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diff --git a/website/src/content/blog/2025-05-04.md b/website/src/content/blog/2025-05-04.md deleted file mode 100644 index e7f024c..0000000 --- a/website/src/content/blog/2025-05-04.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,201 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: Does resurrection doctrine give us unique reasons to work for justice? -description: >- - Tom Wright claims that the only Christian grounds for striving for justice now - is in resurrection doctrine. I'm not convinced. -pubDate: 2025-05-04 ---- - -I've been reading Tom Wright's _Surprised By Hope_, defending his orthodox view -on resurrection. One of his key claims is that only by accepting the orthodox -position on resurrection can Christians justify striving for justice on earth. - -To argue this, he needs to first show that resurrection doctrine does justify -striving for justice on earth, and secondly that the available alternatives fail -to do so. Firstly, the positive argument. - -## Does resurrection give us reasons to work for justice? - -Wright's argument depends on his view on what God's ultimate future will look -like: the present creation will not be abandoned, destroyed, or replaced, but -physically transformed into the new creation. - -He argues that our work now has value, because, at the time when God transforms -the old world into the new, he will incorporate the outcomes of our good works -into the new creation, like an architect incorporating the works of many -stonemasons into a great cathedral. - -He argues this on the basis of 1 Cor 15. I found it a struggle to find a good -justification for Wright's view in chapter 15 alone, but I did find some crucial -context in chapter 3, just before he begins the first of his many exhortations -to the Corinthians. It would be best to read the whole chapter, but here is -verses 11-15: - -> For no one can lay any foundation other than the one already laid, which is -> Jesus Christ. If anyone builds on this foundation using gold, silver, costly -> stones, wood, hay or straw, their work will be shown for what it is, because -> the Day will bring it to light. It will be revealed with fire, and the fire -> will test the quality of each person’s work. If what has been built survives, -> the builder will receive a reward. If it is burned up, the builder will suffer -> loss but yet will be saved—even though only as one escaping through the -> flames. - -This at least implies that the outcome of all our work will persist at least -until the time of judgement, when it will undergo testing, and those that pass -the test will enjoy a reward. You could read this as being like a quality check, -with God dishing out benefits to those that pass his assessment. But you could -read it in another way, more favourable to Wright. The works will be proven, and -the ones that withstand the process will themselves generate a benefit. You -could think of it like baking: when you put a cake in the oven, you prove -whether or not you got the recipe right; if not, it goes in the bin, and if you -did get it right, you get to enjoy the cake. So I agree that 1 Cor provides a -reason to think that the outcome of our works will somehow persist until the -time of judgement. - -However, Wright doesn't just think that our works will persist until the time of -judgement, he also believes that they will at that time be transformed and then -incorporated into the new creation. 1 Cor doesn't directly justify this view. It -is, at least, coherent. Baking a cake in the oven transforms the dough. - -So it seems reasonable to me to use 1 Cor to justify Wright's view that our -works will be transformed into the new Creation. However, that's before -considering any counter-arguments, and I have two which concern me. - -One is that, as Ecclesiastes points out, the profits of our work will be laid to -waste by time. We don't know when God is going to bring about the new creation. -It could be tomorrow, and we should be behaving today in light of that -possibility - but of all the available possibilities, most of them are in the -distant future, so we should expect on average that there will be a long -interval between my deeds today and the judgement of them. Since time lays waste -to all our endeavours, we should expect that the profits of our work will have -vanished long before the judgement. Therefore, it would be unreasonable to work -for justice in the hope that our work will persist until the time of judgement -in order to be incorporated into the new creation, as Wright argues we should -do. - -This first problem is probably the most important, but it's vulnerable to some -counter-arguments, which rather miss the point. So I'm going to move on to my -second problem, which is more niche, but which I think holds stronger against -counter-arguments. - -In 1845, the HMS Erebus and HMS Terror left Britain on an expedition to explore -the Northwest Passage. In July 1845, they were spotted by whalers in Baffin Bay. -None of the sailors were ever seen alive again by Europeans. Both ships became -locked into ice in September 1846, and probably never sailed again. In April -1848, the remaining crew began a desperate 250-mile march to the nearest -European outpost. It is almost certain that all of them died. - -Now, suppose that one of those sailors, between 1846 and 1848, did something -good. Maybe a major act of heroism, or maybe a small, kind word. I think it's -reasonable to suppose that someone, at some time, did something good. - -All the profits of that good act have now completely perished. They are not -recorded in the small records the sailors left behind. None of the sailors who -benefited lived to pass on the benefits. None survived to pass on the light of -justice to the next generation. - -At the time of judgement, then, there will be no remnant of this good act for -God to test, transform and incorporate into his new creation. - -Does this mean that the good act was wasted? Was it only worth a shot just in -case, despite all the odds, the sailors made it home again? - -I think this is a cruel conclusion: but it seems to be where Wright must go. - -If it is implausible that the profits of all our good works will make it through -to the time of judgement, then we have to accept that 1 Cor 3 is true only in -some metaphorical sense, not that our works will literally persist in order to -be tested. And if that is true, then the premise of Wright's argument is false: -our work will not necessarily be incorporated into the new creation, so that -cannot generate reasons for working for justice now. - -I am not convinced by Wright's positive argument. I would like to consider -alternative interpretations of 1 Cor. This is what Wright goes on to do. - -## Do alternative views give us reason to work for justice? - -The first view which Wright considers is the gnostic view that resurrection is -just an afterlife in heaven. He argues that this does not generate reasons for -working for justice now, but his argument is really the converse of the argument -in favour of his own view, which I've already considered above, so I'll move on. - -The other alternative Wright considers is what he calls 'evolutionary optimism'. -You might also call this 'progressivism'. By this he means the view that the new -creation will be made the Church gradually building upon its own works, -generation after generation, approaching and eventually achieving God's perfect -standard by its works. This is the Victorian optimism which is still a powerful -force in our politics: that history is building upon itself, and progressing -from barbarism to civilisation, from brutishness to beauty, from tragedy to -justice. - -He argues that this view, too, does not give us reasons to work for justice now. -His argument is intriguing: if our work for justice is condemned to only ever be -partially successful, then we have no reason to do it. In fact, contra the -evolutionary optimist, no amount of hard work on our part will ever achieve -perfect justice, and therefore if bringing in the new creation is all about our -works, we have no reason to strive for justice. - -I'm intrigued by the premise that if we know that our work will at best be -partially successful, then we have no reason to do it. - -This isn't how we ordinarily think: typically, if I think attempting to go to -the gym twice a week is going to be partially successful, I would say that this -generates a reason for me to go to the gym. - -But I sense there may be an interesting meta-ethical thesis here: perhaps what -we ordinarily call 'partial success' is in fact a mistake, papering over what is -in fact simply a failure. - -There's an obvious error theory: we had to create the concept of the 'partial -success' in order to generate reasons in the world as it appears, the world as -described in Ecclesiastes as 'vanity', where the best-laid plans of mice and men -gang aft agley, and all our works crumble into the dust eventually. In order to -think we had reasons at all, we needed to invent the concept of the 'partial -success'. - -But is there a good argument for the view that there is no such thing as a -partial success? - -In 1915, the HMS Endurance, under the command of Captain Ernest Shackleton, -became stuck fast in Antarctic pack ice in the Weddell Sea. In the face of -extraordinary challenges, Shackleton vowed to bring all his sailors back to the -UK alive: and in one of the most famous exploits of Antarctic exploration, he -succeeded. - -It would have been wrong, had Shackleton vowed only to bring back _most_ of his -sailors. We know that he would have been able to bring _all_ of them back, -because he in fact did so. To strive for less would have been negligent. - -This is to illustrate a general principle: we ought to strive for the best that -we are able. - -Grant that necessarily, no particular justice is inevitable. It follows that -necessarily, it is possible to prevent all injustice. Therefore, perfect justice -is achievable. - -And yet we _know_ that we will not achieve perfect justice. It's way too hard. - -It does seem that I've proven a contradiction: both that perfect justice is -possible and that it is impossible. I expect these are two different kinds of -modality. I'm not too bothered to carefully distinguish them, as long we agree -that these two things can both be true in some sense. By analogy, consider that, -if you can run a mile in so many seconds, you can run it in a second less; that, -by sorites, it follows that you can run a mile in a minute; and that you -obviously cannot run a mile in a minute: it is too hard. Perfect justice is -perhaps a little like this: it is achievable in the sense that it is physically -possible for us to achieve it, but unachievable in the sense that it's way too -hard. - -So, since perfect justice is in some sense achievable, it follows that we ought -to strive for it. But since we know we will not achieve perfect justice, it -follows that we cannot have a reason to strive for it: we cannot genuinely -strive for what we know we cannot do. Therefore, if you reject that God will -work to transform our world of vanity into something fundamentally different -where perfect justice is not only genuinely achievable but actually realised, -then you will be stuck in this hopeless tension, where you both must bring about -perfect justice, and have no reason to do it, because you have no hope of -success. - -Where from here? I would really like to find alternative interpretations of 1 Cor, -and weigh them up against Wright's interpretation. It may be that, whatever the -counter-arguments, Wright's view is the strongest available. It may not. |