root causes of the problem, green rhetors too often go
-on to propose politically impossible solutions. The worst is simply to cut
-individual consumption. Since _The Limits to Growth_ was published for the Club
-of Rome in 1972 [@limits-to-growth], bolstered by eco-classics such as _Small Is
-Beautiful_ (1973) [@small-is-beautiful] and _The Population Bomb_ (1968)
-[@population-bomb], the green movement has frequently emphasised a message of
-austerity, echoing the austerity rhetoric which dominated the cost-of-living
-discourse in the 1970s and since [@climate-change-class-war, pp. 158-159].
-
-So, in 2006, George Monbiot set out his manifesto for putting the UK through a
+following the tobacco industry's strategies in their campaign to use science to
+influence public opinion. The problem for the world is not that people aren't
+listening to the science, but rather that fossil fuel companies, and other
+business lobbies, have an interest in allowing climate catastrophe to continue
+unabated, and powerful means of ensuring their interests are met.
+
+Rhetors who target individual consumption or 'science denial' mis-diagnose the
+root causes of green issues. Having mis-diagnosed the root causes of the
+problem, they too often go on to propose politically impossible solutions.
+
+Perhaps the worst proposal is to cut individual consumption. Since _The Limits
+to Growth_ was published for the Club of Rome in 1972 [@limits-to-growth],
+bolstered by eco-classics such as _Small Is Beautiful_ (1973)
+[@small-is-beautiful] and _The Population Bomb_ (1968) [@population-bomb], the
+green movement has frequently emphasised a message of austerity, echoing the
+austerity rhetoric which has dominated the cost-of-living discourse since the
+1970s [@climate-change-class-war, pp. 158-159].
+
+In 2006, George Monbiot set out his manifesto for putting the UK through a
 90% cut in greenhouse gas emissions. While Monbiot acknowledged that austerity
 rhetoric was a hard sell, repent did he not:
 
@@ -285,36 +241,33 @@ services. Christiana Figueres and Tom Rivett-Carnac implore their readers:
 heat and electricity respond to such demands?' asks Matt Huber
 [@climate-change-class-war, p. 170]. Most consumption for most people is not
 discretionary even in the Global North, and this is even more true in the Global
-South. There is no feasible route to persuading people to impose voluntary
-austerity upon themselves en masse.
-
-Another favourite of green rhetors is to propose smart market-based policies,
-mainly taxing carbon, aimed at tweaking the incentives for private capital to
-nudge the market into financing economic transformation. It's hard to disagree
-with eloquent experts like Sir Dieter Helm [@legacy] who argues that a
-sustainable economy must observe what he calls the 'polluter-pays principle.'
-However, too often, smart market tweaks are proposed which exacerbate market
-injustice, effectively levying the cost of economic transformation on those
-already squeezed by markets. This is not politically sustainable.
-
-In March 1993, for example, Norman Lamont announced a fuel price 'escalator',
-promising to gradually increase fuel duty, partly in order to reduce carbon
-dioxide emissions. A tobacco escalator followed in November. However, amidst
-criticism that the fuel duty was regressive and ineffective and protests from
-lorry drivers, Gordon Brown was forced in March 2000 to rescind the escalator
-and reduce fuel duty [@parl-fuel-escalator; @bbc-fuel-duty-cut]. In 2018,
-Emmanuel Macron suffered a huge loss to his political authority after a similar
-fuel duty policy bequeathed to him by a previous government sparked the 'gilets
-jaunes' civil disobedience movement [@bbc-gilets-jaunes].
+South. There is no feasible route to mass voluntary austerity.
+
+Another favourite of green rhetors is to propose 'smart' market-based policies,
+such as taxing carbon, aimed at nudging the market into financing economic
+transformation through private capital. It's hard to disagree with eloquent
+experts like Sir Dieter Helm [@legacy] who argues that a sustainable economy
+must observe what he calls the 'polluter-pays principle.' However, too often,
+rhetors propose solutions which exacerbate market injustice, effectively levying
+the cost of change on those already squeezed by markets.
+
+In March 1993, for example, Norman Lamont, then Chancellor of the Exchequer,
+announced a fuel price 'escalator', promising to gradually increase fuel duty,
+partly in order to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. A tobacco escalator followed
+in November. However, amidst criticism that the fuel duty was regressive and
+ineffective and protests from lorry drivers, Gordon Brown was forced in March
+2000 to rescind the escalator and reduce fuel duty [@parl-fuel-escalator;
+@bbc-fuel-duty-cut]. In 2018, Emmanuel Macron suffered a huge loss to his
+political authority after a similar fuel duty policy bequeathed to him by a
+previous government sparked the 'gilets jaunes' civil disobedience movement
+[@bbc-gilets-jaunes].
 
 So, while smart market fixes might work on paper, they are too often divorced
-from any politically sustainable programme. Thus, here too, green rhetoric has
-failed to demonstrate to their audience that the change they advocate will be
-good for them, and thus their proposals are politically impossible.
+from any politically sustainable programme.
 
 Finally, having mis-diagnosed the root causes of the issues and proposed
-solutions their audience cannot support, green rhetors fail to properly identify
-an audience that can make a difference.
+solutions their audience cannot support, green rhetors fail to identify an
+appropriate audience.
 
 As I've already shown, green rhetors have a tendency to address an unspecified
 'we,' suggesting a universal human individual, implying that for all relevant
@@ -334,9 +287,9 @@ nevertheless obtained currency far beyond the discipline of geology
 For many scholars, in the world beyond the technical debates of geological
 technocrats, the term 'Anthropocene' describes the present time as one
 characterised by human domination over the Earth. The choice of 'anthropos,' or
-'human,' as the focus point, rather than 'animal' or 'accountant,' implies that
-responsibility for recent changes to Earth's ecosystems are shared roughly
-equally amongst all and only humans.
+'human,' as the focus point, rather than 'mammal' or 'management consultant,'
+implies that responsibility for recent changes to Earth's ecosystems are shared
+roughly equally amongst all and only humans.
 
 Some critics have proposed alternative terms such as 'Capitalocene' or
 'Oligarchocene' so as to more fairly reflect the social texture of the changing
@@ -344,10 +297,7 @@ relationship of human beings within Earth ecosystems [see e.g.
 @anthropocene-or-capitalocene, @blaser-2018]. But Anthropocene, by describing
 the shaping power over Earth's ecosystems as the undifferentiated 'anthropos',
 downplays the importance of the different powers and interests between different
-humans. Thus, when a green rhetor uses the word 'Anthropocene', they suggest
-that you and I engage in environmental discourses as a universalised human, that
-our location in social systems is not relevant to our location in Earth
-ecosystems.
+humans.
 
 For example, Mike Berners-Lee uses the word 'Anthropocene' liberally in his
 public appearances. In his popular book, _There Is No Planet B_, he describes
@@ -379,7 +329,7 @@ that is at fault, it is easy to elide super-human social structures with the
 human individual.
 
 In reality, green rhetoric is primarily addressed not to an imaginary universal
-human individual, but to the Western middle classes. This makes sense, since the
+human 'we,' but to the Western middle classes. This makes sense, since the
 green movement has historically been heavily dominated by large non-governmental
 organisations such as the RSPB, National Audubon Society, Friends of the Earth,
 Greenpeace, and WWF, to name but a few. Typically, such NGOs don't depend on
@@ -393,18 +343,18 @@ concerns are often seen as less important or relevant to environmentalism by the
 dominant NGOs [@working-class-env, p. 13].
 
 But what change is it that Western professional middle classes are capable of
-bringing about? If it's not reducing your individual 'carbon footprint' – which,
-as I've already discussed, is not a proposal with legs – green rhetors have a
-tendency to propose actions which could only be achieved by the imaginary
-universal human 'we,' and not by their actual audience.
+bringing about? If it's not reducing your individual 'carbon footprint' – not,
+as I've already discussed, a proposal with legs – green rhetors have a tendency
+to propose actions achievable only by the imaginary universal human 'we,' not
+their actual audience.
 
 One common rallying cry is for an international agreement. Greta Thunberg has
 spent a great deal of her considerable campaigning energy attending
 international diplomatic summits, such as UN Climate Change Conferences of the
 Parties (COPs) and the World Economic Forum. _An Inconvenient Truth_, Al Gore's
 influential campaign film, was primarily motivated by the desire to see the US
-get back on board with the Kyoto agreement. Only in December, Fiona Harvey wrote
-a 10-year retrospective of the Paris Agreement for the Guardian, in which she
+get back on board with the Kyoto agreement. Last December, Fiona Harvey wrote
+a 10-year retrospective of the Paris Agreement for the Guardian. She
 lauded its achievements and declared, 'the question now is: can countries learn
 from the mistakes of the past decade, in order to keep the Paris agreement alive
 in the next?' [@harvey-2025-12-13]
@@ -439,7 +389,7 @@ to default to activism, but this has no route to political success:
 
 Sadly, despite the great excitement protests often generate, they typically have
 limited material impacts on governments. It is therefore easy for governments to
-pay lip service to some grand ideals and move on. The net result is little
+pay lip service to the protesters' cause and move on. The net result is little
 political change and feelings of betrayal, demonstrated, as eloquently as ever,
 by Thunberg:
 
@@ -455,15 +405,14 @@ putting harms down to individual consumption choices and science denial, whereas
 in fact, these factors play a relatively small role in explaining ecological
 harm, and other factors, such as industrial production decisions shaped by
 markets, are much more significant. A mis-diagnosis of the problem leads to
-false solutions: austerity or 'smart' market fixes, neither of which are not
-politically sustainable. This in turn is due to green rhetors failing to take
-account of the powers and interests of their audience. Rhetors speak as if they
-are addressing an imaginary universal human 'we' capable of acting rationally in
-the universal human interest, asking them to take actions such as creating
-international agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But in fact, green
-rhetors do not address that imaginary 'we,' but rather the Western middle
-classes, who may not have the right powers and interests for such exhortations
-to be feasible.
+false solutions such as voluntary austerity or 'smart' market fixes. Moreover,
+green rhetors fail to take account of the powers and interests of their
+audience. Rhetors speak as if they are addressing an imaginary universal human
+'we' capable of acting rationally in the universal human interest, asking them
+to take actions such as creating international agreements to reduce greenhouse
+gas emissions. But in fact, green rhetors do not address that imaginary 'we,'
+but rather the Western middle classes, who may not have the right powers and
+interests for such exhortations to be feasible.
 
 This begs the question: if green rhetoric is failing, how might it be fixed? One
 common suggestion is that green rhetoric needs to be less catastrophic. Since
diff --git a/chapter2.md b/chapter2.md
index 43cc7f8..845ede1 100644
--- a/chapter2.md
+++ b/chapter2.md
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ of a geological catastrophe. Cosmos-scale world-changing events destroy much of
 the existing world order and its life-sustaining powers: the heavens are
 rolled up like a scroll, the sun and moon are darkened, water turns to blood,
 fire rains down from above. In its place, a new world order is established,
-which enables different forms of life. Al Gore, in his influential global
+supporting different forms of life. Al Gore, in his influential global
 warming campaign film, _An Inconvenient Truth_, was (and remains) typical in the
 way he describes the consequences of certain floods and wildfires as 'like a
 nature hike through the Book of Revelations' [@inconvenient-truth]. In the next
@@ -169,59 +169,36 @@ widespread phenomenon in mainstream American media. This media landscape
 neutralises what might have been active concern and transforms it into apathetic
 fatalism [@american-apocalyptic, p. 60].
 
-A second problem with catastrophic language is that it is conservative. Often,
-catastrophist narratives tacitly assume that everything was going well until The
-Catastrophe loomed its ugly head. The urgency of the crisis means that
+A second problem with catastrophic language is that it is conservative.
+For some rhetors, the urgency of the crisis means that
 established power structures must be supported to work at full throttle, and we
 certainly haven't got time to replace or radically transform them. But if, as
 many political analysts contend, green harms are in fact an inevitable
 consequence of business as usual, such narratives then obstruct the radical
 political critique which will be necessary for a lasting solution to green
-issues. For example, when a consortium of central banks commissioned a report
-on financing the global response to climate change, this is how that report
-opened:
-
-> Climate change is one of the most critical challenges facing humanity, with
-> far reaching consequences that threaten the well-being of people and the
-> planet. Current estimates for climate investment needs in \[emerging market
-> and developing economies\] are in the trillions, _with about 80-90 percent of
-> climate mitigation investments to be financed by the private sector as public
-> funding will be limited._ [@ngfs-dec-2023, p. 5, my emphasis]
-
-Where does this '80-90 percent' come from? The citation takes you to an IMF
-report on global financial stability. The relevant paragraph reads as follows:
+issues. For example, the International Monetary Fund recently reported:
 
 > Aligning capital flows on a low-carbon trajectory has become a critical policy
-> objective, including for financial stability, given that current renewable
-> energy investment and production fall grossly short of funding needed to meet
-> climate targets. A rapid acceleration of investment in low-carbon
-> energy infrastructure is needed, especially in emerging market and developing
-> economies. Private finance is key to achieving these objectives, while climate
-> and financial policies, such as a transition-oriented climate information
-> architecture, are complementary. The new Resilience and Sustainability Trust
-> can help eligible IMF members address longer-term structural challenges
-> generated by climate change. [@imf-apr-2023, p. 46]
-
-There is no mention of an '80 to 90 percent' figure. Doubtless, it is helpful as
-a rhetorical flourish to make the assertion seem more scientific that it really
-is: an ideological assumption that the neoliberal world order, in which
-governments are held hostage to markets, is permanent and inevitable. The figure
-of climate catastrophe functions here to attempt to foreclose radical
-imagination.
-
-So catastrophic language, apart from its fatalist tendencies, can shut down
-radical political discourses and thus discredit the best solutions to green
-problems before they've even been proposed. But perhaps the most vicious
-criticism of green catastrophism is that since green catastrophism reverberates
-strongly with 'Anthropocene' discourses, such rhetoric flattens out power
-relationships. This, say the critics, is the death of all genuine politics.
+> objective \[…\] Private finance is key to achieving these objectives, while
+> climate and financial policies, such as a transition-oriented climate
+> information architecture, are complementary. change. [@imf-apr-2023, p. 46]
+
+The IMF presumes that massive capital flows can only come from the private
+sector, ignoring the fact that historical economic transformations have been
+driven by command-and-control. Tacitly, the IMF assumes that the neoliberal
+order, in which governments are held hostage by markets, is permanent and
+inevitable. The figure of climate catastrophe functions here to attempt to
+foreclose radical imagination.
+
+But perhaps the most vicious criticism of green catastrophism is that since
+green catastrophism reverberates strongly with 'Anthropocene' discourses, such
+rhetoric flattens out power relationships. This, say the critics, is the 'death
+of politics.'
 
 Anthropocene discourse is catastrophic. The arrival of the Anthropocene means
 the end of the Holocene, defined as the time when the climate was hospitable to
 the growth of human civilization. The Anthropocene is thus inherently perceived
-as a threat to human survival. Climate change is conceived as a catastrophic
-consequence of greed driving human individuals to over-consume natural
-resources, especially fossil fuels. Critics, meanwhile, lambast such narratives,
+as a threat to human survival. Critics, meanwhile, lambast such narratives,
 accusing them of deploying threats of catastrophe to distract from the
 importance of economic structure in driving the climate crisis.
 
@@ -229,20 +206,13 @@ Andreas Malm and Alf Hornborg, to take one typical example, argue that the
 Anthropocene discourse of climate catastrophe emphasises the 'anthropos', the
 universal human subject, implying that social relations within the human species
 are relatively unimportant, and what matters is some universal, natural trait of
-the biological species, such as greed or the ability to make fire.
-
-> Climate change is _denaturalised_ in one moment – relocated from the sphere of
-> natural causes to that of human activities – only to be _renaturalised_ in the
-> next, when derived from an innate human trait, such as the ability to control
-> fire. Not nature, but human nature – this is the Anthropocene displacement. It
-> backs away from the vertiginous depth of what is perhaps the most
-> ground-breaking scientific discovery of our time, which tells us that human
-> beings have caused global warming over the course of their _history_.
-> [@malm-hornborg-2014, pp. 65-66]
+the biological species, such as greed or the ability to make fire. In reality,
+the climate catastrophe is not the result of a biological trait, but an historical
+process, and therefore an economic structure.
 
 In sum, green catastrophism is accused of encouraging a fatalist outlook,
-disarming radical discourses in favour of business as usual, and deeping harmful
-'post-politics' discourses by obscuring the importance of power relationships.
+disarming radical discourses in favour of business as usual, and deepening the
+'death of politics' by obscuring the importance of power relationships.
 In all these ways, catastrophic language in green rhetoric can work to actively
 de-motivate audiences to play their part in bringing about the green movement's
 desired outcomes.
diff --git a/chapter3.md b/chapter3.md
index 00d6f7a..5aad3c1 100644
--- a/chapter3.md
+++ b/chapter3.md
@@ -17,16 +17,16 @@ can also imply that human action is irrelevant, or encourage audiences to put
 their hope in 'savior figures such as inventors, scientists, or governments who
 might rescue humanity in the nick of time.' [@flannery-2024, pp. 209-210]
 
-Flannery's critique would imply that green rhetors ought to avoid apocalyptic
-language. This conclusion rests on two key premises: one, that apocalyptic
+Flannery's critique implies that green rhetors ought to avoid apocalyptic
+language. Her conclusion rests on two key premises: one, that apocalyptic
 language is catastrophic in the same way which leads to fatalism, conservatism
-and post-politics as described in the previous chapter; and two, that
+and the 'death of politics' as described in the previous chapter; and two, that
 catastrophe is the dominant effective symbol associated with apocalyptic
 language.
 
 In what remains of this chapter, I will argue that in the case of the Apocalypse
 of John, by far the dominant model of apocalyptic literature in the
-post-Christendom West, these criticisms do not cut. For John and his historical
+post-Christendom West, these criticisms do not bear weight. For John and his historical
 audience, John's visions of catastrophe were essential to his critique of the
 Roman Empire. In contrast to the accusations of fatalism, conservatism and
 death-of-politics levelled against contemporary green catastrophism, John's
@@ -93,13 +93,13 @@ resisting the imperial cult, makes sense of his catastrophic visions, such as
 the one of the two beasts in Rev 13. The second beast instructs people to
 worship an image of the first, and to receive a mark of the beast on their right
 hand or forehead. If they refuse to take the mark, they aren't able to buy or
-sell. The number of the beast is 666. The number 666 is most likely a reference
+sell. The number of the beast -- 666 -- is most likely a reference
 to the emperor Nero [@rowland-rev, p. 114], and the references to buying and
 selling suggest the difficulties a rich Christian might have had doing business
 unless they participated fully in the imperial cult [@roloff-rev, pp. 164-165].
 
-From this, it seems that the visions John relates are not, or at least not
-merely, about an impending catastrophe which he wants his audience to work to
+From this, it seems that the visions John relates are not
+about an impending catastrophe which he wants his audience to work to
 avoid, but about a catastrophe -- perhaps, as Leonard Thompson
 [@thompson-revelation, pp. 27-28] suggests, a catastrophe only visible as a
 catastrophe from John's apocalyptic perspective -- which is already unfolding,
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ servant of God's angel. The woman in Rev 12 is presented as having dominion over
 the sun, moon, and stars, and thus being superior to Artemis and Isis. Jesus
 himself appears with the brightness of the sun and the stars in his hand in Rev
 1, suggesting that he is in control of all the gods worshipped by Greeks.
-[@chaos-new-creation, p. 344] The big idea: Jesus, the Son of Yahweh, the
+The big idea: Jesus, the Son of Yahweh, the
 creator-God, is Lord, and when people reject him and his life-giving creative
 power, they tragically bring death and destruction on themselves and the world.
 
@@ -181,18 +181,17 @@ radical social movements – for better and for worse – continually throughout
 Christian history. The Gregorian reforms, the Lombards, the Hussites, the
 Lutherans, the Diggers, Columbus and the American 'Founding Fathers,' the
 French, American and Haitian Revolutions, the numerous evangelical revivals, the
-'spectre' of Communism, the rise of National Socialism, and today's
-environmental movement – all have been associated with apocalyptic forms of
-language.
+'spectre' of Communism, the rise of National Socialism, the civil rights
+movement, and today's environmental movement – all have been associated with
+apocalyptic forms of language.
 
 So if the catastrophism of John's Apocalypse is essential to the success of his
 rhetoric, how else does John use apocalyptic language to achieve his rhetorical
 goals? I will focus on three key features: revealed knowledge, tribulation
 discourse, and end-time speculation.
 
-One is the use of revealed knowledge. For biblical scholars, this, along with a
-concern with the end times, is a key feature of ancient apocalyptic literature
-[@semeia-14-intro]. The Apocalypse is John's account of a vision he experienced.
+One is the use of revealed knowledge.
+The Apocalypse is John's account of a vision he experienced.
 At first, he sees Jesus, who dictates an address to the seven churches in Asia,
 and after this, an angel shows him a series of visions of 'things which must be
 hereafter' (Rev 4:1). This literary structure follows the model of works such as
@@ -200,7 +199,7 @@ hereafter' (Rev 4:1). This literary structure follows the model of works such as
 Christian works, which likewise contain fantastic visions related via a heavenly
 intermediary. Modern biblical scholars mostly agree that this is a key marker of
 an ancient literary genre, which, incidentally, they label 'apocalypse'
-[@apocalyptic-imagination, chp. 1].
+[@semeia-14-intro; @apocalyptic-imagination, chp. 1].
 
 Why might John have used this genre? While it is perfectly plausible that John
 had a genuine visionary experience [@visions-in-apocalyptic-handbook, pp.
@@ -216,41 +215,39 @@ Early Christian communities led distinctive lives on the basis of exclusive
 sources of knowledge: apostolic authority, prophecy, eyewitness testimony,
 interpretation of tongues, innovative interpretations of ancient Hebrew
 Scriptures. Meanwhile, mainstream Greek society had its own authorities. When
-the two came into conflict, Christians would have found themselves wedged
-between the pull of their community and the overwhelming weight of majority
-epistemic norms. As a result, early Christians would have needed to develop
-defensive strategies if their minority cognition were to survive.
+the two came into conflict, Christians would have found the overwhelming might
+of majority epistemic norms tearing them from their roots in their minority
+community. As a result, early Christians would have needed to develop defensive
+strategies if their minority cognition were to survive.
 
 By adopting the form of an apocalyptic prophecy, and, no less, an apocalypse of
-Jesus Christ, John claims authority beyond any mainstream Greek authority. In
-the course of his apocalypse, he also subtly undermines majority epistemology.
-As already explored, he mocks top Greek gods such as Apollo and Artemis. He also
-highlights the material benefits on offer for the rich to collude with Babylon
-(Rev 18), and highlights the power of Satan to 'deceive' the nations (Rev 20:7).
-The cognitive majority might want to dismiss John as a crackpot. But John can
-defend himself: they have an interest in lies, their gods are lies, and they
-listen to the Devil's lies. Thus, the apocalyptic motif of revealed knowledge
-helps John's rhetoric to convince his audience.
-
-A second apocalyptic motif in John's Apocalypse is the theme of tribulations.
+Jesus Christ, John claims authority no Greek authority can challenge (for a
+member of the Christian minority). In the course of his apocalypse, he also
+subtly undermines majority epistemology. As already explored, he mocks top Greek
+gods such as Apollo and Artemis. He also highlights the material benefits on
+offer for the rich to collude with Babylon (Rev 18), and highlights the power of
+Satan to 'deceive' the nations (Rev 20:7). Thus, the apocalyptic motif of
+revealed knowledge helps John's rhetoric to convince his audience.
+
+A second apocalyptic motif in John's Apocalypse is the motif of tribulations.
 Humans, and in particular the saints, experience suffering in John's visions,
 but this suffering is not meaningless: it is a test of endurance. Those who
 endure, triumph. A crucial part of how this works is what Thompson calls
 'nesting contexts,' whereby John 'nests' his audiences' local contexts in Asian
 churches inside a bigger, cosmic context [@thompson-revelation, pp. 5-6]. Their
 suffering at the hands of local elites is part of a wider resistance against an
-idolatrous imperial cult, and that in turn is just the human face of an
+idolatrous imperial cult, and that in turn is just the visible surface layer of an
 eschatological battle between Jesus and Satan. John's call for his audience to
-persevere is made more compelling if he can convince his audience that their
+persevere is made more compelling by working to convince his audience that their
 struggles are part of a much bigger fight, and one that, because they're on
 God's side, they cannot lose, even if they suffer death along with the 'Lamb who
 was slain.'
 
 Thirdly, like most ancient apocalypses, John's vision explores the end times,
 and this feature also works to strengthen his rhetoric. If the tribulations are
-to be worth enduring, his audience need to know what it's all for. Thus John
-concludes his account of his vision with a utopia in Rev 21-22.
+to be worth enduring, his audience need to know what it's all for.
 
+For this reason, John concludes his account of his vision with a utopia in Rev 21-22.
 The New Jerusalem descends from heaven (21:2). It has twelve gates, one for each
 tribe of Israel (21:12), signifying that it is a place for all God's people. The
 sun and moon, those gods so cherished by the Greeks, are redundant, as are all
@@ -285,10 +282,11 @@ tribulations.
 
 In summary, the apocalyptic form is crucial to the rhetorical force of John's
 Apocalypse. The catastrophic aspects of his vision work against, not for,
-fatalism, conservatism, and post-politics. By adopting the form of an
+fatalism, conservatism, and the 'death of politics.' By adopting the form of an
 apocalyptic prophecy, he defends his cognitive minority community from the
 overwhelming weight of the cognitive majority which surrounds them. Through
 exploring the symbol of tribulations, John steels his audience for suffering,
-and reassures those who are already suffering that their troubles are part of a
-cosmic context. And with his treatment of the end times, John inspires his
-audience with hope that their sufferings will not be wasted.
+and reassures those who are already suffering that their local troubles are part
+of a much bigger cosmic context. And with his treatment of the end times, John
+inspires his audience with hope -- unscientific, but in its own way realistic --
+that their sufferings will not be wasted.
diff --git a/chapter4.md b/chapter4.md
index dd06553..434344d 100644
--- a/chapter4.md
+++ b/chapter4.md
@@ -56,20 +56,21 @@ science to defend their profits [@hulac-jul-2016]. They have also used the same
 strategies, including manufacturing scientific controversy, 'information
 laundering' through think-tanks, and providing financial support to scientists
 who promote views in line with their interests [@smoke-mirrors-hot-air]. Fossil
-fuel companies have used balancing norms in journalism and American values of
-fairness to demand an equal public hearing for climate sceptics over their
-opponents, creating a public impression that the experts are divided
-[@leah-2011, pp. 204-208]. Fossil fuel companies have obscured their involvement
-in their own strategies by funneling their money through legal vehicles called
-'donor foundations,' which give their money to think-tanks on their behalf while
+fuel companies have used balancing norms in journalism to demand an equal public
+hearing for climate sceptics over their opponents, creating a public impression
+that the experts are divided on the reality of human-caused climate change or
+the urgency of the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions [@leah-2011, pp.
+204-208]. Fossil fuel companies have obscured their involvement in their own
+strategies by funneling their money through legal vehicles called 'donor
+foundations,' which give their money to think-tanks on their behalf while
 protecting their anonymity [@brulle-2014]. When climate sceptics don't leave a
 paper trail tracing their money back to the fossil fuel companies who benefit
 from the promotion of their views, they are much harder to refute, particularly
-in cultures like the US which place a high value on the freedom of speech.
+in cultures like the UK and US which place a high value on the freedom of speech.
 
 Therefore, as long as the fossil fuel industry has significant power, the
 majority epistemology of our society cannot help but be partially shaped by
-fossil fuel interests. To escape fossil knowledge requires minority cognition.
+fossil fuel interests. To escape fossil-think requires minority cognition.
 
 This has precedents even within the green movement. In the view of Linda Lear,
 the effect of _Silent Spring_, Rachel Carson's damning exposé on the chemical
@@ -83,23 +84,20 @@ an aggressive publicity campaign against her. She was attacked for being
 'emotional' and an 'hysterical woman.' The fact she had published novels was
 cited as evidence that she couldn't be a real scientist, and her literary
 writing style as evidence that what she was writing couldn't be real science.
-Real science, the chemical industry hastened to remind the impressionable
-public, is necessarily presented in the format of laboratory reports, maximising
-their utilisation of technical jargon in order to prevent the comprehension of
-their contents by under-qualified persons. Carson had no PhD, no academic
-institution, and no network of scientific colleagues to back her up.
-[@silent-spring, pp. 122-124]
-
-To fight the chemical lobby, Carson had to adopt minority epistemology. So,
-alongside her considerable arsenal of traditional scientific facts, she
-included in her book historical facts based on lived experience, with no
-attempt to fit them into clearly-defined quantifiable metrics, in the
-scientific style favoured by the chemical industry. One memorable example was
-her report that parathion poisoning had been known to induce serious illness
-not only in those exposed directly, but also to the physicians who treated
-them, and even the hospital staff who washed their clothes. [@silent-spring, p. 27]
-
-Like John, she was also forced to undermine the chemical industry's majority
+Carson had no PhD, no academic institution, and no network of scientific
+colleagues to back her up. [@silent-spring, pp. 122-124]
+
+To fight the chemical industry, Carson had to adopt minority epistemology. So,
+alongside her considerable arsenal of traditional scientific facts, she included
+in her book historical facts based on lived experience, with no attempt to fit
+them into clearly-defined quantifiable metrics in the scientific style favoured
+by the chemical industry. One unforgettable example was her report of a
+parathion poisoning incident. First, agricultural workers who had sprayed
+parathion on crops fell sick. After that, the physicians who treated them fell
+sick too. Finally, the same illness struck the hospital staff who had washed the
+patients' clothes. [@silent-spring, p. 27]
+
+Like John, Carson was also forced to undermine the chemical industry's majority
 epistemology. In _Silent Spring_, she showed how the chemical industry funded
 the same science which enabled its profits. She undermined their conceptual
 frameworks, arguing that the use of words like 'pesticide' and 'insecticide'
@@ -131,16 +129,16 @@ If green rhetors today want to persuade their audiences,
 they're going to have to fight the majority epistemology, held firmly in place
 by fossil interests. To do that, they'll need to exploit minority cognition,
 undermining the epistemologies that best serve fossil interests and finding
-alternatives that oppose them.
+alternatives which oppose them.
 
 The second feature of John's rhetoric I considered was the theme of
 tribulations. Just as John's audience stood to lose out if they resisted the
 imperial cult, UK citizens stand to lose out, in time, money, and friends, if
-they take political action for a Green New Deal. If audiences are to understand
+they take political action for a greener future. If audiences are to understand
 how such a sacrifice could be good for them, they will need to see that their
 sacrifices are not meaningless, but part of a much larger context. Ann Pettifor,
-in her book arguing for her version of a Green New Deal, shows this rhetoric in
-action:
+in her book arguing for her version of a Green New Deal, shows this green
+tribulation rhetoric in action:
 
 > For change to happen, both courage and leadership will be essential. As I
 > write this, the people of Hong Kong have assembled in their millions to
@@ -203,11 +201,12 @@ self-branded eco-socialist scholar and activist, Max Ajl:
 Ajl, as with many other Green New Deal activists, recognises that having and
 sharing the right utopian vision plays an essential role in bringing about
 transformative political change. While acknowledging that real political change
-involves defeats and compromises as well as victories, he lambasts
-social-democratic political programmes on the grounds that they give up the
-fight for a better world before the battle has even begun: 'if one is building a
-struggle that accepts a compromised horizon, one is not going to reach a further
-horizon' [@ajl-gnd, p. 95]. Or, as utopia scholar Lisa Garforth puts it:
+involves defeats and compromises as well as victories, he lambasts what he sees
+as underly-ambitious political programmes on the grounds that, in the pursuit of
+'realism,' they give up the fight for a better world before the battle has even
+begun: 'if one is building a struggle that accepts a compromised horizon, one is
+not going to reach a further horizon' [@ajl-gnd, p. 95]. Or, as utopia scholar
+Lisa Garforth puts it:
 
 > The hopeful but shallow utopianism in popular environmentalism and global
 > policy-making can be compared with radical ecopolitical visions and similarly
diff --git a/chapter5.md b/chapter5.md
index ce14a90..20fecfc 100644
--- a/chapter5.md
+++ b/chapter5.md
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ audience to carry it out: I am happy to confess my guilt in the same sin. I have
 also not given nearly as much attention to people who hold millenialist
 worldviews as I would have liked, and they deserve.
 
-What I do claim, is that, in defiance of the many critics of apocalypticism, and
+What I do claim, is that, contra the many critics of apocalypticism, and
 despite the fact that apocalypticism, like all good things, can and is twisted
 to evil ends, green rhetors must draw on John's apocalyptic rhetorical strategies.