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diff --git a/website/src/content/blog/2025/05/04/does_resurrection_ground_works.md b/website/src/content/blog/2025/05/04/does_resurrection_ground_works.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e7f024c --- /dev/null +++ b/website/src/content/blog/2025/05/04/does_resurrection_ground_works.md @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +--- +title: Does resurrection doctrine give us unique reasons to work for justice? +description: >- + Tom Wright claims that the only Christian grounds for striving for justice now + is in resurrection doctrine. I'm not convinced. +pubDate: 2025-05-04 +--- + +I've been reading Tom Wright's _Surprised By Hope_, defending his orthodox view +on resurrection. One of his key claims is that only by accepting the orthodox +position on resurrection can Christians justify striving for justice on earth. + +To argue this, he needs to first show that resurrection doctrine does justify +striving for justice on earth, and secondly that the available alternatives fail +to do so. Firstly, the positive argument. + +## Does resurrection give us reasons to work for justice? + +Wright's argument depends on his view on what God's ultimate future will look +like: the present creation will not be abandoned, destroyed, or replaced, but +physically transformed into the new creation. + +He argues that our work now has value, because, at the time when God transforms +the old world into the new, he will incorporate the outcomes of our good works +into the new creation, like an architect incorporating the works of many +stonemasons into a great cathedral. + +He argues this on the basis of 1 Cor 15. I found it a struggle to find a good +justification for Wright's view in chapter 15 alone, but I did find some crucial +context in chapter 3, just before he begins the first of his many exhortations +to the Corinthians. It would be best to read the whole chapter, but here is +verses 11-15: + +> For no one can lay any foundation other than the one already laid, which is +> Jesus Christ. If anyone builds on this foundation using gold, silver, costly +> stones, wood, hay or straw, their work will be shown for what it is, because +> the Day will bring it to light. It will be revealed with fire, and the fire +> will test the quality of each person’s work. If what has been built survives, +> the builder will receive a reward. If it is burned up, the builder will suffer +> loss but yet will be saved—even though only as one escaping through the +> flames. + +This at least implies that the outcome of all our work will persist at least +until the time of judgement, when it will undergo testing, and those that pass +the test will enjoy a reward. You could read this as being like a quality check, +with God dishing out benefits to those that pass his assessment. But you could +read it in another way, more favourable to Wright. The works will be proven, and +the ones that withstand the process will themselves generate a benefit. You +could think of it like baking: when you put a cake in the oven, you prove +whether or not you got the recipe right; if not, it goes in the bin, and if you +did get it right, you get to enjoy the cake. So I agree that 1 Cor provides a +reason to think that the outcome of our works will somehow persist until the +time of judgement. + +However, Wright doesn't just think that our works will persist until the time of +judgement, he also believes that they will at that time be transformed and then +incorporated into the new creation. 1 Cor doesn't directly justify this view. It +is, at least, coherent. Baking a cake in the oven transforms the dough. + +So it seems reasonable to me to use 1 Cor to justify Wright's view that our +works will be transformed into the new Creation. However, that's before +considering any counter-arguments, and I have two which concern me. + +One is that, as Ecclesiastes points out, the profits of our work will be laid to +waste by time. We don't know when God is going to bring about the new creation. +It could be tomorrow, and we should be behaving today in light of that +possibility - but of all the available possibilities, most of them are in the +distant future, so we should expect on average that there will be a long +interval between my deeds today and the judgement of them. Since time lays waste +to all our endeavours, we should expect that the profits of our work will have +vanished long before the judgement. Therefore, it would be unreasonable to work +for justice in the hope that our work will persist until the time of judgement +in order to be incorporated into the new creation, as Wright argues we should +do. + +This first problem is probably the most important, but it's vulnerable to some +counter-arguments, which rather miss the point. So I'm going to move on to my +second problem, which is more niche, but which I think holds stronger against +counter-arguments. + +In 1845, the HMS Erebus and HMS Terror left Britain on an expedition to explore +the Northwest Passage. In July 1845, they were spotted by whalers in Baffin Bay. +None of the sailors were ever seen alive again by Europeans. Both ships became +locked into ice in September 1846, and probably never sailed again. In April +1848, the remaining crew began a desperate 250-mile march to the nearest +European outpost. It is almost certain that all of them died. + +Now, suppose that one of those sailors, between 1846 and 1848, did something +good. Maybe a major act of heroism, or maybe a small, kind word. I think it's +reasonable to suppose that someone, at some time, did something good. + +All the profits of that good act have now completely perished. They are not +recorded in the small records the sailors left behind. None of the sailors who +benefited lived to pass on the benefits. None survived to pass on the light of +justice to the next generation. + +At the time of judgement, then, there will be no remnant of this good act for +God to test, transform and incorporate into his new creation. + +Does this mean that the good act was wasted? Was it only worth a shot just in +case, despite all the odds, the sailors made it home again? + +I think this is a cruel conclusion: but it seems to be where Wright must go. + +If it is implausible that the profits of all our good works will make it through +to the time of judgement, then we have to accept that 1 Cor 3 is true only in +some metaphorical sense, not that our works will literally persist in order to +be tested. And if that is true, then the premise of Wright's argument is false: +our work will not necessarily be incorporated into the new creation, so that +cannot generate reasons for working for justice now. + +I am not convinced by Wright's positive argument. I would like to consider +alternative interpretations of 1 Cor. This is what Wright goes on to do. + +## Do alternative views give us reason to work for justice? + +The first view which Wright considers is the gnostic view that resurrection is +just an afterlife in heaven. He argues that this does not generate reasons for +working for justice now, but his argument is really the converse of the argument +in favour of his own view, which I've already considered above, so I'll move on. + +The other alternative Wright considers is what he calls 'evolutionary optimism'. +You might also call this 'progressivism'. By this he means the view that the new +creation will be made the Church gradually building upon its own works, +generation after generation, approaching and eventually achieving God's perfect +standard by its works. This is the Victorian optimism which is still a powerful +force in our politics: that history is building upon itself, and progressing +from barbarism to civilisation, from brutishness to beauty, from tragedy to +justice. + +He argues that this view, too, does not give us reasons to work for justice now. +His argument is intriguing: if our work for justice is condemned to only ever be +partially successful, then we have no reason to do it. In fact, contra the +evolutionary optimist, no amount of hard work on our part will ever achieve +perfect justice, and therefore if bringing in the new creation is all about our +works, we have no reason to strive for justice. + +I'm intrigued by the premise that if we know that our work will at best be +partially successful, then we have no reason to do it. + +This isn't how we ordinarily think: typically, if I think attempting to go to +the gym twice a week is going to be partially successful, I would say that this +generates a reason for me to go to the gym. + +But I sense there may be an interesting meta-ethical thesis here: perhaps what +we ordinarily call 'partial success' is in fact a mistake, papering over what is +in fact simply a failure. + +There's an obvious error theory: we had to create the concept of the 'partial +success' in order to generate reasons in the world as it appears, the world as +described in Ecclesiastes as 'vanity', where the best-laid plans of mice and men +gang aft agley, and all our works crumble into the dust eventually. In order to +think we had reasons at all, we needed to invent the concept of the 'partial +success'. + +But is there a good argument for the view that there is no such thing as a +partial success? + +In 1915, the HMS Endurance, under the command of Captain Ernest Shackleton, +became stuck fast in Antarctic pack ice in the Weddell Sea. In the face of +extraordinary challenges, Shackleton vowed to bring all his sailors back to the +UK alive: and in one of the most famous exploits of Antarctic exploration, he +succeeded. + +It would have been wrong, had Shackleton vowed only to bring back _most_ of his +sailors. We know that he would have been able to bring _all_ of them back, +because he in fact did so. To strive for less would have been negligent. + +This is to illustrate a general principle: we ought to strive for the best that +we are able. + +Grant that necessarily, no particular justice is inevitable. It follows that +necessarily, it is possible to prevent all injustice. Therefore, perfect justice +is achievable. + +And yet we _know_ that we will not achieve perfect justice. It's way too hard. + +It does seem that I've proven a contradiction: both that perfect justice is +possible and that it is impossible. I expect these are two different kinds of +modality. I'm not too bothered to carefully distinguish them, as long we agree +that these two things can both be true in some sense. By analogy, consider that, +if you can run a mile in so many seconds, you can run it in a second less; that, +by sorites, it follows that you can run a mile in a minute; and that you +obviously cannot run a mile in a minute: it is too hard. Perfect justice is +perhaps a little like this: it is achievable in the sense that it is physically +possible for us to achieve it, but unachievable in the sense that it's way too +hard. + +So, since perfect justice is in some sense achievable, it follows that we ought +to strive for it. But since we know we will not achieve perfect justice, it +follows that we cannot have a reason to strive for it: we cannot genuinely +strive for what we know we cannot do. Therefore, if you reject that God will +work to transform our world of vanity into something fundamentally different +where perfect justice is not only genuinely achievable but actually realised, +then you will be stuck in this hopeless tension, where you both must bring about +perfect justice, and have no reason to do it, because you have no hope of +success. + +Where from here? I would really like to find alternative interpretations of 1 Cor, +and weigh them up against Wright's interpretation. It may be that, whatever the +counter-arguments, Wright's view is the strongest available. It may not. |